

# **Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan**

Report to Congress in accordance with section 1230 of the  
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008  
(Public Law 110-181), as amended

**and**

# **United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces**

Report to Congress in accordance with section 1231 of the  
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008  
(Public Law 110-181)

April 2010

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## **PART ONE: Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan**

### **Executive Summary**

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*This report to Congress is submitted consistent with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. It includes a description of the comprehensive strategy of the United States for security and stability in Afghanistan. This report is the fifth in a series of reports required every 180 days through fiscal year 2010 and has been prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the Secretary of the Treasury. This assessment complements other reports and information about Afghanistan provided to the Congress; however, it is not intended as a single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its international partners, or Afghanistan. The information contained in this report is current as of March 31, 2010.*

**NOTE: This is a historical document that covers progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan from October 1, 2009 to March 31, 2010. The next report will include an analysis of progress toward security and stability from April 1, 2010 to September 30, 2010.**

The attached report is an update on progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan from October 2009 through March 2010. Events during this period centered around President Obama's December 1, 2009 speech on the way forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The President reiterated the United States Government's goal of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Our strategy moving forward is to achieve our objectives through three core elements: a military effort to create the conditions for a transition, a civilian surge that reinforces positive action, and an effective partnership with Pakistan.

The continuing decline in stability in Afghanistan, described in the last report, has leveled off in many areas over the last three months of this reporting period. While the overall trend of violence throughout the country increased over the same period a year ago, much of this can be ascribed to increased International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) activity. Polls consistently illustrate that Afghans see security as improved from a year ago. At the same time violence is sharply above the seasonal average for the previous year – an 87% increase from February 2009 to March 2010.

In his December speech, in response to the deteriorating situation, the President announced the deployment of an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan and requested additional contributions from the international community. Consistent with the President's policy, an increase of U.S. civilian resources was already underway. On March 31, 2010 there were approximately 87,000 U.S. forces and approximately 46,500 international forces in Afghanistan. Additional U.S. forces are on schedule to arrive in Afghanistan on time to meet mission requirements, with force levels expected to approach 98,000 by August 2010. As of March 31,

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approximately 113,000 Afghan National Army (ANA) and 102,000 Afghan National Police (ANP) have been fielded. The Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) are broadly on track to meet targeted growth figures of 134,000 ANA and 109,000 ANP by October 2010 and 171,600 ANA and 134,000 ANP by October 2011.

International force levels continue to grow at an approximately proportional rate to the U.S. force increase. Currently, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has accepted force increase offers from 38 countries with multiple capabilities for operations, tactics, and training. Offers totaling approximately 9,000 troops have been received from NATO and non-NATO partners since the President's December speech. As of March 2010, approximately 40% of the offered increases of international partner troops have arrived in country.

U.S. forces, deployed in conjunction with international forces, operate under a strategic framework based in large part on U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine, focused on population security, while also conducting counterterror operations. This strategy focuses on protecting the population while simultaneously partnering with the ANSF in order to build ANSF capability and eventually transition lead for the security mission to the Afghans, a goal shared by the Afghan Government. A key part of establishing the environment for transition is implementing full partnering between Afghan and international forces. In his November 19 inauguration speech, President Karzai stated a goal of having the ANSF make a full transition to Afghan security lead within three to five years.

NATO Allies and partners have noted that they are cautiously optimistic about the success of the ISAF mission. Many national leaders, however, express concerns over popular support within their countries, which has resulted in continued capability gaps in the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) from unresourced requirements not filled by international partners. The most notable gap is the requirement for trainers and mentors to support development of the ANSF. U.S. Forces are taking on this mission, filling the requirements for training and partnering through a combination of embedded partnering of operational units, Embedded Training Teams (ETTs), and re-missioning of combat forces to conduct training.

In terms of operational execution of the ISAF population-centric COIN campaign, combined ISAF and Afghan Government planning teams identified 80 districts as key terrain. In general, key terrain – defined in military terms as those areas that afford a marked advantage to whichever party controls them – are those districts where the bulk of the population is concentrated, and that contain centers of economic productivity, key infrastructure, and key commerce routes connecting such areas to each other and to the outside world. These districts roughly follow the line of the three major highways in Afghanistan through the most densely populated portions of the country.

Supplementing the 80 Key Terrain districts are an additional 41 Area of Interest districts. In general, these are districts that, for a variety of reasons, exert influence on Key Terrain districts to a degree that renders it necessary to focus information collection and operational resources upon them to support operations in the Key Terrain districts.



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The focus of the campaign on these 121 districts does not imply that what happens in the rest of the country is unimportant, but it does indicate that the emphasis of ISAF operations is concentrated in those areas that have been identified by combined Afghan and ISAF planning efforts as the most critical to success. The ISAF Joint Command (IJC) assessed that, out of the 121 districts, it had the resources to conduct operations in 48 focus districts (comprised of 45 Key Terrain districts and three Area of Interest districts). Operational assessments necessarily focus upon these areas. Conditions in these districts are assessed by means of bottom-up reporting from Regional Commanders to the Commander, ISAF Joint Command (COMIJC).

Operationally, ISAF, in coordination with the Afghan Government, has commenced conduct of clear, hold, build, sustain, and transition operations throughout Afghanistan as part of an 18-month civil-military campaign plan. Active ANSF and Afghan ministry leadership supports the ongoing Operation MOSHTARAK in central Helmand Province. Combined ISAF, ANSF, and Afghan and international civilians continue to make progress in Marjah. Consolidating gains and continuing to deny the Taliban the ability to re-establish a foothold will be the focus for continued operations. These events collectively demonstrate the increasing proficiency of the ANSF and increased engagement by the Afghan Government.

In order to execute military operations more effectively, the Commander, International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF) continued to refine his strategy by promulgating three new operational directives in addition to the *Tactical Directive*, *Partnering Directive*, *COIN Guidance*, and the *Driving Directive* issued during the last reporting period. During this period, Commander, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) transferred operational control of all U.S. Forces (less some notional elements) to General McChrystal as Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, and virtually all U.S. Forces have been put under NATO operational command as well. Enabled by this, COMISAF continued to institute changes to the command and control structure in Afghanistan in order to create unity of command for all operations and foster unity of effort among the many international partners and organizations in Afghanistan. He has not only instituted organizational changes internal to Afghanistan operations but has also directed his efforts to fostering greater military coordination and cooperation among ISAF, Afghanistan, and Pakistan with the creation of the Tripartite Joint Intelligence Operation Center (T-JIOC), situated in Headquarters, ISAF and manned by ISAF, Afghan, and Pakistani forces. The T-JIOC oversees all border incidents.

In the planning and execution of all operations, COMISAF's first priority is to protect the Afghan population, and in this regard, the population is telling us the trends are positive. From July to November, there was a 50% increase in the proportion of Afghans that saw security improve. Even with the rise in violent events against ANSF and ISAF forces and the civilian population considering the dispute over the August elections, the populated areas saw more improvements than declines. When asked who brings improvements to their area, the population sees the Afghan Government as the source of those improvements. The Afghan population also sees the improvements in the ANSF in Regional Command-East (RC-East), with 91% agreeing that national security forces work for a better Afghanistan.

The overall assessment indicates that the population sympathizes with or supports the Afghan Government in 24% (29 of 121) of all Key Terrain and Area of Interest districts. The

establishment of effective governance is a critical enabler for improving development and security. As the operational plan progresses, ISAF is working closely with the Government of Afghanistan and the international community to coordinate and synchronize governance and development in the 48 focus districts prioritized for 2010.

The President's strategy is dependent not only on the application of military capability, but also on increased civilian capacity. Since January 2009, the Department of State (DoS) has more than tripled the number of civilians on the ground in Afghanistan to 992 (as of March 31). These civilians include experts from eleven different U.S. Government departments and agencies, including DoS, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice (DoJ), FBI Legal Attaché, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), U.S. Marshals Service, Treasury Department, Department of Transportation, and Health and Human Services. U.S. civilian experts contribute to the mission in the field, especially in RC-East and RC-South, where a majority of U.S. combat forces are operating and many of the additional 30,000 forces announced by President Obama will deploy. Civilian personnel will remain deployed in significant numbers after the security situation improves and lead for security responsibility is transferred to the Afghans.

The increase in civilian personnel is a reflection of the President's strategy to increase civil-military cooperation at all levels of operations. The integration of senior civilian representatives (SCRs) with military counterparts in each of the RC's provides significant improvements to civil-military coordination that occurred during this reporting period.

On January 26, 2010, the NATO Secretary General announced that former UK Ambassador to Afghanistan Mark Sedwill would assume the responsibilities of the NATO Senior Civilian Representative for Afghanistan, as well as assume responsibility as the NATO Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan by the end of January. The appointment of Ambassador Sedwill signalled a broadening of the mandate of the NATO SCR Office, with a view to empowering the incumbent to assume a greater role in coordinating the delivery of international civil support to the ISAF campaign.

SCR Sedwill explained his proposed approach in the course of an Informal North Atlantic Council Meeting held February 26, 2010, chaired by NATO Secretary General Rasmussen. His three priorities comprise: one, overall transition, to include Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) efforts to create the conditions for transition; two, stabilization efforts through the provision of timely Afghan Government-led governance and development in the 80 Key Terrain districts, as designated in the ISAF Campaign Plan; and three, optimizing strategic political-military coherence with other international community stakeholders, in support of the Afghan Government. The SCR will prosecute these priorities through a restructured office made up of five international directors.

The United States leads 13 of 27 PRTs in Afghanistan. U.S. civilians are posted to all 13 U.S.-led PRTs and to 13 of the 14 PRTs led by our international partners. U.S. civilians operate District Support Teams (DSTs), subordinate to the PRTs, in 32 districts. An additional eight DSTs are scheduled to commence operations in 2010. Since January 2009, the number of U.S.

civilians operating in Afghanistan has tripled. As of April 1, 2010, U.S. civilian presence in the field outside of Kabul has more than quadrupled, from 67 to over 350. Embassy Kabul has requested an additional 20%-30% increase in civilian staff levels by the end of 2010.

While improving the security situation is a vital first step, progress made to improve the security environment cannot be sustained without parallel improvements in governance and development. A consolidated approach is crucial to the eventual success or failure of the ISAF mission. Additionally, although ISAF plays only a supporting role in the extension of governance and socio-economic development in Afghanistan, it must continue to use focused key leader engagement to highlight issues and work in partnership with the Government of Afghanistan to develop and implement solutions that promote positive changes in governance.

The significance of private sector growth as a focus for Afghan development was underscored at the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) and at the London Conference in January 2010 with international community endorsement of an Integrated Plan for Economic Development proposed by the Afghan Government. The Afghan Government plans to prioritize strategic objectives and promote synergy among key ministries to define development priorities and develop integrated programs to deliver tangible results.

The ultimate resolution to the situation in Afghanistan will result from political and diplomatic means that capitalize on security operations. President Karzai highlighted reintegration and reconciliation as priorities for his second presidential term during his November 2009 inauguration speech, and has called for international support of these efforts. The U.S. Government has stated that it supports Afghan-led reintegration to assimilate peacefully into Afghan society those insurgent fighters and leaders who renounce violence, sever all ties with al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups, and abide by the Afghan constitution.

The Afghan-led reconciliation and reintegration program is currently being developed under the guidance of President Karzai's Presidential Advisor for Internal Security Affairs. The program will be an inter-ministerial effort to respond to reintegration opportunities in key communities. This program is being designed within the context of the delicate political and ethnic context of Afghanistan and the need to avoid creating perverse incentives for joining the insurgency or exacerbating perceptions of favoritism for certain ethnic and tribal groups. In addition, planning is underway for a Consultative Peace *Jirga* (scheduled for late May) to reach consensus with key representatives of the Afghan people on a way forward for peace and reintegration.

A cross-cutting issue, impacting all aspects of Afghan Government and economics, is the narcotics trade. The U.S. Government is implementing an interagency approved Counternarcotics (CN) Strategy for Afghanistan. The CN Strategy reflects lessons learned from CN activities from 2001 through 2008 – the most significant of which is that large-scale eradication targeted toward Afghan poppy farmers was counterproductive and drove farmers toward the insurgency. The new strategy places primary focus on interdiction of the nexus between narco-trafficking and the insurgency, but also places a heavy emphasis on agricultural assistance to farmers, with the aim of transitioning them to licit crops, creating jobs, and revitalizing Afghanistan's historically vibrant agricultural sector. The new strategy carries over activities that have proven to be important in a multi-pronged, whole-of-government CN

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campaign, including capacity building for Afghan CN capabilities, assistance in promoting the rule of law, support for governor-led eradication and public information campaigns, and drug treatment and demand reduction activities. Strategic communications and counterpropaganda, as well as regional engagement with countries and international organizations, are also features of the new strategy. The CN Strategy supports our overall counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan, and is closely synchronized with the U.S. Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plans (ICMCPs) for support to Afghanistan and Pakistan and the U.S. Agricultural Strategy.

Finally, the international community's commitment to Afghanistan has signaled just how important the impact of regional actors is for the future stability and security of Afghanistan. In particular, engagement with the contiguous border countries, including the Central Asian States, Pakistan and Iran, in addition to engagement with India, the Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC), Russia, and China is essential to sustaining an independent Afghan Government capable of providing security and progress for its people.

## **Section 1 – Strategy**

As described in the last report, during the last half of 2009, at the direction of the President, the U.S. Government carried out an examination of our strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. President Obama consulted with his national security team, our Afghanistan and Pakistan partners, NATO and non-NATO allies, and civilian leadership in Afghanistan.

On December 1, 2009, President Obama addressed the United States on the way forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The President reiterated the U. S. Government's goal of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan by pursuing the following objectives within Afghanistan:

- Deny al Qaeda a safe haven;
- Reverse the Taliban's momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the Afghan Government; and
- Strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan's security forces and the Afghan Government so that they can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan's future.

The three core elements of the strategy to achieve these objectives are:

- A military effort to create the conditions for a transition;
- A civilian surge that reinforces positive action; and
- An effective partnership with Pakistan.

The President announced the deployment of an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan, and requested additional contributions from the international community (consistent with the President's policy, an uplift of U.S. civilian resources was already underway). The U.S. Government will pursue a military strategy intended to reverse the Taliban's momentum and increase Afghanistan's capacity over the next 18 months. We will work with our international partners, NATO, the United Nations, and the Afghan people to pursue a more effective civil-military strategy, so that the Afghan Government can take advantage of improved security. Finally, we will act with the full recognition that our success in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to our partnership with Pakistan. July 2011 will be an inflection point at which time we will begin a conditions-based transition to Afghan Government lead. The surge of forces will have ended and we will begin to redeploy forces to the United States at a pace determined by conditions on the ground. This is a goal that President Karzai and the Afghan people share, as exemplified by President Karzai's stated goal in his inauguration speech of having a full transition to Afghan security lead within three to five years. The U.S. Government will conduct an assessment of progress toward meeting our strategic objectives by December 2010.

### **1.1: NATO Strategy**

The NATO strategy continues to be based on the NATO Comprehensive Strategic and Political-Military Plan and implemented through the ISAF Operations Plan (OPLAN) 38302. Revisions to the OPLAN by COMISAF over the last six months focus the strategy on protecting the

population and improving rule of law in Afghanistan. To this end, the strategy is focused on COIN operations designed to protect population centers, support improved governance, and create a sustainable security environment for the Government of Afghanistan.

Crucial to the revised NATO strategy is improvement in NATO and international civil-military coordination. To assist in the coordination and delivery of the NATO civilian effort in Afghanistan, on January 26, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen appointed former UK Ambassador to Afghanistan Mark Sedwill as the new NATO Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) and as the civilian counterpart to General McChrystal. His appointment will improve the unity of effort between NATO and the United Nations Assistance Mission-Afghanistan (UNAMA), the European Union, and other international partners.

### **1.1.1: ISAF Campaign Strategy and Strategic Objectives**

ISAF, in partnership with the Afghan Government, conducts population-centric COIN operations, enables expanded and effective ANSF, and supports improved governance and development in order to protect the Afghan people and provide a secure environment for sustainable stability.<sup>1</sup>

The ISAF Campaign strategy focuses on three main efforts<sup>2</sup>:

- Gain the initiative by protecting the population in densely populated areas where the insurgency has dominant influence.
- Separate insurgent influence from the populace and support Afghan Government sub-national structures to establish rule of law and deliver basic services.
- Implement population security measures that connect contiguous economic corridors, foster community development and generate employment opportunities.

The main effort of the concept of operations is to conduct decisive shape-clear-hold-build-transition<sup>3</sup> operations concentrated on the most threatened population in the southern part of the country to establish population security measures that diminish insurgent influence over the people. Operational cohesion is a principal tenet of the campaign design. It is gained by building relationships with Afghans and partnering at all levels within the ANSF with a focus on achieving local solutions. Operational actions are coordinated with the international community to enhance unity of effort and magnify effects. Missions are conducted in a manner that focuses priority on protecting the population and reducing civilian casualties.

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<sup>1</sup> ISAF Mission from COMISAF OPLAN 38302, Revision 4, approved 25 September 2009.

<sup>2</sup> ISAF OPLAN 38302 Rev 4.

<sup>3</sup> The President's Strategy includes transition as part of operations in Afghanistan. However, international forces are predominantly focused on shape-clear-hold-build as they build the capacity within the Afghan Forces and Government to transition.

COMISAF's current intent is to regain the initiative from the insurgency in order to stem the crisis in popular confidence. His campaign design is focused along five lines of operation aimed at:

1. Protecting the population;
2. Enabling the ANSF;
3. Neutralizing malign influences;
4. Supporting the extension of governance; and
5. Supporting socio-economic development.

This approach entails an emphasis on population-centric COIN operations to shape, clear and hold population areas in order to build good governance and Afghan capacity to deliver essential services to the people.

### **1.1.2: ISAF Command and Control (C2)**

The ISAF Command and Control (C2) structure has evolved over the past six months in an effort to achieve greater unity of command. COMISAF recognized that the mission had evolved and that the command structure required reorganization to improve operational effectiveness. The changes made reflect his intent to foster greater unity of action in the execution and fulfillment of the ISAF mission. The changes also reflect two of the main functional responsibilities of ISAF Headquarters: to discharge the responsibilities of ISAF's operational commander in theater, while engaging and interacting at the national and operational level in Afghanistan. The ISAF Joint Command (IJC) was created to execute the latter part in order to allow the headquarters to focus on the former. Thus, the IJC focuses on the full spectrum of COIN operations and stability operations in support of COMISAF's campaign plan. The IJC is the battlespace owner with the responsibility to oversee the Regional Commands (RCs) on behalf of COMISAF.

In addition, the NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A) was established, in recognition of the full scope of the ISAF mission and importance of ANSF growth, to plan and implement authorized and resourced capacity building of the ANSF in order to enhance the Government of Afghanistan's ability to achieve security and stability in Afghanistan.

The roles and missions of the respective headquarters are summarized in the table on page 14.

#### **ISAF Joint Command (IJC)**

The IJC achieved initial operational capability on October 12, 2009 and achieved full operational capability on November 12, 2009, as planned. Despite significant challenges, the IJC Headquarters rapidly established itself as an effective combined team and continues to improve its effectiveness. One of the challenges, resulting from the speed with which the headquarters was established, was manning. As the Framework Nation, the United States took responsibility for filling 345 of the 873 required positions within the headquarters and currently has 348 personnel assigned (101%). Our NATO allies and other troop contributing nations are currently filling 372 of the remaining 528 authorizations (70.5%). As a result, the overall manning of the headquarters is currently at 82.5% of requirements. Of note, the IJC is responsible for command

and control of the Afghan National Army (ANA) Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) and the Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (POMLTs), a mission previously executed by NTM-A and the U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A).

**Table 1 - Roles and Missions of Headquarters**

Headquarters	Level of Influence	Mission
ISAF	Strategic/ theater campaign (political-strategic- operational)	ISAF, in partnership with the Afghan Government, conducts population-centric COIN operations, enables an expanded and effective ANSF, and supports improved governance and development in order to protect the Afghan people and provide a secure environment for sustainable stability.
IJC	Campaign (operational)/ Tactical	The combined team and supporting organizations, in close coordination, will conduct joint operations in key populated areas to disrupt insurgent activities, protect the people against enemy attacks, and maintain the conditions for social, economic, and cultural development.
NTM-A/ CSTC-A	Campaign (operational)/ Tactical	NTM-A/CSTC-A, in coordination with key stakeholders, generates the ANSF, develops capable ministerial systems and institutions, and resources the fielded force to build sustainable capacity and capability in order to enhance the Afghan Government's ability to achieve stability and security in Afghanistan.
ISAF SOF & CFSOCC-A*	Campaign (operational)/ Tactical	ISAF Special Operations Forces (SOF) protect the population, enable the ANSF and neutralize malign influence in order to shape a secure environment for sustainable stability. Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) plans and synchronizes direct and indirect special operations activities in support of COMISAF COIN strategy by building ANSF capacity in order to protect the population and defeat the insurgency threatening the stability of the Afghan Government.

#### **NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A)/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A)**

Another significant development in the past year was the stand up of NTM-A in November 2009. The decision to create NTM-A was approved in April 2009 at the NATO Summit meeting in Strasbourg-Kehl. The Commander, NTM-A occupies the dual role of leading both the U.S.-led CSTC-A and NTM-A. The establishment of a coordinated training mission under a single NATO framework will help focus Allied and partner contributions, allowing improvements to the international training effort.

In February, the headquarter elements of NTM-A achieved full operational capability and turned NTM-A focus to fulfilling staffing requirements for the operational training support elements. Currently 5,111 personnel are authorized for NTM-A/CSTC-A, of which just 2,673 are assigned. This represents manning end-strength of just 52%. Currently, 1,810 trainers are assigned out of the 4,083 trainers required, resulting in 44% staffing rate. NTM-A/CSTC-A individual fills for staff positions are somewhat better with 863 out of 1,028 assigned, for an 84% staffing fill. The most recent focus of effort is sourcing the NATO Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) for NTM-A staff and institutional trainers. Pledges by partner nations for staffing of the CJSOR's critical requirements are being pursued at the NTM-A/CSTC-A command level.




Implemented in mid 2009, the CJSOR's current staffing level of 26% is expected to improve substantially by late 2010. This shortage has a significant effect on the manning of ANA and ANP training centers. In summary, each NTM-A/CSTC-A staff headquarters element continues to seek improvement to its effectiveness, clarify responsibilities, and improve internal coordination.

**United States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A)**

United States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) executes Title 10 and other National support functions for all U.S. Forces assigned to the Afghanistan area of responsibility. General McChrystal is dual-hatted as Commander, USFOR-A and COMISAF. USFOR-A executes operational control of all detainee operations, as well as U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM)-directed activities not covered within the NATO mandate, and conducts direct liaison with the U.S. Embassy and other U.S. organizations operating in Afghanistan. USFOR-A supervises CSTC-A in the execution of its responsibilities to generate and develop the ANSF and the associated security ministries. Through all efforts, USFOR-A maintains close coordination with ISAF to ensure that its actions support COMISAF's objectives. The command relationships between ISAF and USFOR-A are illustrated in Figure 1 - ISAF Organizational Structure.

**Figure 1 - ISAF Organizational Structure**



**Future C2 Evolution**

COMISAF proposed, and Commander, NATO Joint Force Command-Brunssum (JFC-B) endorsed, the creation of a sixth regional command geographically oriented in the southwest portion of Afghanistan. This proposal was generated to address the excessive span of command and operational tempo issues that face Regional Command-South (RC-South) in 2010.

The preponderance of the planned force increase by the United States and other Allies and partners will be employed in RC-South. This concentration of additional forces will exceed the organizational capacity of the existing RC-South Headquarters in nearly every operational function. RC-South troops operate in over 150 separate locations across the six provinces that encompass RC-South's area of responsibility and are separated by more than 600 kilometers at their widest point. RC-South is also the most kinetic of the Regional Commands, accounting for nearly half of enemy-related kinetic events reported each day. Management of the intelligence production to provide RC subordinates with actionable information is presently stretched at or beyond an acceptable limit of the current headquarters.

These issues prompted the request for creation of Regional Command-Southwest (RC-Southwest) in the period July 1–August 1, 2010, which JFC-B staffed to the NATO Military Committee. The Military Committee circulated a draft letter of endorsement for the proposal to the Military Representatives and, pending their endorsement, the proposal is expected to be forwarded to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) for approval. It is anticipated that funding for the new RC will be a contentious issue but that a NAC decision will be delivered by mid-April 2010.

### **1.1.3: NATO ISAF Forces**

#### **Current U.S. and International Force Levels**

On March 31, there were approximately 87,000 U.S. forces and approximately 46,500 international forces in Afghanistan. U.S. forces, deployed in conjunction with international forces, operate under a plan based in large part on U.S. COIN doctrine, which will enhance effective partnering with the ANSF in order to build ANSF capability and eventually transition lead for the security mission to the Afghans, a goal shared by the Afghan Government. Additional U.S. forces approved by the President are on schedule to arrive in Afghanistan on time to meet mission requirements, with force levels expected to approach 98,000 by August 2010. The U.S. force flow has been subdivided into three separate force packages, each built to provide specific capabilities to achieve main effort goals in RC-South and supporting goals in RC-East. The majority of the initial force package (FP-1) consisted of U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) elements, which were put into immediate action in central Helmand operations. Additionally, FP-1 includes an Army brigade to conduct training and mentoring for ANSF forces. Force Package 2 (FP-2) is designed to deliver a counterinsurgency-equipped Army brigade to conduct operations in Kandahar Province. In addition, FP-2 offers added military intelligence assets and a rotary-wing aviation brigade. Force Package 3 (FP-3) delivers the final counterinsurgency Army brigade, which will focus on advising and assisting the ANSF, to RC-East. Follow-on forces will continue our strategy of clear, shape, hold, build, and transition as we carry operations forward from Helmand to Kandahar and beyond.

International force levels continue to grow at a proportional rate to the U.S. troop increase. Currently, NATO has accepted force increase offers from 38 countries with multiple capabilities for operations, tactics, and training. Offers totaling approximately 9,000 troops have been received from NATO and non-NATO partners since the President's December speech. As of March 2010, approximately 40% of the offered increases of international partner troops have

arrived in country. ISAF continues to work with international partners to fill open requirements to facilitate the COIN strategy.

NATO Allies and non-NATO partners have used several NATO Ministerial meetings and international conferences as platforms to promote greater international engagement and participation in Afghanistan. The increase in international forces is a direct result of pledges made at the December 2009 NATO Foreign Ministerial and February 2010 NATO Force Generation Conference. The December conference yielded contributions of approximately 8,000 troops from partner nations. The February conference focused on filling a shortage of 1,300 trainers identified by COMISAF as necessary to train, mentor, and partner with the ANSF. As of March 31, 543 positions have been pledged. NATO and ISAF continue working to match offers with on-the-ground needs. The CJSOR is currently being revised. The numbers of trainers required will likely increase in the coming period.

NATO Allies and partners have noted that they are cautiously optimistic of the success of the ISAF mission. Many national leaders, however, express concern over popular support within their countries, which has contributed to continued capability gaps in the CJSOR from contributions not filled by international partners. Most notable is the requirement for trainers and mentors to support development of the ANSF. We are presently filling the requirements for training and partnering through a combination of embedded partnering of operational units and ETTs. The CJSOR identified a need for 180 OMLTs for the ANA in 2010. Presently, there are 76 U.S. OMLTs committed, 64 international OMLTs deployed, with an additional 23 international OMLTs offered, leaving a need for 17 additional OMLTs to provide training and mentoring in RC-North, RC-Capital, and RC-West. The CJSOR identified a total need for 475 POMLTs to train and mentor the ANP in 2010. Presently, there are 279 U.S. POMLTs committed, 28 international POMLTs deployed, 60 international POMLTs offered, with a requirement for 108 additional POMLTs to successfully carry out the training and mentoring mission for the ANP. A typical OMLT/POMLT consists of 40 personnel.

In addition, the Dutch Government plan to withdraw its forces from Uruzgan, anticipated to begin in August 2010 and to be completed by December 2010, and the planned withdrawal of Canadian forces in 2011, will create demands for additional forces in the near future.

### **Caveats**

National caveats are imposed to limit the conduct of operations by an Ally's or partner's forces. Caveats are significant because they ensure that international partners' troops operate in a manner consistent with national laws and policies, but they may limit COMISAF's ability to utilize his forces. Regardless of national caveats, all ISAF international partners within Afghanistan operate according to the NAC approved ISAF Rules of Engagement. National caveats are updated each time ISAF forces receive a new Transfer of Authority<sup>4</sup> message from a specific troop contributing nation. Commanders and staffs at all levels understand national caveats and are able to adjust plans accordingly. Categories of national caveats are described in Annex C (classified).

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<sup>4</sup> Transfers of Authority messages define the point of transfer of command authority from nations to NATO. They include C2 relationships, capabilities, restrictions and national caveats.

Over half of the international partners operate with additional national caveats that restrict or prohibit certain actions (for example, counternarcotics operations) or operations in specific geographical locations, without national consent. Currently, 22 of 43 troop contributing nations are “caveat free,” an improvement from 18 during the previous reporting period. COMISAF has stated that Allied forces in Afghanistan need to loosen or remove operational caveats in order to be effective in partnering with Afghan forces. Presently, the caveats imposed by 17 nations limit operations outside of originally assigned locations (usually the province in which they are based), conducting CN operations with ISAF (predominantly imposed by Allies in RC-South), and Rules of Engagement caveats (the majority being held by non-NATO nations).

#### **1.1.4: Civilian Organizational Structure**

Since January 2009, the Department of State (DoS) has more than tripled the number of civilians on the ground in Afghanistan to 992 (as of March 31). These civilians include experts from eleven different U.S. Government departments and agencies, including DoS, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice (DoJ), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), U.S. Marshals Service, Treasury Department, Department of Transportation, and Health and Human Services. U.S. civilian experts contribute to the mission in the field, especially in the east and south, where a majority of U.S. combat forces are operating and many of the additional 30,000 forces announced by President Obama will deploy. Civilian personnel will remain deployed in significant numbers after the security situation improves and lead for security responsibility is transferred to the Afghans.

The increase in civilian personnel is a reflection of the President’s strategy to increase civil-military cooperation at all levels of operations. The appointment of Ambassador Mark Sedwill as the NATO Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) and the integration of senior civilian representatives with military counterparts in each of the Regional Commands are two significant improvements to civil-military coordination that occurred during this reporting period.


##### **NATO Senior Civilian Representative (SCR)**

On January 26, 2010, the NATO Secretary General announced that former UK Ambassador to Afghanistan Mark Sedwill would assume the responsibilities of the NATO SCR for Afghanistan on January 28, 2010, as well as assume responsibility as the NATO Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. The appointment of Ambassador Sedwill signalled a broadening of the mandate of the NATO SCR Office, with a view to empowering the incumbent to assume a greater role in coordinating the delivery of international civil effect to the ISAF campaign.

SCR Sedwill explained his proposed approach in the course of an Informal North Atlantic Council Meeting held February 26, 2010, chaired by NATO Secretary General Rasmussen. His three priorities comprise: one, overall transition, to include Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) transition; two, stabilization efforts through the provision of timely Afghan Government-owned and -led governance and development in the 80 Key Terrain districts (Figure 2 - Key Terrain and Area of Interest Districts) as designated in the ISAF Campaign Plan; and three, optimizing strategic political-military coherence with other international community stakeholders

in support of the Afghan Government. The SCR will prosecute these priorities through a restructured office made up of five international directors.

**Figure 2 - Key Terrain and Area of Interest Districts**



Following NAC endorsement of his approach, on March 8, 2010 the SCR submitted his assessment of the new SCR Office structure and resources to NATO Headquarters. The NATO Secretary General subsequently endorsed Ambassador Sedwill's request for ten Voluntary National Contributions and requested ISAF Permanent Representatives to submit the names of high quality candidates to his office no later than the end of March 2010 for subsequent consideration. The mandate to enable and facilitate the delivery of civil effect, in close coordination with, and complementary to, other international partners and the government will significantly enhance the effect of Ambassador Sedwill's office.

### **Senior Civilian Representatives (SCRs)**

Senior Civilian Representatives (SCRs) have been designated as counterparts to NATO-ISAF commanders in each of the Regional Commands. These SCR positions are at the Minister Counselor level, and they coordinate and direct the work of all U.S. Government civilians under Chief of Mission authority within their area of responsibility, and are responsive to Ambassador Sedwill's overall guidance. They ensure coherence of political direction and developmental efforts and execute U.S. policy and guidance. The SCR serves as the U.S. civilian counterpart to the military commander in the Regional Command, to senior international

partner civilians, and to senior local Afghan Government officials. They oversee sub-national civilian staff engagement in U.S. Government planning, assessment, program execution and evaluation; direct analytical reporting and activities in the Regional Commands across all lines of effort; engage with Afghan Government officials, international partners, and PRT-contributing countries to improve collaboration at all levels; and contribute input to USAID priorities implemented through the USAID Regional Program Platform. The SCRs also provide foreign policy guidance and advice about the region to the military commander and, in turn, receive security advice from the commander to guide the execution of reconstruction and development activities.

Each SCR is supported at the Regional Command level by a team of 10-30 personnel under Chief of Mission authority, including policy, development, and administrative support from several agencies, including USAID, USDA, and U.S. law enforcement and other agencies. The USAID Regional Program Platforms, comprised of technical experts from each of USAID's sector offices, are led by a USAID Minister Counselor-level Senior Foreign Service Officer, who serves as the Senior Development Officer and supports the SCR. In RC-South, personnel supporting the SCR include a sub-set of officers assigned to the RC-South Civilian-Military Integration Cell and the Combined Joint Interagency Task Force (CJIATF), to connect these multi-national structures working for the RC-South Commander to Embassy senior leadership. In RC-East, civilian staff participates in relevant planning boards and fusion cells to enhance integrated civil-military effort.

The creation of the SCR positions has enabled civilian agencies to devolve more decision-making authority to the field, and to enable civilians to tailor programs more quickly to the counterinsurgency challenges of each specific environment. The SCR leads the interagency team to define and set priorities, and supervises team efforts to monitor and report program effects. The SCR can elicit and provide feedback into the development programs through the Senior Development Officer. The Senior Development Officer is authorized to manage the USAID program portfolio through the USAID Automated Directives System.

Outside the Regional Command Headquarters, lead U.S. Government civilian representatives are identified for each operational level in the field, down to the District Support Team level, to promote increased responsiveness and accountability for U.S. policy implementation. The selection of a State Department, USAID, or other agency lead depends on the relative experience of the agency representatives and on the operating environment in each specific location.

## **Section 2 – Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF)**

*Requirements of this Section are met by the section 1231 report in Part Two of this document.*

## Section 3 – Security

### 3.1: State of the Insurgency

#### 3.1.1: Insurgent Strategy

The insurgents perceive 2009 as their most successful year. Taliban leader Mullah Omar's recent directives reiterated prohibitions regarding mistreating the population, taking children to conduct jihad, searching homes, kidnapping people for money, and other activities that could turn the population against the Taliban. Expanded violence is viewed as an insurgent victory, and insurgents perceive low voter turnout and reports of fraud during the past Presidential election as further signs of their success.

The Afghan insurgency has a robust means of sustaining its operations. Small arms weapons and ammunition are readily available throughout the region, in addition to sources of improvised explosive devices (IED) and home-made explosive materials and technology. External funding is top-down, while internal funding is bottom-up, providing the Taliban consistent streams of money to sufficiently fund operations. Internally, a significant portion of funds are derived from taxing the opiate trade. Externally, funding originates in Islamic states and is delivered via couriers and *hawalas*.<sup>5</sup> A ready supply of recruits is drawn from the frustrated population, where insurgents exploit poverty, tribal friction, and lack of governance to grow their ranks. At this point, the insurgency exhibits several strengths and weaknesses.

#### Insurgent Strengths:

- The speed and decisiveness of insurgent information operations and media campaigns remain not only the insurgents' main effort, but also their most significant strength.
- Organizational capabilities and operational reach are qualitatively and geographically expanding.
- The ability to intimidate through targeted killings and threats in order to force acquiescence to their will.
- The strength and ability of shadow governance to discredit the authority and legitimacy of the Afghan Government is increasing.
- IED use is increasing in numbers and complexity; IEDs are as much a tactic and process as they are a weapon.
- Insurgents' tactics, techniques, and procedures for conducting complex attacks are increasing in sophistication and strategic effect.

#### Insurgent Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities:

- The insurgency includes multiple locally-based tribal networks, as well as layered command structures, which at times can make decentralized execution difficult.
- Persistent fissures among insurgent leadership persist at the local levels.

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<sup>5</sup> The *hawala* system is an informal value transfer system based on the performance and network of money brokers, called *hawaladars*.

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- The insurgency is dependent on many marginalized / threatened segments of the Pashtun population.
- The insurgency is over-reliant on external support.
- Insurgent violence against civilians and respected figures can be counterproductive.

The overall Afghan insurgent strategy going into 2010 is to counter ISAF expansion and cause casualties to international partner forces with the expanded use of IEDs and suicide bombings, while undermining efforts by the Afghan Government to improve governance and increase influence around the urban centers of Kandahar and Kabul. There have been high levels of kinetic activity during the winter months, resulting both from sustained ISAF pressure and concerted insurgent efforts (facilitated by mild weather) to maintain momentum.

By the middle of the year, insurgent leaders may adjust their strategy in order to delegitimize the Afghan Government and reduce participation in Afghan parliamentary elections. During this period, insurgents are likely to expand operations in the west and north. To further impact the elections, we assessed that they will make a renewed effort to solidify command and control structures and seek to gain popular support. In addition, we can expect to see a significant insurgent response to any potential international partner operations in Kandahar Province.

A March 2010 nationwide survey indicates that 52% of Afghans believe insurgents are the greatest source of insecurity, while only 1% believes the National Army/Police are primarily to blame.<sup>6</sup> This perception provides an opportunity for the Afghan Government, with the support of the international community, to improve its legitimacy and enhance popular perceptions of the government.

The insurgency is comprised of multiple groups pursuing various short- and longer-term goals. They are part of a broader syndicate of extremist groups including al Qaeda, Pakistani Taliban, and Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT) that threatens security in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and elsewhere. The three major groups include the Quetta Shura Taliban, Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), and the Haqqani Network (HQN). These groups cooperate and coordinate at times and their areas of operations tend to be geographically and demographically determined. They operate mainly in the Pashtun-majority areas of Afghanistan in the south and east, and in Pashtun pockets in the north. The common goals of these groups are to expel foreign forces from Afghanistan (although there is no mention of foreign fighters allied with them or al Qaeda) and to undermine the central government.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Statistics from ISAF Nationwide Survey, December 2009-March 2010.

<sup>7</sup> See classified Annex – Disposition of Afghan Insurgent Groups.



### 3.1.2: Afghan Insurgent Areas of Operation

**Figure 3 - Insurgent Areas of Operation in Afghanistan**




Figure 3 - Insurgent Areas of Operation in Afghanistan (above) illustrates the areas of operations of various insurgent organizations in Afghanistan. During the reporting period, the Taliban have attempted to solidify command structures and to become a legitimate alternative government. They currently are not, however, a popular movement and thus there is an opportunity to heighten the legitimacy of the Afghan Government and increase popular perceptions of success.

Following the December 2009 announcements of the troop uplift, insurgent leaders directed their commanders to avoid large-scale confrontation with ISAF forces and to increase the use of IEDs. This reporting period has seen insurgent combatants adhere closely to their leaders' intent with a 236% increase in IEDs noted across the country and a marked increase in stand-off tactics compared to the same period last year. ISAF forces have enjoyed some success in clearing insurgents from their strongholds, particularly in central Helmand, but progress in introducing governance and development to these areas to move toward hold and build operations has been slow. The insurgents' tactic of re-infiltrating the cleared areas to perform executions has played a role in dissuading locals from siding with the Afghan Government, which has complicated efforts to introduce effective governance.

Despite some progress, improvements to national infrastructure remain insufficient to provide tangible benefits for the populace. This weakness has been exploited by insurgents, who continue to leverage their religious, ethnic, and tribal affinities with local Afghans for recruitment, resources, and freedom of movement. Insurgent information operations remain focused on portraying the Afghan Government's inability to provide security to the Afghans. Insurgents have sought to underline this message over this reporting period with high-profile

complex attacks in Kabul and Kandahar. Afghan perceptions of corruption within the Afghan Government, the inability of the government to provide essential services, and exploitative behavior of some government officials and ANSF are contributing to the success of the insurgents' campaign. These shortcomings are also being highlighted and exploited by insurgents as part of their strategy to divert support from the Afghan Government to the limited shadow governance they portray as a viable alternative. One area the Taliban have effectively exploited is as an adjudicator in providing swift and less corrupt dispute resolution.

Over the first quarter of 2010, the insurgents' strategy has proven effective in slowing the spread of governance and development; however, the insurgency has also been under unprecedented pressure. Reporting indicates increased and often strained efforts to resource the fight, which has led to tension and sporadic dips in morale. From the insurgents' perspective, this strain has been compounded by the recent high-profile arrests of several Pakistan-based insurgent leaders by Pakistani authorities and removal of many Afghanistan-based commanders, predominantly by international partner special operations forces (SOF). The arrests in Pakistan have increased insurgent leaders' concern over the security of their safe havens. Financial and logistical support has also proven problematic for combatants operating in areas where recent key leaders have been arrested. If suitable replacements for those captured leaders are not found quickly, combatants in those areas will be impacted. International partner SOF operations against insurgent commanders have also caused short-term disruption to insurgent activity, but their real value may be the longer-term effect on replacement commanders' commitment to the insurgency. This is a difficult metric to obtain data on, but we assess that the combined effects of the recent high-level arrests and the operations against the lower-level commanders will help to set conditions for future reconciliation and reintegration.

### **3.2: ISAF Military Operations**

ISAF, in coordination with the Afghan Government, continues to conduct clear, hold, build, and sustain operations throughout Afghanistan in support of the NATO mission. In order to execute military operations more effectively, COMISAF continued to refine his strategy by promulgating three new operational directives in addition to the *Tactical Directive*, *Partnering Directive*, *COIN Guidance*, and the *Driving Directive* promulgated during the last reporting period.


#### **3.2.1: COMISAF COIN Directives**

The *Night Raids Tactical Directive*, issued on January 23, 2010, raises the threshold that must be achieved before a tactical night raid can be approved. The directive applies to the conduct of night raids by all conventional and SOF in Afghanistan under command of COMISAF. This directive acknowledges that the Afghan population's judgment of our conduct and perception of our intentions will be critical in their decision to support their nation's struggle against the insurgency. While night raids are effective and their operational value is understood, the new directive recognizes the cultural dynamics and acknowledges that night raids' success comes at a steep cost in terms of perceptions of the Afghan population. Therefore, COMISAF directed that night raids should be executed only after all other courses of action have been considered. This

directive outlines a number of the planning and execution factors that must be considered if night raids are to be conducted in order to ensure that they are tactically sound, judiciously used, and as transparent as possible.

The *Communication Directive*, issued March 1, 2010, provided guidance and commander’s intent on the importance and conduct of all communication activities conducted by ISAF and by USFOR-A, under the command of COMISAF. By “communication,” COMISAF was referring to all information activities, including public affairs, Information Operations (IO), psychological operations, and traditional communication, which includes *jirgas*, *shuras*, and other outreach engagements. In particular, the directive emphasizes that neither the security of the Afghan population nor Afghan governance and development goals can be achieved without the population’s active participation. Therefore, the ability of ISAF to improve public perception and counter the enemy’s harmful influence on public support is critical. This directive also emphasizes that communications considerations must be integrated at all levels and stages of planning. This directive highlights that what is said must be supported by actions and behaviors, since this is a critical aspect of Afghan culture. Speed and accuracy of information is critical and must be partnered with the objectives of Afghan officials whenever possible.

### 3.2.2: ISAF Concept of Operations



The ANSF, U.S., and international forces have steadily increased operational tempo (OPTEMPO) to maintain pressure on the insurgency through the winter. The increased pressure is most evident in central Helmand, where ANSF, U.S., and international forces directly challenged the insurgency’s ability to keep pace. This approach has caused the insurgency to explore new tactics, techniques, and procedures aimed at separating the people from the Afghan Government and ISAF. Insurgents are increasingly looking for opportunities to discredit not

only ISAF forces but also the legitimacy of the Afghan Government. Events such as false allegations of Koran desecration or causing civilian casualties (CIVCAS) are expected to rise in frequency.

Disruption of insurgent financial support and re-supply capabilities through effective CN operations and IED material seizures further disrupted insurgent capabilities and effectiveness during the reporting period. An increase in leads on IEDs — and subsequent finds of IED material caches — and drug seizures has impacted the insurgency financially. The continued disruption to their operations reduced the insurgents' ability to organize and stockpile supplies. In RC-East, however, intelligence suggests that the insurgency has increased stockpiling of supplies, perhaps in anticipation of a springtime increase in offensive activity. During this period, the ANSF increased their cache finds, demonstrating growing ANSF capacity to conduct operations with partnered forces.

The insurgents continue their attempts to unravel the relationships being developed between the local populace, local Afghan Government officials, ANSF, and ISAF by attempting to re-assert their influence and control. An increased presence of the ANSF, combined with increase ANSF mentoring, reassures the populace that security forces are committed to holding gains.

ISAF will focus on the expansion and building of infrastructure across the Combined Joint Operational Area (CJOA) to receive growing ANSF forces and ISAF troop increases. Efforts will be made to produce effective, responsive, and proactive IO efforts to counter insurgent propaganda and false allegations. Finally, ISAF will sustain and increase OPTEMPO across the CJOA to prevent/disrupt insurgent attempts to consolidate and reorganize.

### **3.3: Operations**

#### **3.3.1: Regional Command-Capital**

Regional Command-Capital (RC-Capital) is focused on providing security support for Kabul, the capital city of Afghanistan. The ANSF is in the lead for security responsibility in RC-Capital. Despite continuous insurgent threats and many attempts to capture media attention to increase the perception of insecurity in Kabul, this period has seen relatively few major incidents. RC-Capital operations seek to prevent and deter insurgents from performing rocket attacks, deter insurgent actions likely to cause significant media attention or that can be exploited by the insurgents for IO gain, gather intelligence and conduct shows of force, build and develop trust and positive relationships with the local population, train the ANSF, set conditions that separate insurgents from the population, and extend ANSF/Afghan Government influence. RC-Capital and ISAF Headquarters work closely with the ANSF to continually revise and implement an effective Kabul City Security Plan to address security concerns and keep the city safe.

In partnership with ANSF, which has lead for security in Kabul, forces in RC-Capital conducted and participated in six operations in the greater Kabul City area to secure avenues of access to the province, build the trust of the local population, and deter insurgent attacks. The ANSF reaction to two spectacular, complex suicide and small arms attacks in January and February was

effective, and demonstrated improved operational coordination between the ANA and the ANP in the capital.

### 3.3.2: Regional Command–East

Military operations in Regional Command-East (RC-East) during the six months of the reporting period focused on building and reinforcing ANSF competence, capacity, and credibility in a unified effort to protect the population, connect the people to the government, effect sustainable development, and defeat the insurgency.

**Operation CHAMPION SPEAR (September 2009-Dec 2009):** The purpose of this operation was to disrupt IED networks and prevent future attacks within Wardak and Logar. The kill/capture of high-value targets during the operation caused a significant disruption to these IED networks, resulting in lower-than-expected IED activity in this area from October through December 2009.

**Operation CHAMPION ARROW (January 2010-Ongoing):** The purpose of this operation is to degrade insurgent capabilities, improve the protection of the populace, and set the conditions for spring operations within RC-East focusing on Paktya, Paktika, and Khowst. The combined team has conducted numerous cache clearances within this focus area, disrupting insurgent supply inventories.

**Operation TOLO-E-AFTAB (February 11-15, 2010):** The purpose of this operation was to provide support to ANSF/Afghan Government while conducting snow removal, personnel recovery, and security operations in the Salang Pass avalanche area. This combined operation led to the recovery of more than 1,500 persons and enabled ANSF/Afghan Government to take the lead in helping the Afghan people.

Operations have been founded upon the principle of combined action, beginning with the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) tactical command posts co-locating with both ANA corps headquarters (201<sup>st</sup> ANA Corps and the 203<sup>rd</sup> ANA Corps) and ANP headquarters (202<sup>nd</sup> ANP Zone and 505<sup>th</sup> ANP Zone). Through combined action, RC-East has increased the depth of coverage<sup>8</sup> between international partners and the ANSF. The ANA remains the focus of combined action execution due to the current stage of the insurgency in RC-East.

COMISAF's first priority is to protect the Afghan population, and in this regard, the population is telling us the results are positive. From July to November, there was a 50% increase in the proportion of Afghans that saw security improve.<sup>9</sup> Even with the rise in violent events against ANSF and ISAF forces and the August elections, the populated areas saw more improvements than declines. When asked who brings improvements to their area, the population sees the

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
<sup>8</sup> Depth of coverage is the amount of area covered, and how densely, by forces.

<sup>9</sup> The Afghan Perceptions and Attitudes Survey has been conducted quarterly in RC-E since April 2007 with roughly 6,400 samples per survey. When asked, "How has security in your area changed in the last six months," 22% in July and 33% in November said that security improved—a 50% increase. Those saying security declined was steady in both surveys at 25%.

Afghan Government as the source of those improvements.<sup>10</sup> The Afghan population also sees the improvements in the ANSF in RC-East, with 91% agreeing that national security forces work for a better Afghanistan.

When asked whether the people trust the Taliban or the Afghan Government on topics ranging from improving quality of life, providing jobs, and education, Afghans responded with an overwhelming trust for the Afghan Government. In the figure below, green represents survey respondents said they trust the Afghan Government on a battery of 11 topics. If the respondent who said he or she did not trust the Afghan Government on one or more topics, it would modify the color to yellow and to red. The districts of least trust closely correlate to the areas of highest insurgent activity. Afghans in RC-East have the least trust in the Afghan Government in terms of corruption, prosecution, administration of justice, and long-term stability.

**RC-East Public Perceptions (Do you trust The Afghan Government?)**



Governance and development initiatives aimed at creating visual, tangible, and recognizable examples of progress support efforts to sustain stability. In Nangarhar, Konar, and Laghman Provinces, emphasis was placed on improving service delivery capacity, civil training programs, and stability projects in focused districts. Throughout the region, provincial budgetary processes were supported and local stability projects reinforced the Afghan Government’s competence and connection to the people.

Operations in RC-East were directed at insurgents who were disrupting enemy networks and threatening the population, conducting attacks on ANSF and international partners, and seeding instability. Focused tactical operations specifically targeted the insurgent cells facilitating IED attacks against security forces. Combined operations against the Haqqani Network (HQN) and

<sup>10</sup> 32%-Government of Afghanistan, 15%-National Solidarity Program, 18%-foreign organizations, 9%-shuras, 6%-the people themselves.

Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) have reinforced the credibility of the ANSF and disrupted enemy sanctuary in the east.

Pakistani military operations in the Waziristans and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) during the summer and fall impacted the type of resistance faced in RC-East during this timeframe. While continuing to improve coordination, the recent Pakistani and Afghan complementary military operations conducted along the border have placed a high degree of pressure on enemy forces and reduced insurgent safe haven.

Realignment of stabilization forces throughout the region has better enabled the execution of population-centric COIN and reduced the insurgency's ability to influence the population. An example of such realignment and consolidation of forces during the execution of combined action is the increased partnering of ANSF and international forces at Tor Kham Gate, allowing security presence to increase from eight hours per day to 16 hours per day.

### **3.3.3: Regional Command-South**

**Headquarters Regional Command South (RC-South) Operational Design.** Headquarters RC-South changed command in November 2009 and Commander, RC-South conducted a review of the operational design. The new operational design provides direction to all task forces operating in RC-South of Commander, RC-South's intent to conduct population-centric COIN operations. The primary focus of RC-South's intent is on showing positive trends quickly, protecting the population, expanding the authority of the Afghan Government, separating the insurgent from the population (physically and psychologically), and partnering with the ANSF at all levels. Operation MOSHTARAK was initiated February 13, 2010 and will be conducted in three primary phases:

**Operation MOSHTARAK Phase 1 – Freedom of Movement.** Task Force Stryker transferred its responsibilities as a regional battlespace owner during Operation MOSHTARAK Phase 1. To support the redeployment of Task Force Stryker, Task Force Fury assumed responsibility as the battlespace owner in Zabul Province, taking command of the Romanian Battalion and detaching a Task Force Fury battalion to reinforce Task Force Kandahar. The Task Force Stryker force lay-down was reconfigured to conduct freedom of movement operations on the major highways; this change in mission enabled other task forces to concentrate on protecting the population within their battlespace and has demonstrably enhanced freedom of movement across RC-South.

**Operation MOSHTARAK Phase 2 – Operations in Central Helmand.** Operation MOSHTARAK Phase 2 consists of governance-focused shape, clear, hold and build operations in central Helmand Province, with the aim of extending the authority of the Afghan Government to the previously ungoverned areas of Nad Ali District, including the town of Marjah. These operations were conducted by three brigades from the ANA 205<sup>th</sup> (HERO) Corps, supported by U.S. and UK ground forces from Task Force Leatherneck and Task Force Helmand. Shaping operations commenced in the fall of 2009 with an emphasis on Afghan-led engagement with tribal leaders and key decision makers in Helmand Province to shape the political environment and contribute to an anti-climactic clear operation.

On February 13, 2010, once sufficient ANSF and ISAF combat forces had been trained and partnered and the objectives physically isolated, the clear phase of the operation began with an aviation insertion of 1,420 U.S. Marines and their Afghan partners to Marjah and 900 UK forces and their Afghan partners to the northern elements of Nad Ali District. As a result of previous shaping operations, including IO and electronic warfare sorties, tactical surprise was achieved for the aviation insertion, and by the end of February 13, ANSF and ISAF forces established control of key junctions and locations in Marjah and Nad Ali District. Following D-Day, a U.S. Marine ground operation was conducted to clear IEDs surrounding Marjah. ANP and ANA partnering with ISAF troops established Afghan-led control of the area in the days following, allowing Afghan Government leadership, including President Karzai, to conduct visits to Marjah and Nad Ali, and to physically and conceptually extend Afghan governance to these areas.

Operation MOSHTARAK represents the initial implementation of the Afghan Government-led District Delivery Program (DDP), developed by the District Development Working Group including the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development; Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL); Ministry of Health; Ministry of Education; and Directorate for Independent and Local Governance. Following clearing operations by ANSF and ISAF forces, the Stabilization Plan for district-level service delivery by line ministries was launched.

As of March 15, the Government of Afghanistan's authority had been successfully extended and development projects were ongoing, including the visible construction of a new road to link Nad Ali District with the provincial capital of Lashkar Gah and the establishment of enduring ANP checkpoints and police stations for permanent presence of Afghan governance and rule of law.

**Operation MOSHTARAK Phase 3 – Operations in Central Kandahar.** The combined force planning for the force increase and expansion of operations in central Kandahar is ongoing; the operation is to be Afghan-led with ISAF in a supporting role. The operation will commence incrementally, once the political conditions are set, with the deployment of 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, 71<sup>st</sup> Cavalry followed by 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade, 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division and 525 Battlefield Surveillance Battalion; all forces deploying will be partnered with ANSF during the conduct of reception, staging, and onward integration.

**Task Force Uruzgan Expansion of Agriculture Development Zone.** Task Force Uruzgan has facilitated various projects and programs in local agriculture. In November 2009, the UN Food and Agricultural Organization seeds and fertilizer distribution program was implemented, which provided 13,000 families in Deh Rawood, Chora, Tarin Kowt, and Khas Uruzgan with seeds and fertilizers. The distribution was coordinated by non-government organizations (Afghan National Reconstruction Coordination, Afghan Development Association, Afghan Health and Development Society) that used Community Development Councils to identify the beneficiaries. Pricing was carefully managed to ensure that the buyers would see it as an investment.

In December and January, the German Technical Organization distributed 400,000 almond trees in Chora and Tarin Kowt. The saffron yield in November and December nearly doubled compared to 2008. More than 500 farmers are now involved in the project.



The Food and Agricultural Organization trained their implementing partners in project management in order to handle the aftermath of the 2008 seeds and fertilizer distribution program, in which beneficiaries had to hand over a small portion of their yields to the Food and Agricultural Organization (instead of buying the seeds as in 2009). This yield will be distributed to other beneficiaries. Looking forward, it is expected that there will be an increase in almond crops, and potentially also in wheat, although these will be within the confines of the Agriculture Development Zone.

### **3.3.4: Regional Command-West**

During the last five months, RC-West forces have conducted numerous military operations in western Afghanistan. In Badghis Province the main effort focused on securing the Bala Morghab and the Moqur Districts as well as implementing freedom of movement along Highway 1 and Lithium Road. These operations included consolidating and expanding control on the Morghab River, providing freedom of movement along Lithium Road, and supporting ANSF operations.

In Ghowr Province, the situation was calm with ANSF and ISAF military operations limited strictly to civil-military coordination and IO activities. In October 2009, RC-West forces temporarily reinforced PRT Chagcharan with a Task Force North company in order to support local Afghan and ANSF efforts during the national run-off election period.

In Herat Province, combined operations with the ANSF focused on holding operations and removing malign insurgent influence in Shewashan and Pashtoon Zargoon areas and the Sabzak and Zeerko valleys. In addition, RC-West supported RC-South's Operation MOSHTARAK in central Helmand.

Several key leader engagements and humanitarian aid distributions were conducted as well as engineer reconnaissance missions and combat patrols in Herat City District in order to guarantee freedom of movement and security in the area.

In Farah Province, the operations were conducted to shape the Safarak area, to clear Kake Safed, and to hold Push Rud and Shewan areas. The Nawah-E Robot-E Torkan Valley (Bala Baluk District) and Jijah Valley were cleared, and backup support was also provided to ANSF narcotics eradication operations.

### **3.3.5: Regional Command-North**

The winter campaign for 2009 and 2010 focused on shape-clear operations in RC-North forces' area of operations. Combined operations with SOF (ISAF SOF and Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan) were carried out in Charar Darreh in order to shape the battlefield for follow-on operations. Operations also focused on maintaining access to key terrain in Charar Darreh and holding the permanent presence of Combined Team North. Due to

the positive influence of local defense forces (militias)<sup>11</sup> the security situation in east Kunduz improved during the reporting period.

In Balhk, the full spectrum of COIN operations is being conducted. While progress is slow, actions have enabled an increase in operational readiness, training, and capabilities of ANP to support the “hold” phase in Balkh Province. Toward the end of the reporting period, operations commenced in the border area between Faryab and Sar-e-Pol, where security was deteriorating.

Combined Team North conducted shaping operations in key terrain in the district Baghlan-I-Jadid in March. Success to date has included:

- Gained access to insurgent heartland by holding key terrain;
- Disrupted/harassed insurgent C2 infrastructure;
- Improved combined/joint action with ANSF;
- Improved situational awareness on broad scale (intelligence, civil-military cooperation, terrain); and
- Created initial step for access to the people.

Improvement has only occurred in those provinces that have access to Afghan hold forces (Afghan Gendarmerie and ANP). The capability of these forces will continue to improve in the RC-North area of operations with the incoming influx of U.S. forces and the engagement of ANP units with the elements of the 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade, 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division.

### **3.4: Afghanistan–Pakistan Regional Cooperation**

Afghanistan and Pakistan share a common enemy in the COIN fight. ISAF has taken steps to enhance greater military coordination and cooperation among ISAF, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The Tripartite Joint Intelligence Operation Center (T-JIOC), situated in Headquarters ISAF, is staffed by liaison officers from ISAF, the Pakistan military (PAKMIL), and ANSF personnel. The T-JIOC serves as the control center to oversee all cross-border coordination. Border Control Centers are positioned strategically along the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan to provide timely and coordinated responses to resolve conflicts and coordinate cross-border operations. Border Control Centers are also staffed with liaison officers from ISAF, PAKMIL, and ANSF to enhance the cooperation and collaboration efforts of the T-JIOC.

Two Combined Campaign Planning Conferences occurred on January 8 and 20, 2010. The IJC hosted the events with participants from ANSF, PAKMIL, and ISAF to conduct combined operations coordination, collaboration, and planning. These Combined Campaign Planning Conferences and future planned events will help achieve greater unity of effort along the Afghanistan and Pakistan border. The Combined Campaign Planning Conference is how we will start developing the shared solution based on a shared understanding of a shared problem.


The Pakistan Army initiated clearing operations in January and February 2010 against Pakistan insurgents as part of Operation SHER DIL (Lion’s heart) focused on the Bajaur and Mohmand

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<sup>11</sup> See section on Local Defense Initiatives Part One, Section 4.7.

agencies of the FATA as well as Operation RAH-E-NAJAT in South Waziristan Agency (SWA). In SWA, Operation RAH-E-RAST continues. In conjunction with ISAF's Operation MOSHTARAK, the Pakistan military has maintained an increased presence along Afghanistan's southern border. Pakistan reports these operations have succeeded in extending the writ of the Pakistan Government within the area including the former insurgent stronghold of Damadola, native home of Maulana Faqir Muhammad.

**Figure 4 - Afghanistan and Pakistan Military Operations, March 2010**



These operations represent the largest deployment of PAKMIL forces on the western border of Pakistan in the nation's history, with over 130,000 PAKMIL deployed to the FATA and Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). (Please see Figure 4 for a map of key Afghanistan–Pakistan Military Operations.) More than 100,000 PAKMIL troops were moved from the eastern border with India. This unprecedented deployment and thinning of the lines against India indicates that Islamabad has acknowledged its domestic insurgent threat. Pakistan has suffered attacks from terrorists in response to its successful operations. These attacks include mass casualty events in Mingora, SWA — close to clearing operations — as well as in Lahore, far away from the fighting. While these attacks do not appear to have shaken Pakistan's commitment, they do demonstrate, for the time being, insurgent ability to continue attacks despite reported successful PAKMIL operations.

The PAKMIL is beginning to acknowledge the ties and threats posed by Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. The Pakistani operations have focused almost exclusively on internal threats. These operations reduce the space available to all insurgent and extremists groups. While this evolving approach is unlikely to have significant impact on the Afghan insurgency in the short term, it offers opportunities in coming months to have a greater impact on the conflict in Afghanistan,

depending on how PAKMIL operations evolve. Despite discussions regarding the possibility of transfer of Afghan Taliban captured in Pakistan to Afghanistan, most notably Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, no transfers have taken place. The PAKMIL has also offered to provide military training to Afghan army and security personnel. The Afghan Ministry of Defense (MoD) is reviewing the offer, but is evaluating it cautiously based on Afghan Government political concerns.

### 3.5: Population Security

Security and stability conditions in the 80 Key Terrain districts and 41 Area of Interest districts are presently far from satisfactory.<sup>12</sup>

Before proceeding to a detailed discussion of these conditions, a brief introduction of the assessments process is necessary to ensure understanding of the terminology used and the sources of the information.

IJC headquarters developed a comprehensive operational assessments process as a component of ISAF's overall campaign assessment process. The IJC process is bottom-up driven, combining a variety of subjective and objective inputs to arrive at an assessment of conditions with respect to governance, development, and security in those portions of the area of operations that have been identified as key terrain.

Combined IJC and Afghan Government planning teams identified 80 districts as key terrain. In general, key terrain – defined in military terms as those areas that afford a marked advantage to whichever party controls them – are those districts where the bulk of the population is concentrated, and that contain centers of economic productivity, key infrastructure, and key commerce routes connecting such areas to each other and to the outside world. A brief look at the map (Figure 5 - Overall Assessment of Key Districts, March 18, 2010) will show, unsurprisingly, that these districts roughly follow the line of Highways 1, 4, and 7 through the most densely populated portions of the country.

Supplementing the 80 Key Terrain districts are an additional 41 districts identified as areas of interest. In general these are districts that for a variety of reasons exert influence on Key Terrain districts to a degree that renders it necessary to focus information collection and operational resources upon them to support operations in the Key Terrain districts.

Focus on these 121 districts does not imply that what happens in the rest of the country is unimportant, but it does indicate that the focus of the IJC's operations is concentrated in those areas that have been identified by combined Afghan and ISAF planning efforts as the most critical to success. Operational assessment necessarily focuses upon these areas.

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<sup>12</sup> To prioritize efforts, 80 Key Terrain districts and 41 Areas of Interest have been selected with Afghan Government agreement. Key Terrain is defined as areas *the control of (and support from) which provides a marked advantage to either the Government of Afghanistan or the insurgents*; examples include population centers. Areas of Interest are defined similarly, but are of secondary importance to Key Terrain. To optimize use of resources, ISAF selected 45 Key Terrain districts and three Area of Interest districts as focus of effort in 2010.

Conditions in these districts are assessed by means of bottom-up reporting from Regional Commanders to COMIJC, supplemented by the full range of all-source reporting collected and analyzed by the IJC's Information Dominance Center. The bird's-eye view of conditions with respect to the governance, development, and security lines of operation is depicted by means of a five-point color-coded rating for each district, as seen on the maps in the detailed discussion below. Each district also receives an "overall" rating using a similar rating scale. Supporting this color-coding are detailed narratives describing specific conditions in each district, an assessment of the status of essential elements of district governance organizations and infrastructure, biographical assessments of the qualities of key district leaders, and other quantitative and qualitative indicators.

The guiding philosophy driving the development of the assessment ratings was the concept of population support: do conditions with respect to governance, development, and security tend to influence the population toward support for the Afghan Government, or in the direction of anti-government elements? Overall, what is the level of popular support for the Afghan Government or for the insurgency in each district?

Terminology and color codes are described in the table below.

**Table 2 - Criteria for Assessing Districts**

Color Code	Governance	Development	Security	Overall
Green	Full Authority	Sustainable Development	Secure Environment	Population supports Afghan Government
Blue	Emerging	Dependent Growth	Occasional Threats	Population Sympathizes with Afghan Government
Yellow		Minimal Growth	Frequent Threats	Population Neutral
Gray	Dysfunctional	Stalled Growth	Dangerous Environment	Population Sympathizes with Insurgency
Red	Nonexistent	Population at Risk	Insecure Environment	Population Supports Insurgency

The overall assessment indicates that the population sympathizes with or supports the Afghan Government in 24% (29 of 121) of all Key Terrain and Area of Interest districts. The establishment of effective governance is a critical enabler for improving development and security. As the operational plan progresses, ISAF is working closely with the Government of Afghanistan and the international community to coordinate and synchronize governance and development in the 48 focus districts prioritized for 2010.

Overall Assessment of Key Districts

Figure 5 - Overall Assessment of Key Districts, March 18, 2010






Figure 6 - Comparison of Overall Assessment of Key Districts, December 24, 2009 - March 18, 2010



**Figure 7 - Comparison of Security Assessment of Key Districts, December 24, 2009 - March 18, 2010**



Currently 35% (42 of 121) of the Key Terrain and Area of Interest districts are assessed favorably at the “occasional threats”<sup>13</sup> level or better.

Although the overall security situation has stabilized somewhat since the end of 2009, violence during the current reporting period is still double that for the same period in 2008-2009. However, some individual islands of security exist in the sea of instability and insecurity. A new contiguous island of security is reported by RC-North in the districts surrounding Mazar-e-Sharif. Additionally, a small secure contiguous area exists within RC-South from the Ring Road to the Wesh-Chaman Border Control Point. The limits of security are significantly related to the presence of well-led and non-corrupt ANSF. In a significant number of cities, the secure zone is primarily the inner portion of the city center, with the outlying, more rural areas less secure due to insurgent presence. The location and size of the security zones is primarily the location where improvements in governance and development can occur. Therefore, the expansion of the security zones leads to the opportunity to improve governance and development in those areas.

Active ANSF leadership supports the ongoing Operation MOSHTARAK in central Helmand. Combined ISAF and ANSF forces continue to gain ground in Marjah. Consolidating gains and continuing to deny the Taliban a chance to re-establish a foothold will be the focus for continued operations. These events collectively demonstrate the increasing proficiency of the ANSF.

In some areas where ANSF presence is limited, militias and guardians, sometimes with the approval of the Afghan Government – while an imperfect guarantee of security – assist in improvements to the security of some districts. In the Khanabad District of Kunduz Province in RC-North, militias maintain a fragile stability within the outlying areas of the district that would otherwise contain numerous insurgents. In the case of Khanabad, however, the militia is assessed as neither supporting the anti-Afghan forces nor the Afghan Government. The Afghan Public Protection Police (AP3) within Wardak Province, under the auspice of the Afghan Ministry of Interior with active partnering by U.S. Forces, covers nearly five districts including the Key Terrain district of Seyedabad along the Ring Road and the Area of Interest district of


<sup>13</sup> The threat scale: secure environment, occasional threats, frequent threats, dangerous environment, and unsecure environment.

Nirkh. This mentored program provides another security force option that can mitigate the insurgent threat.

Although widespread insurgent influence remains, a high percentage (84%) of Afghans feel that security is either “good” or “fair” in their *mantqa* (area). Additionally, 44% of respondents rated security as “good.” While these numbers represent a decline compared to the previous quarter, they are still relatively good compared to historical trends.

**Afghan Perception of Security**

**Figure 8 - Afghan Public Opinion Poll on Security, September 2008–March 2010**



14

Maintaining Afghan population support for ISAF and its mission is critical for two reasons. First, ISAF is closely linked with the Government of Afghanistan and is working actively to assist the government in taking steps to increase its competence, effectiveness, legitimacy and acceptance. Critical to this is ISAF’s ability to maintain the support of the Afghan people in order to realize desired gains. Second, popular support is a prerequisite for success in a COIN campaign; the alternative is popular support for the insurgency, which renders the ISAF mission unachievable.


Afghan popular support for ISAF and its mission is variable; however, a decline in Afghan perceptions toward ISAF has been evident over the last quarter. In December 2009, the perception of ISAF improved from the post-election lows of September 2009. However, in March 2010, perceptions dropped again. The “very good” rating has reached its lowest point since polling began in September 2008. As shown in the figure below, 29% of Afghans had a “very good” or “good” opinion of ISAF with an additional 34% reporting a “neutral” rating. Directives have been issued to ISAF personnel and partners regarding respect for Afghan culture,

<sup>14</sup> Afghan opinion polls are conducted quarterly as part of ISAF Nationwide Survey and thus the data represents the opinions for each quarter going back to 2008.



treatment of its citizens, better partnering, and mentorship with Afghan organizations in both the military and civilian sectors. In addition, actions that demonstrate ISAF intent to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan are important factors in positively influencing Afghan popular perception of ISAF. However, these positive influencers may be temporarily outweighed by increased force numbers and kinetic events.

**Figure 9 - Afghan Public Opinion Poll of ISAF, December 2008–December 2009**



### 3.6: Violence and Kinetic Events

One indicator for illustrating violence levels is kinetic events. The steady increase of kinetic events in 2009 reached a peak in August, just prior to the presidential elections. Between August and December we saw a descending trend, which has since leveled out to the end of this reporting period. However, events are running at twice the average of 2008-2009 for the same period. As in previous years, the majority of the incidents occurred in the southern provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, and Uruzgan, and in the east of the country in Konar and Khowst. Kinetic levels in the south spiked in February 2010 as a direct result of the opening of the offensive phase of Operation MOSHTARAK.

The overall trend of violence throughout the country has gradually decreased since the peak reached during the August 2009 election. However, the overall violence trend during this reporting period is significantly increased from previous reporting periods. Violence is sharply above the seasonal average for the previous year – an 87% increase from February 2009 to March 2010. Figure 10 illustrates the compounding trend of increased kinetic events since December 2007.

Violence levels have been generally constant throughout the winter. This can be attributed, in part, to the mild winter. A more significant factor is the increased level of ANSF and ISAF shaping operations to set the conditions for the start of Operation MOSHTARAK in central Helmand.

Figure 10 - Kinetic Events in Afghanistan by week, December 2007-March 2010<sup>15</sup>





Figure 11 - Kinetic Events, October 2009-March 2010<sup>16</sup>



<sup>15</sup> SAFIRE is surface to air fire.


<sup>16</sup> NATO Secret CIDNE database, through 31 March 2010

**3.6.1: IED Events**

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) continue to be the number one threat to U.S. and Allied forces in Afghanistan. Secretary Gates continues to make counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) efforts that enable protection of U.S. Forces a priority for the Department of Defense.

IED attacks and associated casualties decreased compared to the last reporting period but were still high compared to the same period of the previous year. IEDs continue to cause the most civilian and military casualties. IED events increased markedly in 2009. The overall number of events was two times higher in December 2009 compared to 2008. This increase led to an increase in the total number of casualties by 55%, with a 123% increase in international partner casualties. January to March 2010 saw a 16% increase in IED use, mainly caused by central Helmand operations where insurgents prepared an IED-based defense.

**Figure 12 - IED Events, October 2009-March 2010<sup>1718</sup>**



Providing similar C-IED support to ISAF Allies and partners is also a priority for the Secretary. At the February NATO Informal Defense Ministers Ministerial in Istanbul, Turkey, Secretary Gates announced a comprehensive C-IED support package for Allies and partners fighting in Afghanistan. The Secretary focused on three key areas of support: information exchange, training support, and the loaning of key C-IED enabling equipment. These efforts are designed to improve the ability of Allies and partners to protect their own forces against IEDs, which will save lives, maintain Alliance solidarity in Afghanistan, and complement U.S. force protection efforts.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> “Own Goal” describes an event where the insurgent inadvertently detonates the mine or IED and kills himself.

**Information Exchange**

The Department of Defense is considering ways to improve information exchange to ensure that all partners have access to critical and timely information on IEDs. In December 2009, ISAF established intelligence fusion cells in RC-East, RC-South, and RC-North to improve information and intelligence exchange. These cells bring together intelligence analysts and information from across the Alliance to improve the ground commanders' access to information. To further the C-IED fight, the Department of Defense (DoD) is exploring ways to expand real-time access to classified databases and systems that deal with IEDs, such as the Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) counter-IED database. Access to this network will allow U.S. and partner forces to stay current on the latest IED threats and tactics, which will increase force protection capabilities.

**C-IED Training**

In addition to improving the flow of information, augmenting the C-IED training that deploying forces receive before reaching Afghanistan will teach life-saving skills that will further increase the forces' ability to protect themselves. DoD is coordinating training support for NATO Allies and partners through the Services and the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO). These C-IED experts can provide pre-deployment and home-station train-the-trainer courses that focus on C-IED battle staff training, team training, and pre-deployment exercise support.

**C-IED Enabling Equipment**

The training program will prepare Allied and partner forces to effectively use equipment that the U.S. will loan to forces in the fight in Afghanistan. The training and equipment will be tailored to the mission each nation will execute and the IED threats specific to their areas of operation and Regional Commands. Equipment to be loaned include persistent threat reduction systems, electronic control measures used to counter remote-detonated IEDs, robotic equipment for route clearance and engineering missions, and mine detection equipment. The equipment will remain the property of the U.S. Government for use by forces in Afghanistan, and will be returned upon completion of the mission.

**Loan of MRAPs**


In addition to the previously mentioned C-IED equipment, the Secretary directed DoD to provide a number of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles to Allies to protect their forces in Afghanistan. The Secretary articulated three ways that Allies will be provided MRAPs: facilitation of MRAP sales to Allies that want to purchase them; applying various DoD funding authorities to loan MRAP vehicles to nations that cannot afford them; and providing nations with MRAPs in excess of U.S. force needs. Some partners have already indicated their desire to purchase MRAPs and DoD will help facilitate the sales and delivery of these vehicles through the Foreign Military Sales process. For nations that cannot afford to purchase MRAPs, the Secretary directed DoD to procure MRAPs for loan to Allied nations using the Coalition Readiness Support Program. Finally, as U.S. forces begin drawing down from Iraq, MRAPs that are excess to the U.S. commanders' needs will be transferred to Afghanistan and loaned to Allies and partners under Section 1202 authority. Cumulatively, it is the Secretary's intent to begin moving these MRAPs to Allies and partners no later than the fall of 2010.

### 3.7: Civilian Casualties (CIVCAS)


Civilian casualties (CIVCAS) is a strategic issue that will impact the success and progress of the U.S. and international community in Afghanistan. Minimizing the number and magnitude of CIVCAS incidents is critically important, as is the need to effectively manage the consequences of such incidents when they do occur. The insurgents are responsible for 80% of CIVCAS. However, insurgents can exploit and manipulate CIVCAS events to their advantage, while U.S. and international forces are held accountable by the Afghan population for all incidents where there are CIVCAS.

Data indicate that ISAF is reducing the number of CIVCAS incidents. The numbers of CIVCAS caused by ISAF have fallen in relation to the size of the force and despite an increase in OPTEMPO. Compliance with COMISAF’s *Tactical Directive, Tactical Driving Guidance, Escalation of Force Directive, and Night Raids Tactical Directive* is having a positive impact. By contrast, the Taliban “code of conduct” regarding CIVCAS avoidance, noted earlier in this report, appears to have had little impact. There have been instances observed when the insurgents used civilians as human shields trying to exploit ISAF caution. ISAF remains committed to safeguarding non-combatants and avoiding CIVCAS at all costs. UNAMA released in January 2010 its annual report on *Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict* that states: “ISAF’s declared strategy of prioritizing the safety and security of civilians is a welcome development and, as the latter months of 2009 indicate, such policies greatly enhance the protection of all civilians. However, the inability or unwillingness of the armed opposition to take measures that pre-empt and reduce the harm that their tactics entail for civilians translates into a growing death toll and an ever larger proportion of the total number of civilian dead.”

**Figure 13 - Civilians Killed, October 2009–March 2010<sup>19</sup>**



<sup>19</sup> Civilian casualty (CIVCAS) data taken from the ISAF CIVCAS Database. The “Other” category in the two figures is a roll-up of four categories from the database including UNAMA, Afghan, Natural Disaster, and “Other.”

Figure 14 - Civilians Wounded, October 2009–March 2010<sup>20</sup>

## Section 4 – Governance


A national survey completed in March 2010 indicates that 59% of Afghans believe their government is headed in the right direction, an increase of 0.5% over December 2009 and 8% over September 2009. However, more than 83% reported that corruption affects their daily life. Despite the prevalence of corruption, 45% reported confidence in the national government, an increase of 6% over September 2009. Sub-national governance projects were largely stalled during the fourth quarter of 2009 due to increased insecurity and an extended and controversial presidential election process. Figure 15 provides an assessment of district-level governance in Afghanistan as of March.

While improving the security situation is a vital first step, progress made improving the security environment cannot be sustained in the long term without parallel improvements in governance and development. A consolidated approach is crucial to the eventual success or failure of the ISAF mission. Additionally, although ISAF plays only a supporting role in the extension of governance and socio-economic development in Afghanistan, it must continue to use focused key leader engagement to highlight issues and work in partnership with the Government of Afghanistan to develop and implement solutions that promote positive changes in governance.

### *Cabinet and Governor Appointments*

Since the announcement of the Presidential election results in November 2009, President Karzai has only succeeded in receiving parliamentary confirmation of 14 of 25 cabinet ministers. Eight of the ministries have acting ministers with very limited authority and three ministries have no minister. Confirmation of these 11 ministers is vital to progress toward good governance in these respective ministries, the enactment of the Government of Afghanistan's national policies, and the development of strategic plans and guidance within these ministries.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

**Figure 15 - District Level Governance Assessment, March 2010**

#### 4.1: Population Perception of the Government

In March 2010, 30% of Afghans believed that the government was less corrupt than one year prior while only 24% believed that it was more corrupt. Eighty-three percent of Afghans stated that government corruption affected their daily lives — a 1% decrease from December 2009 but still 4% higher than September 2009. Twenty-nine percent of Afghans believed their president to be corrupt, while 33% believed their provincial governor to be corrupt, and 34% believed their district governor to be corrupt. These results actually represent drops of 5% from the previous quarter (a positive indicator).<sup>21</sup>

Despite their feelings about government corruption, Afghans' confidence in their government reached a new high (since polling started in September 2008). Between September and March of 2009, Afghan confidence in the national administration increased by six percentage points to 45%, confidence in the provincial governor increased by five percentage points to 47%, and confidence in the district governors increased by six percentage points to 44%. When asked if the government was heading “in the right direction,” 59% of Afghans responded “yes.” This represents an increase of eight percent over the previous September 2009.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>21</sup> Statistics from ISAF Nationwide Survey, September 2009, December 2009, March 2010.

<sup>22</sup> Statistics from ISAF Nationwide Survey, September 2009, December 2009, March 2010.

## 4.2: Anti-Corruption Efforts

While Afghanistan has achieved some progress on anti-corruption, in particular with regard to legal and institutional reforms, real change remains elusive and political will, in particular, remains doubtful. Public perceptions of the government with regard to corruption continue to be decidedly negative, with blame placed on ISAF and the rest of the international community as well as the government.

In October 2009, the Afghan Government, via the Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF), a special crime investigation unit mentored by the FBI and the UK Serious Organized Crime Agency, achieved its first high-profile corruption arrest (the Saifullah case). In addition, the mayor of Kabul was charged with corruption by the Attorney General's Office in December 2009, indicted, and removed from office. The Saifullah case has yet to go to trial. More recently, in February 2010, the MCTF completed an investigation into the former Minister of Hajj for extorting bribes from pilgrims; however, as of March 15 charges and an arrest warrant were still pending. While these cases prove the ability of Afghan institutions to carry out investigations and even arrests of high-profile corrupt actors, they also highlight continuing challenges with trial capacity and political interference.

The Afghan Government presented an anti-corruption concept paper at the January 2010 London Conference, which included 32 specific commitments that the government would accomplish between February 28, 2010 and the end of the year. These commitments include a number of potentially significant reforms:

- Empowering the High Office of Oversight to compel enforcement actions by other government departments with regard to corruption;
- Defining and establishing investigative powers of the High Office of Oversight regarding administrative corruption within the government;
- Establishing a statutory basis for the MCTF;
- Developing a legislative agenda to align Afghan law with the United Nations Convention Against Corruption;
- Developing a list of senior civil service positions to be subject to a transparent hiring process;
- Passing legislation to strengthen asset declaration requirements for senior government officials; and
- Establishing an International Monitoring and Evaluation Mission, a combined International-Afghan expert body that will periodically review progress on anti-corruption in Afghanistan, provide recommendations, and publish a report of findings.

The first set of 13 measures was supposed to be brought into effect by Presidential decree no later than February 28, 2010. As of March 2010, only one of two decrees has been signed. When the other is signed, it will leave eleven of 13 first "tranche" commitments to fulfill. Six more are due by the Kabul Conference (currently scheduled for early June 2010) and the remaining 13 by the end of 2010.



The Afghan Government, with significant international community support, has also established an Anti-Corruption Unit within the Attorney General's Office, a mentored and vetted unit to prosecute high-profile corruption cases. This fulfills a requirement from the June 2008 Anti-Corruption Implementing Law. The Anti-Corruption Unit currently has four of a planned final capability of 51 prosecutors on the job.

Another requirement of that law is an Anti-Corruption Tribunal under the Supreme Court to try corruption cases. Eleven judges have been nominated and vetted for this court and it recently began hearing its first case.

While these are potentially significant moves, each one has required a great deal of encouragement, pressure, and support from the international community to come to fruition. It remains clear that while the government will take some actions, there remains a way to go in the anti-corruption fight. The Government of Afghanistan, as a whole, has yet to exercise sustained leadership on this critical issue or to take the initiative, instead of merely responding to international community initiatives, pressure, and encouragement. Anti-corruption institutions remain dependent on international community support in order to function and remain in existence.

ISAF Anti-Corruption Guidance holds the entire force accountable for recognizing, reporting, and acting against corruption within the mandates of ISAF. The Anti-Corruption Task Force continues to meet weekly to prioritize cases and coordinate with the involved Embassies, the MCTF, European Union Police (EUPOL), and NTM-A. ISAF also initiated a planning effort that, by the end of March 2010, will produce a set of concrete actions to impact the corruption problem over the next six months. The concept behind this effort is to make visible impacts that will begin changing the perceptions of the Afghan people regarding government corruption, and thereby foster the restoration of trust between the government and the people. With focused shorter-term efforts, we will build momentum to expand success in the longer term.

The political will to prosecute those charged with corruption remains a significant obstacle to progress against corruption in the country. While some positive measures have been achieved, the commitments that the Afghan Government made at the London Conference provide a basis for bringing about further needed reforms. In the short- to mid-term (next six months to two years) it is vital to continue with institutional reforms driven by a consistent and coordinated message from the international community.

### **4.3: Elections**

The Afghanistan 2009 Presidential and provincial council elections were conducted on August 20, 2009. President Karzai was declared the winner by the Independent Elections Commission (IEC) on November 2, 2009. The results of the provincial council elections were not officially announced until December 26, 2009. The 2009 elections were marred with allegations of fraud and corruption, which drew significant complaints both domestically and internationally. January brought a positive sign of the maturing electoral process when the IEC announced its decision to postpone parliamentary elections from May until September 2010. The IEC cited as

its rationale a lack of funding, security uncertainties, logistical challenges, and the need for “improvement of the election process in the country.”

However, without specific details of how the election process will be managed at the provincial level, it will be difficult to complete a comprehensive assessment of the electoral process for the upcoming parliamentary elections. ISAF will continue to use its influence to promote unity of effort between the Government of Afghanistan, UNAMA, and the donor community to encourage quick identification of a limited set of practical, technical reforms to reduce fraud at polling sites. Only if progress is made in this area can we expect to see a better electoral event in the fall than we experienced last year.

On March 17, 2010, President Karzai signed a presidential decree issuing a number of significant changes to the extant electoral law, which have the potential to complicate international oversight and fraud monitoring. On March 31, 2010 the lower house of Parliament (the Wolesi Jirga) rejected this decree and it now remains in limbo. The full impact of these laws on the electoral process will be assessed in the near future. It is critical that the fall 2010 elections are viewed both domestically and internationally as an improvement over the 2009 elections.

The IEC is preparing for a voting capacity for twelve million voters but does not expect more than six million voters to turn out for the elections. Additionally, the IEC expects approximately 3,000 candidates, 6,800 polling centers, and 20,000 polling stations. ISAF is prepared to assist with security as needed, building upon last year’s efforts where the ANSF successfully took the lead in election security efforts.

#### **4.4: Government Reform**

Capable ministry executives and civil servants are vital to increasing and improving the capacity of the Afghan Government at the national and sub-national levels. Significant progress in this area is not achieved in months but in years. Currently, the Government of Afghanistan, United Nations, and donor community collaborate on programs to assist in policy reform, organizational reform, and the reformation of public administration systems. These initiatives are vital to the Government of Afghanistan’s efforts to gain the trust of the people of Afghanistan and to strengthen its legitimacy both domestically and internationally. Some of the reforms are focused on implementing the systems and processes that will enable sustainable long term growth of the ministries and the permanent staff of the ministries. Afghan perceptions of the ability of the government to deliver services will assist in ensuring that the Afghan people will accept the Afghan Government as a culturally and ideologically acceptable government. However, it is crucial to recognize that what is appropriate for the international community may not be the best solution for Afghanistan, due to social, cultural, and economic differences. As of the end of the reporting period this remains an area of challenge and risk.

##### **4.4.1: Civil Service Reform**

The Afghan Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC) is contributing to the government reform effort, through its Civil Service Institute and to date it has

redefined more than 80,000 government civil servant job descriptions in the various ministries. This commission is also working closely with the Ministry of Finance and the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) to develop sustainable incentives for the recruitment and retention of quality civil servants.

The Afghan Civil Service Institute has graduated over 1,300 government employees. The objective of this initiative is to train civil servants to deliver better and faster administrative services to Afghans. This program focuses on improving civil servant capacities in the functional areas of procurement, policy/strategy, financial management, personnel management, and project management. The institute provides training in leadership, management, and public administration reform. This institute is a vital component in the development of competent, effective, and efficient public service employees and systems.

The Capacity Development Program, renamed in May 2009 the Afghanistan Civil Service Support (ACSS), will be disbursing \$85 million from January 2010 through the end of the project in February 2011. The ACSS supports the IARCSC to train civil servants throughout Afghanistan in the five common administrative functions as stated in the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS):

- Financial management,
- Project management,
- Human resources management,
- Procurement, and
- Policy/strategic planning.

Throughout 2010, over 15,000 training sessions will be offered in these five functions at the national and sub-national levels, coordinated through the IARCSC and Afghan Civil Service Institute's regional offices and provincial training facilities. Emphasizing the need for improved sub-national governance, the program will provide technical assistance to Provincial Development Councils and support the work to decentralize resources and information received by Afghan line ministries.

In addition to these activities, ACSS will provide support to the IARCSC to ensure the successful implementation of Public Administrative Reform across the civil service. The purpose of Public Administrative Reform as outlined within the Civil Service Law is to, "lead, regulate reform, formulate, and implement structure and policies of the public administration system." The key components are:

- Organizational restructuring of government,
- Administrative reform to strengthen decision making and service delivery,
- Implementation of a new pay and grading system and related exit management,
- Merit based appointments across the civil service,
- Institution of civil service performance evaluation systems, and
- Civil Service training and capacity building.

In supporting the IARCSC to achieve these objectives, ACSS will provide legal assistance and policy guidance to senior civil service management on Public Administrative Reform strategies, develop performance evaluation systems, implement an effective Human Resource Management Information System, and provide technical assistance to the IARCSC Appointments and Appeals boards in support of the institutional development of a merit-based civil service for Afghanistan.

#### **4.4.2: Civilian Technical Assistance Plan (CTAP)**

The Afghan Government-owned Civilian Technical Assistance Program (CTAP) has been developed to address four key areas of concern to the Government of Afghanistan: one, better coordination of interventions and technical assistance; two, reducing the cost of technical assistance; three, ensuring that the government defines the priorities for technical assistance; and four, achieving more effective technical assistance. Over time, CTAP will lead the government to become more business-like in operations and improve its service to the people of Afghanistan. It will also gain better control of its development priorities through the implementation of programs and ANDS priorities. CTAP aims to comply with four key principles stating that for technical assistance to be effective, it should be effective, demand-driven, government-led, and focused primarily on capacity development.

The U.S. Government is transferring \$30 million (\$10 million in FY 2009 and \$20 million in FY 2010) in budget support directly to the Ministry of Finance to implement the CTAP. This money will enable the government by increasing its authority to recruit, hire, and place technical advisors in ministries at the national and sub-national level. For the United States, CTAP represents a rationalization of technical assistance by reducing the reliance on large institutional contractors and allowing more control and oversight over the placement of advisors – on Afghan terms, not U.S. terms. Other major international donors are also contributing to CTAP.

At the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) meeting in January and at the January 28 London Conference, the Afghan Government proposed the CTAP as a tool both to improve capacities within government departments and to coordinate efforts between donors and the Afghan Government. The government expressed that CTAP is the preferred vehicle of technical assistance, and donors should align their capacity improvement programs with CTAP and channel their assistance through it.

Currently, donors have provided funding support for 80 personnel, sustainable over a five-year period. Pilot projects with the IDLG, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Mines, and the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL) have already been launched for the Afghan Government to recruit desired advisors. With design of the assistance for the pilots complete and hiring underway, the CTAP secretariat anticipates placing the first four advisors in the financial and administration areas of the IDLG in April. An additional eight personnel are projected to be hired for MAIL in the May-June 2010 timeframe.

#### **4.4.3: Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG)**

The Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), a ministerial-level body focused on sub-national governance reporting to President Karzai, is responsible for sub-national governance policy and improvements, including the appointments of provincial and district governors. IDLG has three key efforts underway to improve sub-national governance: assisting with the development and execution of the Sub-National Governance policy; improving inter-ministerial coordination through the District Delivery Program (DDP); and, the establishment of a Capacity Building Unit.

The Sub-National Governance policy, approved by the Afghan Cabinet on March 22, provides an overarching framework for improving governance institutions in Afghanistan and paves the way for devolving decision-making and budget authority to the provinces and districts. It is thus a critical enabler for extending a formal governance structure to the provincial level. Fully implementing the policy, however, will take at least five years and require the enactment of nine new laws and the revision of 22 others.

Recognizing the importance of extending governance to the local areas during the “hold” phase of the ISAF campaign plan, IDLG has led an effort to improve inter-ministerial coordination in order to increase service delivery to the Afghan people in the 80 Key Terrain districts. IDLG was formally put in charge of this effort, the District Delivery Program (DDP), by Presidential decree on March 18, 2010. As part of this effort, IDLG has created a Central Support Team to support its coordination, planning and implementation efforts to establish governance and basic services in the Key Terrain districts. This team will consist of a support cell and a mobile advisory team. The advisory team is composed of advisors from various key ministries that provide sub-national public services. The advisory team will assess the needs of the “cleared” districts and coordinate for the delivery of basic services. In addition, they will assist in the establishment of line ministry offices in these areas. The support cell will provide assistance in program/project management, strategic communications, and administrative support to the team.

In addition, the IDLG has recently established a Capacity Building Unit. This unit is focused on development of capacity at institutional, organizational, and individual levels of the IDLG Central Office, provincial governor offices, and district governor offices. This unit will be responsible for development of a five-year capacity-building strategy for IDLG and for launching efforts in Laghman, Nangarhar, and Wardak provinces, beginning with assessments in April 2010.

#### **4.5: Reconciliation and Reintegration**

President Karzai highlighted reintegration and reconciliation as priorities for his second presidential term during his November 2009 inauguration speech, and called for international support of these efforts reiterated at the January 28, 2010 London Conference. The U.S. Government has stated that it supports Afghan-led efforts to assimilate peacefully into Afghan society those who renounce violence, sever all ties with al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups, and abide by the Afghan constitution.

The Afghan-led program is currently under development under the guidance of Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai, Presidential Advisor for Internal Security Affairs and *de facto* Afghan lead on reintegration. The program will be an inter-ministerial effort to respond to reintegration opportunities in key communities. This reintegration program is being designed within the context of the delicate political and ethnic context of Afghanistan and the need to avoid creating perverse incentives for joining the insurgency or exacerbating perceptions of favoritism for certain ethnic and tribal groups. In addition, planning is underway (led by Minister of Education Farook Wardak) for a Consultative Peace Jirga (tentatively scheduled for May) to reach consensus with key representatives of the Afghan people on a way forward for peace and reintegration.

Following the London Conference, an international Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund is being established to support Afghan-led reintegration efforts and ensure that financial resources are available as soon as operationally required. Also during the reporting period, Congress provided the Secretary of Defense with the authority to use funds available for the Commanders' Emergency Response Program for fiscal year 2010, in coordination with the Afghan Government and with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to support the reintegration. These funds will be used in coordination with the international Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund and other U.S. Government funds that enable reintegration in support of an Afghan-led program that seeks to increase stability in Afghanistan by reintegrating back into Afghan society low- and mid-level insurgent commanders and fighters who meet the necessary criteria.

#### **4.6: Rule of Law and Criminal Justice Reform**

In the justice sector, there has been little enduring progress despite significant investment toward reform, infrastructure, and training. Courts are understaffed and chronically corrupt. Corruption may be stemmed by ensuring that the salaries for judicial staff are adequate, that an adequate number of defense attorneys exist, and by implementing a case management system and court watch or court monitoring program. Security for judges and prosecutors continues to be a significant problem, especially in RC-South. Despite these challenges, 50% of Afghans said they would take a dispute to a state court, compared to 38% who would take a dispute to a local *shura/jirga*.

Effective justice sector support at a district level must include support to both the formal and informal justice sectors. There must also be support to strengthen the links, oversight, and accountability mechanisms between the two sectors. At the district level, it is anticipated that the District Delivery Program (DDP) will be one mechanism to improve access to justice at the district level. Judges and prosecutors are the civil servants most at risk at the district level and the ability of ANSF and ISAF to protect returning judges and prosecutors will be critical to the successful establishment of an effective justice system at the district and provincial levels.

The Afghan Government has committed to the adoption and implementation of a national informal justice policy (formally called the National Policy on Relations between the Formal Justice System and Dispute Resolution Councils) contained in the ANDS, the National Justice Sector Strategy, the National Justice Program, and the London Conference Communiqué. The

adoption of a policy will provide a public demonstration of political will, consensus, and commitment to the Government of Afghanistan-led recognition of and support for the informal justice sector in Afghanistan.

Progress to date in reforming the judicial system includes the Supreme Court removal of approximately 40 judges for misconduct; although, until recently, the Court lacked the tools to systematically supervise over 1,300 judges from Kabul. Another significant change is the introduction of the Afghanistan Case Assignment System in every court case completed by Afghanistan Rule of Law Program. The Afghanistan Case Assignment System allows for tracking and assignment of cases, strengthens the capacity of the Supreme Court to monitor and discipline judges, and collects statistics on case flow and makes them publically available. With greater transparency and discipline, opportunities and incentives for judicial corruption will be reduced. Furthermore, a new Rule of Law support program, expected to begin in April or May 2010, will build upon the Afghanistan Rule of Law Program. Key activities anticipated in the new program may include training in judicial ethics for judges at the national, provincial and district levels; establishment of judicial conduct curricula at the university level in all law faculties in Afghanistan (Kabul and six regional institutions); and the training of the eleven judges of the newly created national Anti Corruption Court in Afghan law and the legal and other considerations to be taken into account in connection with corruption cases. The new project will also support provincial judges' access to district courts.

Support for development of the Afghan judicial system comes from a combination of efforts. Presently, there are seven Department of Justice (DoJ) attorneys in Kabul. In addition, the first DoJ Attaché arrived in Kabul on October 29, 2009; this is a new position that is the senior DoJ representative in the Embassy. Recruitment efforts are currently underway to increase the number of DoJ attorneys, both in Kabul and, later (in 2011), in the provinces.

Although there has been success building the rule of law at the Counternarcotics Justice Center (CNJC) and there is hope for similar success at the Anti-Corruption Unit/MCTF, the level of success for tackling the most serious cases of corruption will be measured by the amount of political will. As has been a theme for the past few years, without high-level political will to target and prosecute the most corrupt officials, it is difficult to imagine large and meaningful cases being routinely prosecuted. Political will means more than indifference toward significant cases; more importantly, it means the absence of interference in the judicial process.

A final component to the judicial process is the Afghan corrections system. The Afghan public's perception of the corrections system is that while it is improving, many problems still remain. At the end of the reporting period, prison facilities were opened in all 34 provinces and district detention centers in 225 of 364 districts (62%). However, these facilities are far from perfect and there is a continued need for infrastructure construction/renovation, increased staffing, and training. In December 2009, only 50% of Afghans believed that prisons were capable of holding prisoners for the duration of their sentences. This belief likely stems from knowledge of past prison escapes as well as a number of high-profile cases of criminals who were convicted and sent to prison but later pardoned due to government corruption.

**Joint Task Force-435**

The Joint Task Force (JTF)-435 was formed under the Commander, USFOR-A to assume responsibility for U.S. detention operations and to effect transition of detention operations to the Afghan Government. JTF 435 aligns Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, ISAF, and ANSF detention procedures from point-of-capture to point-of-release and reintegration in order to facilitate the partnered development of a consolidated Afghan Government-owned process. To reduce the strategic vulnerability that detention operations can create, success requires increasing confidence of Afghan citizens and the international community that the U.S. and Afghan Governments' detainee operations are humane, legal, legitimate, and necessary to defeat the insurgency. Transitioning detention operations to the Afghan Government and assisting the government to strengthen its judicial system are beginning steps required to ensure Afghan sovereignty. At present, we must fully partner the collective forces of contributing nations with the Government of Afghanistan in order to develop a comprehensive, Afghan-led, Afghan-owned process.

After reaching initial operational capability on January 7, 2010, the task force has rapidly expanded to fill its Joint Manning Document to 100%. At the same time, JTF-435 continues to pursue filling the Afghan partner billets that complement its lines of operation. The initial build of partner positions includes four Afghan Government Ministry of Justice prison experts and five National Directorate of Security investigators who will form the foundation of the future Parwan Rule of Law Center and will assess additional requirements. The integration of Brigadier General Mohebull, the Afghan JTF-435 Deputy Commander and Afghan Detention Coordinator, and the appointment of Brigadier General Safiulah as the proposed commander of the future Detention Facility in Parwan (DFIP), mark the beginning of Afghan ownership from point-of-capture to point-of-release to ensure the process is fully connected to the Afghan people. It also sets the conditions for evolution of JTF-435 toward becoming a Combined Joint Interagency Task Force (CJIATF).

DFIP transition and partnership has been JTF-435's primary line of operation. The Afghan Government is assisting with finding Afghan personnel to implement vocational-technical, reintegration and de-radicalization programs. On April 1, 2010, JTF-435 will begin training its inaugural Afghan Corrections Officer class of 300 Afghan National Army recruits who will eventually move to the DFIP as part of the facility transition. Every five weeks for seven cycles, 300 soldiers will be trained in order to achieve the force density of Afghan Corrections Officers required to run daily operations at the DFIP. In the coming months, JTF-435 will assess the progress of this effort and the others that align with it as we approach DFIP transition to the Afghan Government by January 2011.

**4.7: Local Defense Initiative**

The Afghan Government is in the process of developing a Local Defense Initiative (LDI) designed to secure local communities by denying insurgents access to and support of the local population at the village level. The initiative is led by the Independent Directorate of Local Governance, and has yet to be formally approved. The intention is for the Minister of Interior to be responsible for the execution of the program through the district chief of police. The program



is designed to augment the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP); controls and vetting will be performed by community leaders and district officials. The Local Defense Initiative program will be implemented within districts where the IDLG assesses leadership to be effective at the district governor and chief of police level.

Currently, the LDI program, which began in July 2009, is organized and run through village *shuras*, under the direction of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) and with the assistance of ANSF in some cases. It is currently active in parts of five districts. After U.S. SOF instruct the village *shuras* in the operation of LDI, the *shuras* then choose and vet the local defenders. The number of local defenders at each village is decided by the village *shura* — in traditional Afghan fashion. While U.S. Forces assist with training and mentoring, as well as reach-back capability to the ANSF and international forces, the village *shura* is responsible for providing weapons to the local defense force. The U.S. SOF encourage cooperation between the local defenders and the ANSF. In some villages the interaction with the ANSF has helped to build trust in the Afghan Government.

## **Section 5 – Reconstruction and Development**

The significance of private sector growth as a focus for Afghan development was underscored at the JCMB and London Conference in January 2010 with endorsement by the international community of a Government of Afghanistan-proposed Integrated Plan for Economic Development. The Afghan Government plans to prioritize strategic objectives and promote synergy among key ministries to define development priorities and develop integrated programs to deliver tangible results. The plan focuses on aligning key ministries in development clusters:

- Agricultural and rural development to build prosperous rural communities;
- Human resource development to prepare Afghans for the labor market; and
- Infrastructure and economic growth to develop a business climate enabling private investment and expanding opportunities for private sector employment.

The Minister of Finance will serve on each cluster to assure a national perspective, leverage projects underway in other clusters, and attract additional investment for substantial job creation and sustainable economic growth. He will also ensure that CTAP, utilizing donor-provided technical assistance and capacity building for Afghan Government civil servants, is incorporated into planning for the implementation of these clusters by Government of Afghanistan line ministries.

The plan also envisions a budget reform process to strengthen Afghan Government financial management capacity to eventually assume ownership and management of Afghan development planning and programming according to a timetable agreed on by donors.

Cluster ministerial groups have been formed and are operating as of early March 2010. The clusters are defining goals and strategies to be vetted with donors in preparation for the Kabul Conference. The Integrated Economic Development Plan is expected to be the leading construct for discussion and adoption at the Kabul Conference in early June.

## **5.1: United Nations Assistance Mission-Afghanistan (UNAMA)**

On October 28, 2009, a United Nations Assistance Mission-Afghanistan (UNAMA) guest house in Kabul was attacked. Five staff members were killed and nine were wounded. For security reasons, UNAMA temporarily relocated to Dubai approximately 600 of its 1,100 international staff. By the first week of March 2010, all staff that had been relocated had returned to Kabul. U.S. civilian assistance efforts were largely unaffected by UNAMA's decision to temporarily relocate its personnel. We support ongoing efforts by the UN to improve the security of UNAMA personnel.

Eight regional and 12 provincial UNAMA offices are currently operational. In 2009, the General Assembly approved a 33% increase in UNAMA's 2010 budget, which includes a substantial increase in the number of international and Afghan staff, and also provides for the opening of four new provincial offices in Jowzjan, Takhar, Panjshir, and either Paktika or Laghman. The Jowzjan and Takhar offices are already operational, but formal opening ceremonies have been delayed. Two provincial offices, in Sar-E-Pol and Tirin Kowt, were opened in 2009. We support an expanded UNAMA presence in the provinces, which will enhance its ability to observe and coordinate civilian assistance in the field.

On March 22, 2010, the 15-member UN Security Council unanimously approved UN Security Council Resolution 1917, renewing UNAMA's mandate. Resolution 1917 recognized the key role the UN plays in coordinating international efforts in Afghanistan, and the critical support UNAMA provides to the Afghan Government on matters of security, governance, and regional cooperation. The UN is expected to play a critical role implementing the commitments made by the Afghan Government and the international community at the January 2010 London Conference. A new Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) for Afghanistan, Staffan de Mistura of Sweden, was appointed on January 28, 2010. Resolution 1917 mandates that UNAMA and the SRSG continue to lead international civilian efforts on the rule of law, transitional justice, anti-corruption, Afghan Government development and governance priorities, and strengthening cooperation between ISAF and the NATO Senior Civilian Representative to improve civil-military coordination.

## **5.2: Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)**

The United States leads 13 of 27 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan. U.S. civilians are posted to all 13 U.S.-led PRTs and to 13 of the 14 PRTs led by our international partners. U.S. civilians staff District Support Teams (DSTs) in 32 of ISAF's 48 focus districts (18 in RC-East, 13 in RC-South, and one in RC-West). An additional eight DSTs are scheduled to come into operation in 2010. Since January 2009, the number of U.S. civilians operating in Afghanistan has tripled. As of April 1, 2010, there are over 1,000 civilians in country. During this same time, U.S. civilian presence in the field outside Kabul, has more than quadrupled, from 67 to over 350. The majority of new civilian personnel were deployed to RC-South and RC-East. Embassy Kabul has requested an additional 20%-30% increase in civilian staff levels by the end of 2010.

The focus of civilian assistance in Afghanistan is building the capacity of Afghan institutions to withstand and diminish the threat posed by extremism, and to deliver high-impact economic assistance – especially in the agricultural sector – to create jobs, reduce the funding that the Taliban receives from poppy cultivation, and draw insurgents off the battlefield. At the national level, we are focusing our efforts on Afghan ministries that can have the most impact on service delivery, particularly in the south and east. We are also adapting our programs to account for local realities and broadening our support and engagement at the provincial and district levels to increase the visibility, effectiveness, and accountability of the institutions that impact Afghan lives the most. PRTs remain our primary means of effecting these changes at the provincial level.

Our key initiatives are:

- Increasing significantly the number of civilian technical advisers in key line ministries in the provinces and district centers;
- Implementing a new civil-military agriculture redevelopment strategy to deprive the insurgency of new recruits and income from the narcotics trade;
- Expanding sub-national capacity building efforts through new civil-military initiatives, such as the District Development Working Groups and District Support Teams;
- Facilitating the re-emergence of traditional dispute resolution mechanisms while strengthening the formal justice system;
- Targeting drug traffickers and their networks, instead of targeting poor farmers through eradication;
- Supporting Afghan Government efforts to reintegrate Taliban who renounce al Qaeda, cease violence, and accept the constitutional system; and
- Designing a new communications strategy to counter al Qaeda and Taliban propaganda, while delivering media and other resources to the Afghans to enable them to shape their own political narrative.

The civilian presence at the sub-national level continues to increase, and the requirements for life support, mobility, and security continue to grow. Civilian efforts to improve governance, development, and the rule of law are significantly undermined if civilians are unable to travel to meet with their Afghan counterparts, engage with the local population, and monitor projects. Mobility is a particular concern for U.S. civilian personnel at non-U.S. PRTs. To address this concern, Embassy Kabul is actively pursuing bilateral Memoranda of Understanding with ISAF partners that operate PRTs where U.S. civilians are or will be stationed. Memoranda of Understanding have been signed with the United Kingdom and Lithuania, and several others are near conclusion.

### **5.3: Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)**

The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) was set up in May 2002 to provide coordinated financial support to Afghanistan. The fund has two windows: the Recurrent Window channels funding for the recurrent costs of government, including salaries for teachers, health workers, and civilian staff throughout the country; and the Investment Window channels

funding for government investment projects under the ANDS such as agriculture and rural development, justice, private sector development, capacity development, education, urban development, transport, and energy. Since early 2002, 31 donors have contributed \$3.6 billion (as of February 19, 2010). Just under \$1.9 billion has been disbursed to the Government of Afghanistan to help cover recurrent costs, such as civil servants' salaries, and over \$1.2 billion has been made available for priority investment projects. The ARTF is managed jointly by the Asian Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, the United Nations Development Program, and the World Bank. Representatives of the Ministry of Finance participate in the monthly Management Committee meetings as observers. A monitoring agent ensures proper fiduciary management of all recurrent cost financing under the ARTF.

Representatives of donor countries met on November 10 in Kabul and capital representatives met on January 29 in London, following the London Conference on Afghanistan. At the meetings, agreement was reached that allocations from the fund will now follow a clear Afghan Government strategy, with an estimated financing envelope of around \$2.6 billion for 2010-2013. This represents a 32% increase in available funds over the past three years. In laying out its new ARTF strategy, the Afghan Government focused on priorities in the agriculture, infrastructure, and irrigation sectors. The ARTF has already begun its work in agriculture, with the initial planting of 1,130 hectares of new horticultural orchards (grapes, apricots, almonds, and pomegranates) in 11 provinces. In the critical area of power distribution, ARTF funds are ensuring that the electricity now delivered from Uzbekistan reaches around 100,000 households in urban population centers.

As shown in the following table, donors have increased their pledges and paid-in contributions to the ARTF from the previous quarter. Overall the ARTF increased from approximately \$3.3 billion in the previous quarter to over \$3.6 billion by the end of this quarter.

**Table 3 - Pledges and Paid-in Contributions to the ARTF**

	<b>Month</b>	<b>SY 1388 Pledges* (in millions)</b>	<b>SY 1388 Paid-in* (in millions)</b>
(A)	As of February 19, 2010	705	650
(B)	As of September 21, 2009	611	354
(A-B)		+94	+296

\*Solar Year (SY) 1388 = March 21, 2009 – March 20, 2010

In terms of our ARTF contribution, the United States paid in the bulk of our contribution during this reporting period (\$175 million). USAID submitted a request for an early release of FY 2010 ARTF funds to provide financial support to Afghan Government programs on a more timely basis, including the National Solidarity Program, to ensure smoother implementation based on the Afghan budget calendar (March 21, 2010–March 20, 2011).

To date, the major share of ARTF financing — for roads, schools and local infrastructure — has been channeled through the Government of Afghanistan directly to rural communities across Afghanistan, where over 80% of the population lives. Donor contributions have supported the


construction of over 11,000 kilometers of rural access roads built with local labor under the National Rural Access Program. The National Rural Access Program has helped connect over 27,000 villages to markets and has generated significant employment. Afghan communities are also the focus of the National Solidarity Program. Donors through the ARTF have provided the National Solidarity Program with over \$600 million to date, helping over 22,000 communities to rebuild vital local infrastructure in line with local needs and priorities. ARTF contributions are also used to finance Afghanistan's education program. The Education Quality Improvement Program (EQUIP) for basic education finances school construction, school upgrades, and around 9,500 school management committees across all provinces of Afghanistan. The committees, or school *shuras*, which are made up of local community members, forge partnerships with local government to manage basic education needs. The support helps provide the 6.3 million children that have returned to school, of which 2.2 million are girls, with decent school infrastructure and teaching standards.

During the reporting period, the government met the ARTF Incentive Program benchmarks. The Incentive Program provides a platform for a coordinated multi-donor dialogue with the Government of Afghanistan. The objective of the Incentive Program is to support a government-led reform agenda with a particular emphasis on improved revenue performance and economic governance. The main counterpart for negotiation/implementation for cross-government reforms of the Incentive Program is the Ministry of Finance. The Incentive Program is a part of the broader ARTF Recurrent Cost Window. An important part of the agreement between donors and the government in December 2008 was the start of a phased decline of \$25 million annually in the provision of ARTF financing for recurrent costs. Partially off-setting that decline was the initiation of the Incentive Program, which offers additional resources to the Afghan Government on the basis of fulfillment of certain measures. Twenty-five percent of the value of the Incentive Program is related to quantitative revenue targets and 75% to structural reforms. Since inception, two reform cycles have been agreed upon, implemented, and reviewed (the second concluded in early January 2010). The Incentive Program provided \$40 million in the first year and \$60 million in the second year. It is set to increase to \$70 million in the next round; negotiations began in the first quarter of 2010. At the same time, baseline recurrent cost support decreased from \$276 million to \$250 million and to an expected \$225 million in Solar Year 1389. Both government and donors have been satisfied with this shift from guaranteed recurrent cost support to a performance-based system that recognizes and supports the Afghan Government's own reform results.

## **5.4: Economic and Social Development Capacity**

### **5.4.1: Economic Development**

Sustainable economic growth (Figure 16), with particular emphasis on creating a large number of new jobs in the private sector, is a key priority of the Afghan Government. Providing economic opportunities and sustainable livelihoods for all Afghans is critical to counter the appeal of the insurgency and reduce instability. However, public perception of employment prospects remains low.

**Figure 16 - District Level Development Assessment, March 2010**

The U.S. Department of Treasury and USAID’s Economic Governance and Private Sector Support Program provided assistance of \$70 million over four years ending in August 2009 for the implementation of fiscal reforms as called for in Afghan Government agreements with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These included the promulgation and enforcement of financial and administrative regulations, the strengthening of revenue collection operations, and the development of IMF program benchmarks. The Economic Growth and Governance Initiative will continue these efforts. The Economic Growth and Governance Initiative is a follow-on project to the Economic Governance and Private Sector Support Program, valued at up to \$93 million over a maximum of five years beginning in August 2009. It will also advance the anti-corruption agenda by creating a better business environment, specifically through modifications to the commercial law framework, through efforts such as streamlining business registration and licensing procedures; improving mining, telecoms, insurance and energy regulation; strengthening supervision of the banking sector and improved financial intermediation; and enhancing reporting and collection of tax and non-tax revenues into the Central Treasury. The Trade Access and Facilitation in Afghanistan project (\$63 million over five years) is supporting efforts to streamline and simplify the customs clearance process, thereby reducing time and payments for trading across borders and thus mitigating opportunities for corruption. Combined with support for public outreach on these efforts, assistance is increasing predictability, transparency, and collection of government revenue. USAID has also supported the establishment of a “one-stop shop” for business registration, which removes the need for approvals from multiple agencies and significantly improves the climate for business and investment.

On March 17, the Paris Club agreed to cancel the \$1.026 billion debt owed to it by Afghanistan. On January 26, 2010, the Afghanistan Government received \$1.6 million in debt relief from the World Bank's International Development Association and the IMF under the Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative, based on Afghanistan's progress in implementing a series of reforms in public finance management, the mining sector, and health and education services transparency and accountability.

### **Government Revenue**

Afghanistan reported in late January 2010 that its budget revenues from March 21, 2009 to March 21, 2010 were likely to be in excess of the 54.5 billion Afghanis (an estimated \$1.1 billion) target set by the IMF. Estimates from Afghanistan's Ministry of Finance project that revenues are likely to top 64 billion Afghanis (an estimated \$1.3 billion) – 17% more than target and 60% over 2008-2009. Customs revenue makes up 39% of all Afghan Government revenues. The Afghan national budget deficit grew again during the fourth quarter of 2009, with revenue now covering only 30.3% of expenditures.<sup>23</sup> The Afghan Government has become increasingly more dependent on contributions from the international community to sustain deficit spending.

This increase in revenues is a result of better governance and various revenue enhancement measures initiated by the Afghan Government over the past year, including strict performance monitoring of regional directors by Afghanistan's Customs Department headquarters in Kabul; roll-out of the ASYCUDA (the Automated System for Customs Data) transit and declaration processing system to Customs Houses at Torkham Gate, Jalalabad, Kabul Inland Customs Depot, Kabul Airport, Hairaton-Mazar-e-Sharif, Islam Quala-Herat, and Shirkan Bandar; removal of several incompetent and corrupt officials from sensitive posts; institution of a daily revenue collection reporting system; and capacity building of officers engaged in critical work such as data analysis and enforcement.

However, Afghanistan's recent customs revenue jump is also a reflection of an increase in imports – indicative of Afghanistan's weak domestic production capability and stagnant exports. In the medium-term, Afghanistan's fiscal sustainability must come from stronger domestic economic growth and a broader private-sector tax base. USAID is expanding its business development and job creation programs to assist Afghanistan to enhance its economic performance. For instance, USAID is supporting the establishment of Medium Tax-payer Offices in provincial economic centers to enhance revenue collection efforts and broaden the country's tax base.

According to the IMF's Heavily Indebted Poor Country paper published in February 2010, inflation in Afghanistan has been "appropriately managed." After a period of high inflation due to high fuel and commodity (e.g., wheat) prices, inflation is back down to manageable levels in Afghanistan – around six percent for the first quarter of 2010. Except for a spike in inflation during the drought-stricken years of 2007-2008, when global commodity prices also surged, inflation in Afghanistan has in general remained below ten percent.

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<sup>23</sup> Government of Afghanistan, Central Statistics Office.

## **Government Spending**

Afghan Government spending has been rising, particularly in the security sector, though much of it has been financed by grants. The total increase in security spending, 15.8 billion Afghanis, represents most of the increase in overall government spending.<sup>24</sup> Operating spending (public sector wages and salaries, transfers, purchases, pensions, capital expenditures, and interest) is projected to increase to 14.4% of GDP, roughly twice as high as the amount allocated for development spending. Much of the operating spending will continue to be security related. Development spending, consistent with the ANDS, continues to focus on infrastructure, rural development, education, and health.

### **5.4.2: Key Border Crossing Points**

During the reporting period, progress has been made in improving Border Crossing Points infrastructure, technical assistance, and programming, starting at the busiest ports of entry at Tor Kham Gate and Wesh-Chaman. The goal is to assist the Afghan Government improve border security, customs revenue collection, and cross-border trade to regional partners and beyond.


Eight Border Crossing Points have been identified as most critical for securing effective Afghan Government control of major flows of traffic, commerce, and revenue along Afghanistan's borders. Securing border crossings is a key component of the Afghan Government's pursuit for legitimacy and to generate essential customs revenue.

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<sup>24</sup> The operating deficit excluding grants is projected to worsen by 1.6 percent of GDP. However, almost all of the additional security spending will be financed with grants and thus the operating balance including grants is expected to remain roughly unchanged.



**Figure 17 - Key Border Crossings in Afghanistan**



Key Border Crossing	Priority
Tor Kham	1
Wesh-Chaman	2
Heyratan	3
Islam Qalah	4
Zaranj	5
Shir Kahn	6
Towraghundi	7
Gulam Khan	8

Despite recent progress in the end of 2009 and early 2010, all key Border Crossing Points have serious deficiencies. The highest-rated point – Tor Kham Gate – remains in critical need of attention and is only rated at just over 50% functional.<sup>25</sup> Several of the crossing points have no permanent international presence, so reporting on their condition is episodic and incomplete.

This period has seen an increased emphasis placed on the Wesh-Chaman Border Cross Point in the Spin Boldak District of Kandahar Province. It lies along a critical ISAF ground line of communication and will become increasingly important to support the planned 2010 ISAF force expansion. Important infrastructure and procedural improvements are underway to bolster

<sup>25</sup> Functional ratings are based on seven factors: facilities, Afghan Border Police readiness, customs service efficiency, international partner presence, presence of mentor teams, forward operating base capacity, and electric power availability.

security, increase through-put, and enhance intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance efforts. The improvements should result in a significant increase in capability by April 2010. ISAF continues to work closely with the Pakistan military to reduce delays on the Quetta-Chaman ground line of communication while maintaining security.

Slow but steady progress is being made at the busiest ports of entry, Tor Kham and Wesh-Chaman. The Afghan Government goals to improve border security, customs revenue collection, and cross-border trade with regional partners include:

- Improved road access;
- Power generation to support 24/7 operations;
- Installation of modern customs equipment;
- Providing Afghan Border Police and Customs training/mentoring: 2 trainers/2 mentors at Wesh-Chaman and 6 trainers/3 mentors at Tor Kham with mobile training teams to be deployed as well; and
- Streamlining customs inspection procedures to improve the speed and efficiency of transit and transportation of goods, reduce illicit trade, tackle corruption, and facilitate exports into new markets.

The opening of the Customs Academy in January 2010 provides customs inspections training and highlights another significant development to improve the borders. The goal, with USAID technical assistance, is to establish the academy as a center of excellence to draw trainees from the region.

Efforts coordinated with key Afghan Government and international community stakeholders by the ISAF Border Issues Working Group include improving road access, power generation to support 24/7 operations, installation of modern customs equipment, and providing Afghan Border Police (ABP) trainers/mentors. A key effort is streamlining customs inspection procedures to improve the speed and efficiency of transit and transportation of goods, reduce illicit trade, tackle corruption, and facilitate exports to new markets.

#### **5.4.3: Task Force Business Stability Operations (TFBSO)**

The mission of the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO) is to restore normal life in situations where a country has deteriorated to the point that economic hardship and violence are in a synchronous downward spiral. TFBSO efforts seek to stabilize economic conditions, remove economic motivations to commit violence from local populations, and to enable normal development efforts by governmental and non-governmental organizations. During a 12-week assessment, over 50 members of TFBSO teams conducted more than 60 individual site visits throughout Afghanistan, assessing many critical sectors of the Afghan economy. Four strategic observations were made during the 12-week assessment:

- Lack of economic sovereignty,
- Lack of emphasis on rural agriculture,
- Lack of economic benefit from international development, and

- Lack of intra-Afghan commerce.

The TFBSO concluded that Afghanistan must develop self-sustaining, indigenous revenue sources. Mining was specifically identified as a key area for economic development by the TFBSO because of its potential to attract foreign investment and generate significant government revenue. The group noted that accelerating this development will create an indigenous revenue stream for Afghanistan, and ultimately economic sovereignty.

#### **5.4.4: Infrastructure**

Gains in infrastructure, particularly transportation, provide a modest outlook for development progress. However, ISAF surveys illustrate persistent low public confidence in government provided services: only 47% are satisfied with electricity, 28% with water, and 27% with roads.

The Ring Road is now 89% complete; however, an Asian Development Bank contract for a 434-kilometer section of road construction in Badghis Province has been terminated due to deteriorating security conditions. ADB is now seeking U.S. Army Corps of Engineers assistance to identify alternative contractors, but the outcome is unclear at this time.

The Ministry of Transportation and Civil Aviation has developed a Civil Aviation Master Plan for domestic and international airport renovation and capacity building for ministry personnel to manage and operate these facilities. ISAF support to assist the Ministry of Transportation and Civil Aviation in this transition process will be critical to its success.

Major improvements are needed in energy, where only 25% of the population (mainly in urban centers) is connected to the government energy grid. Service is provided on an infrequent rotational basis, consisting principally of imported electricity from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and a significant proportion of the population relies on private diesel generators. This is both expensive and unsustainable in the long term.

The renovation of the Kajaki hydro-electric project now includes two operational turbines with a third awaiting installation. Along with the repair of the existing 110 kV transmission line and new substations linking Kajaki to Kandahar City, the project goal is to provide a substantial increase (51 MWe in Phase I and up to 100 MWe in Phase II) in cost effective, reliable electricity, critical to stimulating agribusiness development, the principal economic growth enabler in the southern region. This USAID project has been stalled over the past year. To protect the dam, ISAF has been instrumental in obtaining Commanders Emergency Response Program funding to maintain the existing \$12 million security contract over the next year at Kajaki. It is estimated that Phase I of the project will require 36 months to complete, once a permissive security environment has been established in Helmand and Kandahar.

USAID and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers are finalizing assessment reports of the regional power distribution system to improve electricity output for the population at current levels in the south. These reports will include recommendations to reduce losses caused by corruption and

inefficiencies and to improve system reliability, including commercialization to enable the Government of Afghanistan to generate revenue required to finance future energy expansion.

USAID and the Asian Development Bank are starting projects in Shibirghan to rehabilitate existing gas wells and build a new 100 MW gas-fueled power plant, in order to stimulate natural gas production that could increase energy access for both urban and rural villages in the northern region.

Large infrastructure projects are key enablers for development. They create economic corridors and support industries reliant upon the extraction of natural resources. These industries have the greatest potential to drive economic growth in the country. However, these projects face security and manpower concerns. Infrastructure, including air, rail, and road systems, are essential to linking agricultural production areas to domestic and cross-border processing centers and markets, as well as establishing the country as a regional transport hub for trade and commerce with neighboring countries in Central Asia, the sub-continent, and beyond. Railway construction is essential to this concept. An Asian Development Bank-sponsored project began in January 2010 linking Hairaton to Mazar-e-Sherif. While only 87 kilometers long, this initial effort strategically links the country to the European rail network.

#### **5.4.5: Agriculture**

Agriculture is the major source of income for the majority of the population. A healthy licit agricultural sector will generate long term employment and foster economic and political stability. In order to assist with development of the agricultural sector, and in conjunction with the U.S. Government's broader civilian uplift efforts, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) increased its civilian presence in Afghanistan from 13 agriculture experts in October 2009 to 55 experts by March 2010. Additionally, USDA is in the process of embedding five agricultural experts in the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL) to assist with ministry-identified priorities. Advisors working on water and natural resources management, extension, and sanitary and phytosanitary issues are already embedded. Ministry advisors working on agribusiness and credit and change management are pending.

Afghanistan continued to benefit from above-average production of cereals during the summer of 2009 as the food security situation had improved compared to the same period the previous year. USAID's Famine Early Warning System projected an average of 19.5 provinces to be "Generally Food Secure" during the fourth quarter 2009 and first quarter 2010 (compared to 11 during the same period the previous year). The 2010 cereal crop, the major determinant in food security in the future, will be harvested in May and July and the Afghan Government will publish its first estimate of the 2010 crop in May.

USAID's Afghanistan Vouchers for Increased Production in Agriculture (AVIPA) Plus is a \$300 million one-year extension (August 2009-August 2010) of the previous AVIPA program. \$50 million is allotted for supplying vouchers for agriculture inputs in 18 northern, central, and western provinces. \$250 million is allotted for programs specifically in Helmand and Kandahar that include vouchers redeemable for agricultural supplies for high-value, non-wheat crops; cash-

for-work programs to improve rural infrastructure critical to long-term agricultural development; small in-kind grants to farmer cooperatives and agribusinesses; and training. Between October 1, 2009 and March 31, 2010 a total 361,113 vouchers were redeemed. Each voucher contains 50 kg of wheat seed, 100 kg of urea fertilizer, and 50 kg of diammonium phosphate fertilizer.<sup>26</sup>

MAIL and the international community are collaborating on initiatives to increase productivity through expanded extension services, technology transfer, and capacity building. The purpose is to enable farmers to transition from subsistence agriculture by leveraging the strengths of traditional crops such as pomegranates, grapes, melons, plums, apricots, almonds, pistachios, and walnuts, and providing improved seeds and fertilizers to maintain existing grain crops including wheat, rice, and maize.

Technical assistance is being provided to MAIL on standardization and accreditation to promote high-value Afghan food exports, including organic and natural food branding programs, and to the Export Promotion Agency of Afghanistan to help Afghan businesses overcome trade restrictions to support export promotion and market access in the top three commodities produced in the country: handicrafts, fresh fruits and carpets.

The livestock and poultry industry is also benefitting from improved breeding techniques and vaccination programs. Next steps require the establishment of value chains to provide storage, logistics, and transportation to link the farm gate to processing centers and markets. Since most agricultural production is rainfall dependent, early melting of mountain snow due to warm winter temperatures could negatively impact upon the grain harvest and subsequently upon food security, particularly in the north. The Government of Afghanistan and the international community are working together to prepare for the provision of food humanitarian assistance, if this becomes necessary. Finally, MAIL is embarking on a change management process to modernize and improve the provision of agricultural services to farmers to support licit agricultural reconstruction and agribusiness development.

#### **Agribusiness Development Teams (ADTs)**

The Agribusiness Development Team (ADT) is a self-contained volunteer unit composed of 58 Army National Guard soldiers with backgrounds and expertise in various sectors of the agribusiness field. Their mission is to provide training and advice to Afghan universities, provincial ministries, and local farmers with the goal of providing increased stability and improved opportunities for Afghanistan's re-emerging agribusiness sector. ADTs ensure that improvements are sustainable with local assets and within the context of MAIL's abilities. To be effective immediately, ADT personnel must be in place to impact the next growing season.

Eight ADTs are currently deployed to RC-East, RC-Capital, and RC-South, augmenting the PRTs in Afghanistan. These ADTs include soldiers from Missouri, Texas, Kentucky, Indiana, Oklahoma, California, Kansas, and South Carolina. Since the inception of the program in 2007, 17 ADT deployments have covered 14 provinces and contributed to over 282 sustainable agriculture projects generating more than \$21 million in revenue for the people of Afghanistan.

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<sup>26</sup> There were no redemptions under AVIPA during the prior reporting period (April-September 2009) since wheat seed and fertilizer distributions are timed to coincide with the planting season.

Deployments in the remainder of 2010 include units from Arkansas, Kansas, Texas, and Iowa. Their efforts will focus on areas where progress in security and stability has been made. At least four additional provinces will be targeted this year for additional ADT deployments.

The ADT concept provides immediate agricultural expertise and it provides task force commanders another tool for daily community engagement.

#### **5.4.6: Mining**

One notable economic area of opportunity is mining of natural resources and precious gems. A new Afghan Minister of Mines, Mr. Wahidullah Shahrani (formerly the Minister of Commerce), was confirmed earlier this year. Increasing ministerial capacity to manage better the country's mining resources and transparency are high on his agenda – two key areas where improvement is needed to encourage domestic and foreign investment. A significant mining project, the Anyak Copper Mine, located in Logar Province, is scheduled to be developed by Metallurgical Company of China under a Ministry of Mines contract, but has been delayed due to security concerns, including significant anti-personnel demining issues. The project could potentially generate over \$300 million in revenue (estimated at 47% of the current Afghan budget) and create up to 3,000 jobs with possible road, rail, processing, and power plant projects.

#### **5.4.7: Telecommunications**

Afghanistan's mobile phone penetration is estimated at close to 40% of the population, and is quickly growing. To date there are over 12 million cell phone accounts in Afghanistan, a country of 29 million people. Mobile phones account for 99% of all communication lines employed. The mobile phone market also serves as the country's largest taxpayer, employs more than 100,000 people, and generates as much as \$1 billion in annual revenue for the country's five operators.

#### **5.4.8: Land Reform**

The Land Titling and Economic Restructuring for Afghanistan project, valued at \$56 million over five years ending in September 2009, reduced immovable property registration from more than 30 steps to three for buildings and four for land, and liquidated nearly \$20 million in government assets, transferring them transparently to the private sector for more productive use. Through the follow-on Land Reform in Afghanistan project valued at up to \$140 million over five years, and dedicated solely to land market reform, USAID will continue to assist the Afghan Government in reducing corruption in land transactions by informing citizens of land processes and procedures, by eliminating unnecessary steps and delays in land transactions, and by establishing a legal and regulatory framework to land administration.

#### **5.4.9: Host Country Contracts**

The U.S. Government has host country contracts with the Ministry of Public Health (\$236 million over five years) and the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology (\$1 million over three years). These host country contracts mean that the U.S. Government provides direct support to these government ministries, as they pass U.S. Government procurement and financial management assessments.

During the reporting period, assessments for U.S. Government direct assistance consideration were completed for MAIL and the Ministry of Education. USAID is currently conducting a needs assessment of the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development's procurement and financial systems. The assessment will help determine if the Ministry's systems and procedures comply with USAID policies governing USAID-financed projects.

During the reporting period, an updated direct assistance action plan was approved by the USAID mission director and submitted to Finance Minister Zakhilwal. Relevant USAID offices will assess the following Afghan ministries and government agencies for direct assistance consideration: (1) Civil Service Commission; (2) IDLG; (3) Afghanistan Investment Support Agency; (4) Ministry of Higher Education; and (5) Ministry of Public Works.

#### **5.4.10: Local Procurement**

On November 11, 2009 Ambassador Eikenberry, joined by USFOR-A, UNAMA, and Peace Dividend Trust representatives, launched the "Afghan First" policy, which deems that, consistent with applicable U.S. law governing U.S. Government procurement and acting within legal authorities, U.S. Government officials making procurement decisions for goods and services in support of U.S. operations in Afghanistan will actively solicit Afghan suppliers who can immediately or prospectively meet requirements of price, quantity, and quality on a competitive basis. The Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce and Industries, whose membership includes more than 35,000 private sector businesses, hosted the event.

As a result, the international community pursued products, services, and partnerships with Afghanistan. For example, the Strategic Provincial Roads Program employs 5,500 Afghans building nearly 1,000 kilometers of roads. Every design and construction contract goes to Afghan firms, which get hands-on training in how to meet international quality standards. Construction contracts currently require that 70% of the workers are local, so the employment and training benefits spread across the country. USAID's Energy Program has been employing almost 1,000 Afghans to build the new 105 MW power plant in Tarakhil Kabul. In parallel to the construction, 28 Afghan operators, engineers and mechanics have been trained on plant operation and management. Once completed in a few months, ownership of the plant will be transferred to the Afghan Government while the trainees, along with Afghans who have worked with the U.S. contractor to build and operate the plant, will become the core of the plant work force. In the agriculture sector, 94% of all staff hired (1,661) by USAID are Afghans (excludes short term/cash for work, etc.).

USAID has significantly expanded the number of partnerships with Afghan counterparts as well. Approximately \$8.4 million has been invested in joint activities that have leveraged an additional \$53 million in investments in the country. Partnerships cover a wide area of activities, such as promoting public awareness on entrepreneurship (television series: Dream and Achieve, Afghan Business Success) and information technology (One Laptop Per Child, Light Up Jalalabad), introducing new technologies, and resolving value-chain gaps in the main focus sectors of carpets, natural fibers, food processing, marble, and gemstones. An example of these efforts is the Ferosgha-e-Afghan Shopping Center, located in Kabul City, which was severely damaged during a January 18 attack by the Taliban. The owner and 80 merchants who had shops in the building suffered major losses. A full assessment of the damage to the building estimated cleaning and renovation costs at more than \$600,000. USFOR-A and USAID financed a portion of the cleaning and removal of unsafe material and a portion of the renovation costs of the building. USAID contributed \$238,500, USFOR-A contributed \$47,000, and the building owner covered remaining costs.

#### **5.4.11: Health and Education**

There has been some progress in the health and education sectors where the Government of Afghanistan is providing services at the most basic level. Afghans in two-thirds of the districts have access to basic health care, yet hospital care is not widely available and needs to be improved. Afghanistan is one of a handful of countries where polio remains a major health issue and to address this concern a national polio immunization campaign is underway. The Ministry of Public Health is committed, with ISAF security assistance, to meet 2010 World Health Organization targets leading toward polio eradication.

As well, the U.S. Government is increasing access for pregnant women to skilled birth attendants in order to improve maternal and child health in Afghanistan. USAID currently funds and provides technical support to eight community midwifery programs and two facility-based midwifery education programs. To date, 648 midwives have graduated from U.S. Government-supported midwifery programs in Afghanistan, representing over 25% of all midwives in the country. Furthermore, to strengthen the midwifery profession, USAID provides support to the Afghan Midwives Association, the Afghan Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, and the National Midwifery Education Accreditation Board. These efforts have increased the total number of trained midwives from 475 under Taliban rule to over 2,500 today.

In education development, presently approximately two-thirds of school-age children are attending primary school. However, access to secondary school is minimal and the quality of education remains low at all levels. The education system needs to provide the population with the basic skills needed to grow the economy. Initial steps are being taken to address education reform. The Ministry of Higher Education has issued a new strategy and the Ministry of Education is expected to follow, with policies and programs to modernize the educational system and to establish a national vocational training system.



#### **5.4.12: Women's Issues**

Women's empowerment is inextricably linked to the achievement of U.S. objectives in Afghanistan — including improvements in Afghanistan's security, economic opportunity, governance, and social development. The promotion of women's rights is integrated into the overall U.S. strategy and all the key programs, including education/literacy, health care, security, rule of law, political participation, and economic development, are described in the State Department's Regional Stabilization Plan. The U.S. Embassy in Kabul is working with ISAF to ensure that reintegration efforts incorporate elements of these programs and continue to advance women's rights.

In FY 2009, the U.S. provided approximately \$153 million in assistance to Afghan women. We expect to provide over \$175 million in assistance to women in FY 2010.

In education, we continue to invest in girls' education, and our assistance focuses on 25 provinces benefitting more than one million women and girls by increasing recruitment and training for women teachers.

With our assistance, women's access to health care has risen dramatically since 2001. The number of midwives available to assist with deliveries has quadrupled; the number of health facilities with women health workers has more than doubled. Drug addiction, however, remains a problem among Afghan women and their children. The Department of State's International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Bureau (INL) funds the only three residential drug treatment centers for women with adjacent child care and treatment facilities, in Kabul, Herat, and Balkh. We continue to expand these existing programs to further increase women's access to health services, essential medicines, family planning, and pre- and post-natal care so that women have access to the services and information they require for good health.

Economic development includes assisting women gain access to credit and provide them training to compete in local and regional markets. We train women in agricultural production and animal husbandry, veterinary medicine, poultry breeding, and skills for using farm machinery. We also have specialized programs aimed at helping women build small businesses linked to agriculture.

The Afghanistan Small and Medium Enterprise Development Program is active in Helmand, Herat, Kabul, and Nangarhar provinces. This program works to increase opportunities for trade, employment, and investment in Afghanistan, focusing particularly on the economic empowerment of women.

USAID provides technical and financial support to the Afghan Women's Business Federation, an umbrella organization for approximately 87 women's associations. Separately, USAID has helped established 27 women business associations to provide advocacy services.

In addition, a three-year, \$26.3 million program is providing small grants to women-led non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in a wide array of areas. Grant recipients have facilitated computer training, English language training, radio programming for women, and provision of inputs for women's agricultural initiatives.

We continue to urge the Afghan Government to protect women leaders and to take seriously threats against women and girls by extremists who try to discourage school attendance by destroying schools or throwing acid on young school girls. To that end, U.S. programs help protect women's health facilities and young school girls. We are also expanding women's participation in the security sector through recruitment and protection of women, as well as training on gender-related issues for the Afghan National Police and the Afghan National Army. Specialized training, funded by the State Department, supports the expansion of Family Response Units devoted to domestic violence cases. Our assistance has improved the number and capacity of Family Response Units that respond to cases of violence against women; U.S. mentors have worked with over three dozen Family Response Units in ten provinces. These Family Response Units addressed 897 cases during 2009. Our programs also conduct outreach to Afghan communities to teach them about the Family Response Units and to encourage women affected by violence to make use of their services.

Afghan women and girls can still be sent to prison for "moral crimes," including fleeing domestic violence or eloping. Many State Department rule of law and human rights programs help civil society organizations and Afghan policymakers advocate for reform of such discriminatory laws, including the Gender Justice component of the Justice Sector Support Program, the Increasing Women's Rights and Access to Justice in Afghanistan Program, and the Advancing Human Rights and Women's Rights within an Islamic Framework Program. Our programs also train and educate male and female police officers, prosecutors, defense attorneys, corrections officers, and others in civil society in the fair interpretation and application of the penal code sections that affect women.

We also continue to encourage women's political involvement, especially in Afghan conflict-resolution and post-conflict processes. In advance of parliamentary elections this fall, we are making use of public outreach and education as well as financial support to Afghan-led civic education programs for men and women in order to encourage greater electoral participation by women, both as candidates and as voters. We have also supported training for female members of Parliament and women leaders elected at the grassroots level on how to be more effective and capable leaders.

#### **5.4.13: Civil Society & Media**

Governments always have incentives not to reform themselves; an active and informed civil society and independent media are essential to accountability. USAID's Initiative to Promote Afghan Civil Society provides training and small grants and has established resource centers for NGOs and community groups throughout the country. The Internews project supports media-strengthening efforts. It has trained journalists and helped establish 40 independent, community-based radio stations, and it provides ongoing assistance in business development for media outlets, program production and distribution, media law advocacy, and monitoring. In addition, an upcoming Afghanistan Media Development and Empowerment Project, valued at \$31 million over one year, will increase public access to reliable, high-quality news and information through the use of mobile telephony.

## Section 6 – Counternarcotics

### 6.1: Strategy and Priorities

The National Security Council recently approved a new U.S. Government Counternarcotics (CN) Strategy for Afghanistan. The U.S. CN Strategy for Afghanistan supports the President's Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategy. It is integrated with the U.S. Government Agriculture Assistance Strategy for Afghanistan, which focuses on the redevelopment of the agricultural sector as an engine for job growth and higher incomes for rural families, enabling farmers to choose licit alternatives to poppy. The CN Strategy focuses on the interdiction of drugs and precursor materials, stopping drug traffickers, capacity building, and arresting drug lords. As part of the U.S. Government's whole-of-government approach to assist the Government of Afghanistan wage its counterinsurgency, the CN Strategy supports the U.S. Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan and supports the U.S. military and international partner counterinsurgency campaign.

The CN Strategy reflects lessons learned from CN activities from 2004 through 2008 — the most significant being that large-scale eradication targeted toward Afghan poppy farmers was counterproductive and drove farmers to the insurgency. The new strategy places primary focus on interdiction of the nexus between narco-trafficking and the insurgency, but also places a heavy emphasis on agricultural assistance to farmers, with the aim of transitioning them to licit crops, creating jobs, and revitalizing Afghanistan's historically vibrant agricultural sector. The new strategy carries over activities that have proven to be important in a multi-pronged, whole-of-government CN campaign, including capacity building for Afghan CN capabilities, assistance in promoting the rule of law, support for governor-led eradication and public information campaigns, and drug treatment and demand reduction activities. Strategic communications and counterpropaganda, and regional engagement with countries and international organizations, are also features of the new strategy.

The strategy has two goals:

Goal 1: Counter the link between narcotics and the insurgency and significantly reduce the support the insurgency receives from the narcotics industry.

Goal 2: Address the narcotics corruption nexus and reinforce the Government of Afghanistan.

The roles and missions of the international and Afghan entities fighting narco-trafficking in Afghanistan remain unchanged from the previous report. The Government of Afghanistan has the lead in all CN operations and partners with ANSF, U.S., and international forces to target narcotics traffickers and facilities known to support the insurgency.

The U.S. CN Strategy is closely aligned with four Afghan national CN priorities as laid out in its National Drug Control Strategy:

- Disrupt the drug trade by targeting traffickers and their backers;
- Strengthen and diversify legal rural livelihoods;
- Reduce the demand for illicit drugs and treatment of problem users; and
- Develop state institutions at the central and provincial levels vital to delivery of Afghanistan's CN strategy.

The U.S. Government continues to support the Afghan Government's eight-pillar National Drug Control Strategy, which includes international and regional cooperation, institution building, demand reduction, public awareness, alternative livelihoods, interdiction, justice sector reform, and eradication.

The U.S. military and representatives from civilian agencies will work together to develop integrated civil-military plans tailored for specific areas. The integrated civil-military plans will insure CN and military efforts complement each other in support of counterinsurgency goals. The Afghan Government continues to lead eradication operations and, along with support from ISAF, the UK,<sup>27</sup> the U.S. Embassy, and various organizations from the international community, has planned government-led eradication. ISAF policy toward government-led eradication intends to provide support, in accordance with its mission and mandate, predominantly in the five prioritized provinces of Kandahar, Helmand, Uruzgan, Badghis, and Farah. From an ISAF perspective, government-led eradication is not only about reducing poppy cultivation, thus diminishing the total production of opium, but equally about enhancing law and order and governance in the prioritized provinces.


The newly appointed Minister of Counter Narcotics appears to have taken a very strong position concerning eradication. He has instituted a new High Level Coordination Meeting that he chairs to oversee the planning and implementation of eradication. To build support for his views and determination on eradication, he recently met with the governor of Kandahar and eight of his district leaders to reiterate his expectation to see eradication in Kandahar carried out in accordance with plans. He intends to visit other governors to reiterate the Afghan Government's desire and expectation to see eradication conducted in both priority and non-priority provinces.

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<sup>27</sup> The UK is the G8 Lead Partner Nation for CN.

## 6.2: Progress to Date

**Figure 18 - UNODC Expected Opium Cultivation Level in 2010**



After a major drop in opium cultivation over the last two years, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) projects a stable crop for 2010 and expects the majority of poppy-free provinces not to cultivate in 2010. The majority of Afghan opium cultivation remains in south and southwestern Afghanistan. According to the UNODC, there is a strong correlation between insurgency and cultivation. The UNODC Opium Winter Rapid Assessment Survey indicates that almost 80% of villages with very poor security conditions grew poppy, while poppy grows in only 7% of villages unaffected by violence.

Narcotics trafficking remains a serious problem in Afghanistan, and funds gained from the opium trade continued to be a significant source of funding for insurgents and a source of government corruption during the reporting period. The Afghan Government managed to eradicate 647 hectares of poppy in Helmand and Farah during the first quarter of 2010. The Ministry of Counter Narcotics plans and implements eradication operations in close coordination with the provincial governors.


Opium prices increased through December 2009 and January 2010 in the geographical areas along the opium supply lines in Helmand to both Pakistan via Bahram Chah and Iran via Farah and Nimruz. In particular, prices increased in the areas where forces built up (Marjah, Helmand) and CN operations were conducted (Bahram Chah, Helmand). The knowledge of pending operations in Marjah (Operation MOSHTARAK) had major effects on narcotics traffickers who began buying significant amounts of stocks, settling debts, and closing and moving their businesses to avoid risk of impending interdiction. Price hikes were followed by a significant drop in prices corresponding to the start of operations in Marjah, and further decreased with the complementary CN operations in Bahram Chah. These operations contributed to an overall downturn in drug-related activity and the availability of opium. Buyers and transporters have

demonstrated that they are unwilling to absorb sustained risk and the narcotics business has significantly decreased in the corresponding operational areas.

Operation MOSHTARAK saw significant, close cooperation between ISAF, ANSF, and law enforcement agencies on CN-related efforts. The seizures have not been significant, however, because traffickers moved out of the region before the operation commenced. CN efforts will continue through the duration of the operation, and we assess that it will have a suppressing effect on narcotics production and trafficking in the areas where the operations occur. This creates a window of opportunity to further separate the insurgent criminal nexus from the population.

ISAF established the Combined Joint Interagency Task Force–Nexus (CJIATF-N) to support and coordinate CN operations and provide support to Regional Commanders. With CJIATF-N's support, ISAF, ANSF, Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) specialized units, and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) are working together to dismantle narcotics trafficking networks. Between October 1, 2009 and March 31, 2010, ISAF and ANSF conducted 73 CN operations, leading to the detention of 84 personnel and the destruction of 25,126 kilograms (kg) of opium, 416 kg of morphine, and 1,321 kg of heroin. Additionally, 10,886 kg of hashish and 10,115 kg of precursor chemicals used to create morphine and heroin were seized.

**Figure 19 - Narcotics and Precursor Chemical Seizures in Kilograms, October 1, 2009-March 31, 2010**



The DEA, with DoD and DoS funding, continues to support, train, and equip three specialized units within the CNPA. The 220-member National Interdiction Unit – established by the DEA as a specialized tactical arm of the CNPA – is capable of safely conducting interdiction operations and seizures and serving arrest and search warrants in a high-threat environment, much like a U.S. special weapons and tactics (SWAT) team. To address the concerns in the south, the DEA developed Operation SOUTHERN FURY; a campaign plan for counternarcotics investigations and operations in the south. This campaign plan is meant to be fully coordinated and synchronized with the U.S. military and ISAF operating in the south, predominately in Helmand

Province. This campaign will target drug trafficking networks supporting the insurgency, insurgent leaders actively engaged in drug trafficking, and corrupt government officials involved in the drug trade. As a result of Operation SOUTHERN FURY, DEA and its counterparts have seized approximately 790 kg of opium, 124 kg heroin, and over 10,000 kg of chemicals. The operation has denied drug manufacturers and traffickers a key area in which they previously thrived.

In August 2008, the National Security Council's Deputies Committee recommended the formation of the Afghan Threat Finance Cell (ATFC) to identify and disrupt the sources of funding that support insurgent and terrorist organizations operating in Afghanistan. The ATFC works to develop information that will be used to prosecute individuals, either in the United States or Afghanistan, who provide financial support to insurgents. The ATFC conducts a vast majority of its investigations and operations with vetted Afghan personnel from the DEA-mentored Sensitive Interdiction Unit members, the Public Prosecutors Office, and vetted judges. Information developed by the ATFC is passed to Afghan counterparts for their assistance and action, as well as to U.S. Government and ISAF law enforcement, military, and intelligence communities.

At this time, the ATFC is led by DEA and comprised of personnel from the DEA, DoD, Treasury, Joint Warfare Analysis Center, Institute for Defense Analysis, FBI, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, and the Office of Foreign Asset Control. Personnel from the UK Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA) and the Australian Federal Police are also assigned to work with the ATFC.

The ATFC has worked with international partner forces, as well as U.S. and Afghan law enforcement agencies to identify financial facilitators who have been involved in the transfer of funds to insurgent groups throughout the country. In support of these activities, the ATFC and Afghan authorities have raided seven *hawalas* that were actively involved in the transfer of these funds.<sup>28</sup> Large amounts of intelligence information were obtained and analyzed as a result of these raids, which resulted in the identification of other insurgent and criminal organizations operating in Afghanistan and throughout the region. The ATFC has also identified several money laundering networks with direct links to insurgent groups, high-level narcotics traffickers, and corrupt governmental officials. In January 2010, the Sensitive Interdiction Unit executed search warrants on three Kabul-based locations of the New Ansari Money Exchange. The searches resulted in the seizure of four computers, several cellular and satellite telephones, thumb drives, and thousands of documents.

Beginning in 2009 and currently ongoing, DEA began an expansive effort to target high-value drug traffickers through both focused mentoring of elite Afghan CN forces and an increased operational presence. In particular, the DEA in-country staff is partnered with the Afghan Government to establish the drug enforcement institutions and capabilities needed to enforce the rule of law in Afghanistan. The Afghan Government has shown some improvement in prosecuting narcotics traffickers to date. On March 9, 2010, a DoJ-mentored Criminal Justice Task Force judge convicted and sentenced CNPA Operational Commander Sayed Hassan Karimi

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<sup>28</sup> *Hawala* is an alternative or parallel remittance system. It exists and operates outside of, or parallel to, traditional banking or financial channels.

under the 2005 Afghanistan Counter Narcotics Law for violation of Article 15 (Drug Trafficking and Sale of Precursor Chemicals). Karimi was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment — the maximum prison sentence allowable under the minimum mandatory sentencing guidelines of the 2005 Afghanistan Counter Narcotics Law. No other Afghan defendant has been sentenced in excess of 15 years for trafficking precursor chemicals. He was also fined one million Afghanis. The arrest and prosecution of Karimi should be considered a significant anti-corruption prosecution.

In addition, Haji Bagcho, indicted in June 2009, was subsequently charged in January 2010 with narco-terrorism. While the Criminal Justice Task Force has successfully prosecuted a number of drug dealers involved with corruption, some have been pardoned, significantly diminishing Criminal Justice Task Force effectiveness. Lack of Afghan Government will and the capacity to prosecute narco-corrupt officials continues to undermine development of governance and security.

Between October 31, 2009 and March 31, 2010 the United States and the United Kingdom committed \$38 million to fund the Afghan Government's Good Performers Initiative. The Good Performers Initiative rewards provinces that are poppy free, or in which poppy cultivation has declined significantly, by funding priority development projects that have been approved by Provincial Development Councils and provincial governors' offices. Provinces are deemed poppy-free based on results reported in the UNODC Annual Opium Survey. The Good Performers Initiative aims to deliver projects in a timely, cost effective, and transparent manner to help ensure communities are motivated to stay away from poppy cultivation. Since the program's inception in 2006, the number of awarded provinces has risen from six to 27. Forty projects in 21 provinces are currently underway supporting agriculture, education, governance, irrigation, and health initiatives. The Ministry of Counter Narcotics administers the program, with funding from the State Department's INL Bureau.

### **6.3: Efforts to Improve Afghan Capacity**

ISAF has continued to support various law enforcement agencies with a mandate to counter the illicit narcotics industry in Afghanistan. Through liaison and coordination, ISAF has simplified the coordination mechanisms that allow law enforcement agencies to gain ISAF support for their missions. ISAF cooperation with those agencies is at present assessed to be very good. Their operations — aimed at disrupting the narcotic networks, traffickers and facilities — are of great benefit to the wider campaign.

DoD established a CNPA Development Cell under CSTC-A/NTM-A to allow for targeted training of the CNPA. As a result of an assessment trip done during the summer of 2009 (referenced in the previous report), DoJ assigned a criminal justice sector expert from its International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program to assist with the development of the broader CNPA. During the reporting period, DoD, DoS, and DEA combined resources to further develop CNPA's specialized units. DoD continued to provide transportation and lodging support to DEA and its counterparts in the Regional Commands. DoD is completing the construction of a forward operating base in Herat that is scheduled to be finished in May. The



Herat forward operating base will enable CNPA's specialized units to conduct investigations and interdiction operations in the region. During the reporting period, the CN Training Academy trained 210 CNPA officers and 55 customs officers. The courses at CN Training Academy are designed to provide professional training beyond the basic police courses. The DEA continued its expansion with support from DoD, increasing mentoring opportunities for personnel in CNPA's specialized units. DoD, DoJ, DoS and DEA will continue to work together to build the capacity of the Government of Afghanistan.

INL expanded its support for drug treatment services from 16 drug treatment centers to 28 centers during the reporting period. The new drug treatment residential facilities are in Badakhshan (male), Kabul (two male facilities), Herat and Jowzjan (two adolescent facilities), Nangarhar, and Farah (three facilities for women and their children). In addition, INL began to support a large 100-bed center in Kabul operated by two NGOs with oversight by UNODC. INL also sponsored training for drug treatment counselors during February 2010, with special workshops for clinicians from the adolescent treatment centers. INL funded a three-year outcome evaluation on the effectiveness of drug treatment programs. This project was initiated with the development of the survey methodology, survey instrument, and training for the interviewers and sample collection teams.

The Colombo Plan, with INL funding, also received the support of Afghanistan's Ministry of Education to integrate 21 life skills lesson plans into the science curriculum of 24 schools for boys and girls. The life skills drug prevention program will be implemented during the next Afghan school calendar year in Kabul. A two-year study on the special testing of children exposed to second-hand opium smoke and opiates found high concentrations of opiates in children from homes where opiates are smoked.

During the reporting period, USAID also contributed significantly to the CN strategy. USAID alternative livelihoods and development programs include Incentives Driving Economic Alternatives-North, East, West and the Alternative Development Program-South West (Farah and Uruzgan). The Afghan Vouchers for Increased Productive Agriculture Plus Program (AVIPA-Plus) (the Kandahar and Helmand portion only) is a \$250 million stabilization program for these two provinces that ensures that target activities and crops for stabilization are focused on those that will also have a longer-term alternative development (counternarcotics) impact, (i.e., focusing on high value and permanent crops rather than staple crops). The program is designed to provide Afghan farmers at least 125,000 vouchers, redeemable for agricultural supplies and inputs including tools, seed, fruit and nut saplings, grape vines, and trellises. Under these three programs alone, since October 1, 2009 over 105,000 hectares of land have been brought under improved irrigation or returned to licit cropping. As well, over 88,800 farmers have received training in improved agricultural techniques and business skills. Under AVIPA-Plus in Helmand and Kandahar — as part of the "hold" phase of U.S. military operations in the south — over 18,000 Afghans across nine districts have been provided short-term cash-for-work employment and approximately 8,500 members of farmer associations have applied for and received grants of equipment, services and tools worth more than \$4 million.

## **6.4: International Coordination**

During the reporting period, the CJIATF-N became operational although it still requires more personnel to be fully operational. The Interagency Operations Coordination Center and Joint Narcotics Analysis Center continued to provide support to commanders and international law enforcement agencies. Support from CJIATF-N, the Interagency Operations Coordination Center, and the Joint Narcotics Analysis Center enabled law enforcement and military forces to increase significantly the number of CN operations conducted. The CNPA Development Cell under CSTC-A/NTM-A has become the focal point for international cooperation on the development of CNPA. The CNPA Development Cell will work with the UNODC and others from the international community to coordinate development support. Increased cooperation will lead to a rapid improvement in the development and professionalization of all CNPA personnel.

## **Section 7 – Regional Engagement**

### **7.1: Pakistan**

The Pakistan Military (PAKMIL) has been involved in nearly continuous operations since June 2009 in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The PAKMIL currently has close to 150,000 troops deployed to the NWFP and the FATA. Its operations have included offensive and clearing operations, intelligence-based raids, airstrikes, stability operations, and humanitarian support for internally displaced persons. As Pakistan has increased its tempo of operations, the U.S.-Pakistan defense relationship has seen substantial improvements.

In 2009, the PAKMIL launched a series of sequential offensive operations initially focused on securing gains in Swat, especially in Malkand Division. As the PAKMIL consolidated its gains in the NWFP and transitioned to the “hold and build” phase of its operations in Swat, the Government of Pakistan turned its attention toward the historic Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) safe haven of South Waziristan Agency (SWA). In October 2009, the PAKMIL launched a three-pronged multi-division offensive operation into the historic TTP sanctuary. The operation successfully achieved its geographic objectives but failed to destroy the TTP network. This operation was supported by shaping operations in Kurram, Orakzai, and Khyber that attempted to interdict enemy fighters fleeing the PAKMIL offensive in SWA. As the PAKMIL consolidated its position in SWA it launched a new offensive in February 2010, led by the Frontier Corps in Bajar. This operation is of note because of the high degree of effective communication between PAKMIL forces and their ISAF counterparts across the border in Afghanistan. In addition to the large offensive military operations conducted by the PAKMIL, the Government of Pakistan has acknowledged in the press that it has captured several key Afghan Taliban leaders in Pakistan to include Mullah Baradar and several shadow governors.

Encouraging and facilitating bilateral and trilateral coordination among Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the United States and broader engagement with the international community is a key aspect

of the U.S. strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Since January, there has been considerable interaction between key civilian and military leaders in the Government of Pakistan, Afghan Government, and ISAF. On January 20, 2010, the PAKMIL, ANSF, and ISAF held a Combined Campaign Planning Conference. This conference was a series of meetings directed by Pakistani Chief of Army Staff General Kayani, Afghan Deputy Minister of Defense Lieutenant General Karimi, and COMISAF General McChrystal to synchronize ANSF, PAKMIL, and ISAF operations along the border. The Combined Campaign Planning Conference achieved an unprecedented level of understanding among the militaries regarding concepts of operations and upcoming campaign plans, and resulted in a series of follow-up meetings.

In addition to the enhanced military to military dialogue, there has also been an effort to increase the dialogue between Pakistan and Afghanistan civilian leadership. On January 25, prior to the London Conference, President Zardari and President Karzai, along with a number of ministers, held bilateral talks in Turkey as part of a Turkish Government-hosted conference of regional leaders coupled with the third round of the Turkish-sponsored Trilaterals. The two parties discussed ways to repair the relationship between the two capitals and an approach forward on possible ways to negotiate with the Taliban. Following the discussions in Turkey, Pakistani Foreign Minister Qureshi announced at the January 26 London Conference on Afghanistan that Pakistan welcomed international support for Afghanistan, but he signaled Pakistan's belief in the importance of its role.

Overall, the United States has seen aggregate improvement in relations with the PAKMIL and there have been a series of positive steps taken to dismantle extremist networks and deny terrorists safe havens in Pakistan. There is still much work to be done, but there is a positive trend line toward achieving our overall strategic goals.

## **7.2: India**

India has pledged \$1.3 billion in reconstruction and developmental aid in Afghanistan, approximately one-third of which has been disbursed. India's civilian aid is channeled into three main areas:

- Infrastructure development (roads, water, electricity);
- Capacity building (1,300 annual college scholarships and civil service training grants); and,
- Humanitarian assistance (food and medical aid).

India is currently working on the Salma hydroelectric dam in Herat Province as well as other power generation/transmission projects, has refurbished telecommunications infrastructure equipment in 11 provinces, and is constructing the new Afghan parliament building in Kabul. In January 2010, at the London Conference for Afghanistan, India announced additional assistance for Afghanistan agriculture in the form of agriculture degree scholarships and training grants to agricultural officials. India also announced that they would work with the United Nations Development Program and the Afghan Government to enhance existing ministerial capacity-building programs. Indian projects were undertaken in partnership with the Afghan Government,

in alignment with the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, and with a focus on local ownership of assets. India remains one of Afghanistan's largest assistance donors.

### **7.3: Central Asian States**

The countries of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan) continue their important contributions to the security and stabilization of Afghanistan. Most notably, officials from Central Asia have worked closely with U.S. officials to diversify lines of communication into, and out of, Afghanistan. These lines of communication, including over-flight permissions and ground transit agreements, have allowed further development of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), providing an alternative transportation route into Afghanistan that allows commercial vendors to bring supplies to the U.S. and ISAF forces in Afghanistan.

With the help of our Central Asian partners we are steadily increasing traffic on the NDN and overcoming impediments that hinder the network's efficiency as they arise. Both in the air and on the ground we are increasing shipments while decreasing processing time. From 20 containers per month in January 2009, we now ship 350 containers per week, and expect this figure to increase further. Additionally, we support infrastructure projects in the region that expand the NDN's capacity. For example, the recently begun Hairaton-Mazar-e-Sharif railroad, a \$170 million joint Uzbek-Asian Development Bank project, will connect Afghanistan to the European rail system. The Uzbek national railroad company, Uzbek Temer Yollari, is making solid progress in the construction of this railway.

The NDN is an effective means to resupply our warfighters and provides capacity and redundancy to complement our lines of communication through Pakistan. This is particularly important in light of President Obama's decision, announced in December 2009, to send 30,000 more soldiers to Afghanistan, and the commitment by our allies for another 7,000. Since its inception in January 2009 to the end of March 2010, we shipped over 8,900 containers via the NDN.

In addition to the NDN, which remains purely commercial, DoD conducts military over-flights of most countries in Central Asia. We have close relationships with each transit country, and are working to increase over-flights and open new flight paths. Importantly, we also have access to the Manas Transit Center in Kyrgyzstan, through which the majority of our combat troops transit on their way to Afghanistan.

In addition to their logistics contributions, Central Asian countries provide electricity to Afghanistan and support infrastructure development, including Asian Development Bank-sponsored construction of a rail line from the Uzbek border to Mazar-e-Sharif. Kazakhstan has also provided \$50 million to educate more than 1,000 Afghan students in Kazakh universities.

The United States, Afghanistan, and Central Asian countries have a mutual interest in preventing the spread of terrorism. Afghanistan stability has been strengthened by the operations of Central Asian counterterrorist, counternarcotics, and border patrol forces. These ongoing efforts play a

critical role in the difficult task of securing Afghanistan's northern border and preventing the spread of extremism to the broader region.

#### **7.4: Iran**

Iran continues to actively attempt to influence events in Afghanistan through a multi-faceted approach involving support for the Karzai government, economic and cultural outreach to the Afghan population — particularly to minority populations — and covert support for various insurgent and political opposition groups.

Tehran's support for the Government of Afghanistan is reflected in its diplomatic presence, including high-level visits and key leadership engagements, and in the activities of numerous Iranian NGOs that are present in the country. During the 2009 presidential elections in Afghanistan, Iranian officials met with both President Karzai and his main opponent Abdullah throughout the campaign and worked hard to appear as the deal-maker during the post-election period. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited Kabul on March 10 and used his public engagements to argue against the presence of foreign military forces in Afghanistan.

Since 2001, Tehran has also pledged over \$1 billion in aid to Afghanistan, but has actually disbursed only a fraction of that amount. Iran hosted a large population of Afghan refugees, many of whom have returned, but has used the threat of repatriation of the remainder as a lever to influence the Government of Afghanistan.

Most concerning, Iran continues to provide lethal assistance to elements of the Taliban, although the quantity and quality of such assistance is markedly lower than the assistance provided to Shia militants in Iraq. Tehran's support to the Taliban is inconsistent with their historic enmity, but fits with its overall strategy of backing many groups to ensure a positive relationship with potential leaders and hedging against foreign presence.

Iran's historical, cultural, and economic ties with much of western Afghanistan, its religious affinity with Afghan minority groups, and its extensive border with Afghanistan will ensure that Tehran continues to attempt to influence events in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future.

#### **7.5: China**

Chinese leaders used the March 23-25 visit of Afghan President Karzai — his fourth trip to the People's Republic of China as President — to continue to improve relations and promote stability and security in Afghanistan. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao pledged that China would provide assistance and aid, and enhance security and economic cooperation, while Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie said that the Chinese military would continue assistance to the Afghan National Army to improve its capacity of safeguarding national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and domestic stability. During the visit, the two sides signed three agreements: one on economic and technological cooperation worth approximately \$23 million; a second on favorable tariffs for Afghan exports to China; and a third on training programs for 120 scholarships in the fields of communications, commerce, economics, counternarcotics, education, and health.

China continues to invest in Afghanistan, but remains concerned about the safety of its workers. Two Chinese engineers were kidnapped in Afghanistan on January 16 and have not been released. Chinese President Hu Jintao raised the issue of Chinese workers during his meeting with President Karzai, expressing the hope that Afghanistan would take further steps to strengthen security measures to create a sound and safe environment for exchanges and cooperation.

Since 2002, China has given more than \$130 million in aid to Afghanistan, and in 2009 announced it would provide an additional \$75 million over the next five years.

## **7.6: Russia**

President Medvedev has stated on numerous occasions that Afghanistan is our “common cause.” Russia recognizes that a stable, democratic Afghanistan is in its national security interests. Russian officials acknowledge that narcotics trafficking and the spread of violent extremism from Afghanistan pose security risks to Russia and stability in the North Caucasus.

In 2009, DoD began to take advantage of a NATO-Russia arrangement that allows for the transit of non-military equipment and supplies through Russia. We also utilize the Afghanistan Air Transit Agreement, offered by President Medvedev during the Presidents’ April 1, 2009, meeting in London, and signed at the July 2009 Moscow Summit. The agreement permits up to 4,500 military and unlimited commercial flights to transit Russian airspace on their way to Afghanistan each year. The agreement diversifies our supply routes to Afghanistan, reduces transit times and fuel usage, and complements agreements we have made with others in the region. Since we began exercising the agreement in October 2009, flights have become routine and have flown over 18,000 personnel over Russia en route to Afghanistan. This is in addition to the thousands of containers of non-military supplies delivered to Afghanistan via Russian rail on the Northern Distribution Network. We continue to explore other transit cooperation agreements with Russia and other countries in the region.

Russian officials, concerned about Afghan heroin trafficking, have a counternarcotics liaison in Afghanistan. Russia also operates a training course for Afghan counternarcotics police officers at a center at Domodedovo through the NATO-Russia Council Counter-Narcotics Project.

## **7.7: Gulf Cooperation Council States (GCC)**

The member nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) continue to provide support to the Afghanistan stabilization effort in the period from October 2009 to March 2010. In addition to the military and financial contributions detailed elsewhere in this report, members of the GCC provided key basing facilities and access for forces operating in Afghanistan.

Many of the GCC countries provide critical air bases and over-flight and transit rights for operations in Afghanistan and logistical support of these operations.

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Qatar continues to host the Combined Air Operations Center, which provides airpower command and control for Afghanistan. Qatar also hosts USCENTCOM's forward headquarters, which has a crucial command and control responsibility for Afghanistan. Bahrain hosts the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command headquarters, a key supporting effort for Afghan operations. Kuwait is the headquarters of U.S. Army Central Command Forward and also serves as a key transit base. Other GCC countries host key air and naval facilities and provide staging capability for combat, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and logistic operations in support of Afghan security.

We expect the importance of GCC member states to rise as NATO forces increase their numbers in Afghanistan.

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## **PART TWO: United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces**

### **Executive Summary**

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*This report to Congress is submitted consistent with section 1231 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181). In accordance with subsection (a), the report includes a description of the long-term plan for sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF), with the objective of ensuring that the ANSF will be able to conduct operations independently and effectively and maintain long-term security and stability in Afghanistan. The report includes a comprehensive strategy, with defined objectives; mechanisms for tracking funding, equipment, training, and services provided to the ANSF; and any actions necessary to assist the Government of Afghanistan achieve a number of specified goals and the results of such actions. Consistent with section 1231, this report has been prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State. This assessment complements other reports and information about Afghanistan provided to the Congress; however, it is not intended as a single source of information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its international partners, or Afghanistan.*

**NOTE: This is a historical document that covers the United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces from April 28, 2009 to March 31, 2010.**

The Afghan National Army (ANA), under the command and control of the Ministry of Defense (MoD), and the Afghan National Police (ANP), under the command and control of the Ministry of Interior (MoI), together constitute the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF). Building an ANSF of sufficient quality and size to assume the responsibility as the primary provider of security for the Afghan population remains a challenge, with significant risk attached. Over the time period of this report, there have been a number of new initiatives that have reshaped the ANSF development program with the goal of being able to quickly grow the size of the ANSF while simultaneously improving the quality of the overall force. This new approach is transformational in nature and will be explained in the report. The two most significant changes to the ANSF program include improved unity of command through organizational changes to the NATO command structure, including the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) Joint Command (IJC) and NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A), and the embedding of international forces to partner with the ANSF at all levels to provide mentorship and leadership in the operational environment.

In January 2010, the Joint Coordination Monitoring Board (JCMB) approved the Afghan Government request to establish new end-strength goals for the ANA and ANP of 134,000 and 109,000, respectively, by October 2010, and of 171,600 and 134,000, respectively, by October 2011. One of the most significant challenges to successful execution of the ISAF plan for the growth and development of the ANSF is the shortage of NTM-A institutional trainers. These trainers provide basic and advanced instruction and training to the ANSF along a range of policing and war-fighting skill sets. The U.S. Government has aggressively engaged NATO

Allies and non-NATO partners to contribute forces to fill validated capabilities, as identified by the NATO Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR). Without sufficient mentors and trainers, our ability to effectively grow and develop the ANSF is at risk.

To provide for the growth and development of the ANSF, Congress appropriated \$6.6 billion in FY 2010 for the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF). This is two-year funding that will be used to directly support the President's strategic objectives and it supports the October 2010 end-strength goals of the ANA and the ANP. In February 2010, the Department of Defense (DoD) submitted the FY 2010 ASFF Supplemental request of \$2.6 billion and the FY 2011 Overseas Contingency Operations ASFF request of \$11.6 billion. To improve oversight of ASFF, NTM-A/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) has added additional staff and implemented organizational changes, including the addition of a one-star general as the Deputy Commanding General of Programs (DCG-Programs), directly responsible for execution of the ASFF budget.

The MoD and ANA continue to improve capacity and increase end-strength. The MoD's strengths include strong leadership from the Minister and the Chief of the General Staff and an improving capability to formulate and distribute policies, plans, and guidance. In particular, within both the Operations and Communications Directorates, progress has been made in achieving improved capability measurement (CM) ratings. On the other hand, challenges within MoD's Education Directorate, Logistics Command, and Acquisition Agency have led to delays in capability progression. Systems development in both logistics and personnel management are key focus areas for NTM-A mentors.

The ANA is continuing to grow at an accelerated rate, focusing on infantry-centric forces to provide immediate security-capable boots-on-the-ground, while consciously delaying development of many of the combat support and combat service support enabler units until a later date. The ANA has, to date, been able to meet its growth goals through improved recruiting and positive trends in retention and attrition. However, there are problems associated with the rapid growth; most prominently, scarce officer and non-commissioned officer (NCO) leadership for new units while maintaining adequate leadership support within existing units. Embedded partnering with international partner units is intended to mitigate some of this leadership risk.

The ANA Air Corps (ANAAC) continues to grow and improve its capabilities. Currently the ANAAC includes approximately 3,100 personnel and a fleet of 46 aircraft, up from 2,538 personnel and 32 aircraft in May 2009. The ANAAC has a fleet of five AN-32s and one AN-26 fixed-wing propeller-driven aircraft that provides medium cargo lift. In addition, in October 2009, the ANAAC acquired its first two U.S.-manufactured C-27 Spartan fixed-wing propeller-driven aircraft that will also perform the medium airlift mission. This is historic as it is the first ever Western-built aircraft in the ANAAC inventory.

NTM-A continues to work within the MoI to advise and mentor selected senior Afghan officials and officers. Ministerial capacity within the MoI lags behind the MoD and corruption remains an issue. There are positive sign of capacity improvement including the internal development of a National Police Strategy that Minister of Interior Atmar signed in February 2010.

The ANP currently is on track to meeting growth goals, but there is overall concern among the U.S. interagency and the international community regarding the ability of the ANP not only to grow but also to improve the quality of both basic police training and the quality of the fielded force. The MoI, in coordination with NTM-A, has instituted a series of programs to improve recruiting, retention, and attrition of the ANP while also promoting the development of a quality force. These initiatives include establishment of the ANP Recruiting Command and the ANP Training Command to provide structure and oversight in the critical areas of increasing police pay, adding mandatory literacy training to the basic training program, developing Afghan-led Police Training Teams, and embedding international partner units with the ANP.

Operationally, the ANSF have taken the lead in the conduct of operations in many districts of the country, with ISAF in support, and have lead security responsibility in RC-Capital. The ANSF have been the lead in OPERATION MOSHTARAK in RC-South, with planning directed and coordinated by the MoD and MoI with ISAF, and effectively partnered with ISAF units to clear and now hold the area. The initial success of this operation has resulted in localized security improvements and improved freedom of movement for the population.

In the coming year, DoD will continue to work with the ANSF to grow and develop the force so they can eventually assume lead for security responsibility throughout Afghanistan. There is considerable risk in this plan, but COMISAF will assess the new programs as they move forward, including a formal assessment this summer, to allow for course corrections and implementation of mitigation strategies. Additionally, success also depends on the Afghans exercising determined leadership and rooting out corruption and incompetent leaders within the ANSF to gain trust and credibility with the Afghan people. To achieve our goals, we must continue to work with the international community and the Government of Afghanistan in the upcoming year to improve accountability and ensure structures are in place to institutionalize best practices and ensure transparency within the ANSF.

Finally, in order for the ANSF to successfully transition to security lead, there is a requirement for a minimum acceptable rule of law capacity (i.e., governance, courts, judges, prosecutors, and correctional capacity) to support the security effort. Defining sufficient rule of law capability, and the resources required to achieve it, is outside the scope of this report but is being addressed by the interagency and international community. Without the necessary supporting rule of law structures, the ANP will become ineffective over time. No matter how many police we train or how well we partner with them, without sufficient rule of law and governance, transition will fail.

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## Section 1 - Strategy

The long-term objective of the United States, and the international community, is to build an ANSF capable of independently providing for the internal and external security needs of Afghanistan. To achieve this goal, we must develop an ANSF that are nationally respected, professional, ethnically balanced, democratically accountable, organized, trained, and equipped to meet the security needs of the country, and increasingly funded by Government of Afghanistan revenue.

Significant changes to the ANSF development program were implemented over the last year. These changes build on the goals of President Obama's Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategy, announced in March 2009 and refined in December 2009, including the goal of intensifying our training mission to develop increasingly self-reliant Afghan security forces able to take a lead role in the counterterrorism fight and eventually transition to a lead security role. Efforts are consistent with the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and the 2005 Afghanistan Compact, which defines the political partnership between the Afghan Government and the international community.

A key element of the strategy is an ANSF of sufficient size and capability to eventually assume responsibility for internal and external security within Afghanistan. In June 2009, General Stanley McChrystal assumed command of the NATO International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF), dual-hatted as Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A). Shortly thereafter, the Secretary of Defense directed Commander, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) to provide analysis and recommendations on the future ANSF size and capabilities needed to fulfill the intent of the President's strategy. General McChrystal's initial assessment of the situation incorporated the Secretary's requested assessment. This assessment was conducted with input from the Government of Afghanistan, military commanders, think tank experts, U.S. Embassy Kabul, and the interagency. In addition, USCENTCOM worked with CSTC-A, the Center of Army Analysis, and the Joint Staff to develop a model for ANSF growth requirements.

COMISAF's initial assessment was completed in August 2009 and was provided to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the Secretary of Defense. Based on its size and capabilities, he assessed the ANSF as incapable of countering the resilient insurgency in both the near and long term and recommended increasing the ultimate end-strength of the ANSF, while simultaneously accelerating the current growth rate and improving capacity development.

COMISAF's assessment acknowledged the risks inherent in rapidly growing the ANSF, including inadequate training, lack of enablers, and inexperienced leadership. To mitigate these risks, ISAF instituted a program of close partnership between operational ISAF forces and the ANSF. This partnering concept is a critical piece of COMISAF's strategy and requires international partners to fully integrate with the ANSF to execute a full partnership with the shared goal of working together to bring security to the Afghan people. Under partnering, ISAF units will be physically co-located with the ANSF from the national headquarters level through the regional, provincial, and district levels, establishing the same battle rhythms while planning and executing operations together. Embedded partnering is beginning to provide daily

mentoring, training, and operational oversight to mitigate risk and develop more capable and professional army and police forces.

COMISAF's assessment also included other recommendations to reshape the ANSF development program. These included realigning the command and control structure within ISAF to bring the operational mission of mentoring and developing the fielded ANSF forces under the new IJC. The IJC was formally approved by the NAC in August 2009 and achieved full operational capability in November 2009. Based on the desire to build a synergistic relationship between the maneuver and mentorship forces, IJC was given the responsibility of provision of partners and, in coordination with NTM-A, the development of pre-deployment training requirements and standards for the ANA and ANP.

In his December 2009 speech at West Point, the President declared the need to increase U.S. force levels both for combat operations and for training and developing the ANSF to eventually transition security responsibility to the Afghan Government. U.S. force levels are increasing as forces deploy through August 2010. The ISAF plan for the 30,000 U.S. troop uplift, and additional NATO and non-NATO forces, is based in large part on U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine. The U.S. and international force increase is focused on improving population security and enabling a more permissive environment in which to improve the capacity and capabilities of the ANSF.

Another significant achievement in the ANSF development strategy over the past year was the establishment of NTM-A in November 2009. The decision to create NTM-A was approved by Allied leaders at the April 2009 NATO Summit in Strasbourg-Kehl. NTM-A was established to provide a coordinated training mission for the ANSF, under a single NATO framework, to focus international contributions and standardize overall ANSF development efforts. The dual-hatted U.S. NTM-A/CSTC-A commander is synchronizing ANA and ANP training under a single umbrella, allowing him to draw on, and more effectively employ, in-theater resources. In addition to manning, training, equipping, and sustaining the ANSF, NTM-A is responsible for development of higher-level training, including defense colleges and academies, and is responsible for ANSF doctrine development. The U.S.-commanded CSTC-A retained the bilateral responsibility of the ministerial development missions within MoD and MoI, along with control over U.S. Title 10 (DoD) funding responsibilities through ASFF.

Lieutenant General William Caldwell assumed command of NTM-A/CSTC-A in November 2009 and immediately directed a team of internal and external experts to conduct a 30-day assessment of NTM-A/CSTC-A's programs, processes, and performance. The assessment framed NTM-A/CSTC-A's broad mission under three categories:

- (1) Team with Afghans in all areas of ANSF growth and development;
- (2) Insist upon and promote transparency in our interactions and, by so doing, help attack corruption and establish accountability; and
- (3) Set the conditions for transition from international partners to Afghan leadership of training programs as soon as practicable.

NTM-A/CSTC-A's assessment identified five command focus areas: leader development; balancing speed of production with quality; ensuring the right structure and capabilities within the ANSF; reforming the ANP; and filling NTM-A/CSTC-A personnel shortfalls.

In January 2010, the JCMB approved the Afghan Government request to establish new end-strength goals for the ANA and ANP of 134,000 and 109,000, respectively, by October 2010 and 171,600 and 134,000, respectively, by October 2011. In 2010, ANP growth will be accomplished by increasing the number of light infantry, COIN-trained Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) Gendarmerie to improve police capability to directly confront the insurgency; the number of Afghan Border Police (ABP) to improve security at the border; and the number of Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) at the district and provincial levels to improve the police-to-population ratio. This request was in line with COMISAF recommendations. This decision was affirmed by the U.S. Government and endorsed by the international community at the January 2010 London Conference. These goals were based on ISAF and Afghan estimates of how quickly the ANSF could grow, while achieving and maintaining an acceptable level of quality. These approved end-strength numbers, however, do not reflect a final judgment of the ultimate end-strength requirement. The international community recognizes that the ANSF must be sufficiently sized to prevent Afghanistan from again being used as a safe haven by al Qaeda. Determination of an ultimate end-strength will be conditions based, including ongoing assessments of training infrastructure capacity and ANSF performance in the field, as well as on efforts to find an appropriate balance between national forces and local police and defense forces.

## **Section 2 – ANSF Funding**

### **2.1: Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)**

The Secretary of Defense is provided with Title 10 funding through the National Defense Appropriations Act to man, train, equip, and sustain the ANSF through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF). For FY 2010, Congress appropriated \$6.6 billion for ASFF. This money is two-year funding and will be used to directly support the President's objectives and it supports the end-strength goals of growing the ANA to 134,000 and the ANP to 109,000 by October 2010.

For the MoD, in addition to providing sustainment funds to support the existing forces, the ASFF budget provides for manning, training, equipping, and fielding of 72 infantry battalions, 12 special operations forces (SOF) battalions (commandos and security forces), 13 combat support battalions (reconnaissance, artillery, and engineering) and 21 combat service support battalions (logistics). The ANAAC will receive expanded mobility; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and light attack capability.

For the MoI, in addition to providing sustainment funds to support existing police forces, FY 2010 ASFF funded ANP growth to 96,800. The ASFF also provides funding for infrastructure

required to field two additional ANCOP battalions, a MoI National Logistics Center, and a MoI transportation battalion.

In February 2010, DoD submitted the FY 2010 ASFF Supplemental request of \$2.6 billion and the FY 2011 Overseas Contingency Operations ASFF request of \$11.6 billion. After October 2010, both the ANA and ANP will, in accordance with the JCMB decision in January 2010, grow to 171,600 and 134,000, respectively, by October 2011. The focus in ANA growth will shift from infantry-centric forces to additional enablers such as combat support, logistics, route clearance companies, military police, and military intelligence to begin to reduce ANA dependence on international partner enablers. This more balanced ANA force structure is designed to shape the environment and improve security, ultimately setting conditions for the maintenance of civil order by the ANP. The FY 2011 ASFF budget request supports the accelerated growth of the ANP to generate, employ, and project a force that can conduct and sustain independent law enforcement, counterterrorism, COIN, and other operations. The budget request also supports expansion of the ANCOP and the ABP as well as supporting the development of MoI enablers. Additionally, it provides for construction of 88 ANP district headquarters, expands seven border police facilities, and provides protective vehicles and fire department capabilities. It is important to note that no matter how well the ANP is trained and mentored, without minimally sufficient rule of law infrastructure and capacity, as well as governance capacity in place, the police will not be able to transition successfully.

## **2.2: ASFF Direct Funding**

A significant policy change to the flow of ASFF was approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in November 2009, which allows CSTC-A to receive ASFF funding directly and gives the CSTC-A commander the authority to decide which DoD organizations would be used to provide CSTC-A contract support. Previously, all ASFF execution was managed through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. The new policy provides CSTC-A increased flexibility, shortens acquisition timelines, and is expected to save money both in the short and long term.

## **2.3: International Community Funding for the ANSF**

In early 2009, the NAC agreed to expand the NATO ANA Trust Fund, including additional funds for sustainment costs. Prior to this expansion, the trust fund could only be used for ANA training, equipment, and transportation. Several international partners have provided significant monetary contributions to the ANA Trust Fund in the amount of approximately \$155 million. On the ANP side, the United Nations Development Program oversees the Law and Order Trust Fund-Afghanistan (LOTF-A), which provides funding for police salaries and other police development programs. From 2002 to 2009, the international community donated approximately \$625 million to LOTF-A. The United States will continue to work through diplomatic channels and international organizations to encourage its Allies and partners to help pay for ANSF sustainment, but likely will continue to shoulder the major portion of these costs for the near future.



## **2.4: Budget Sustainment**

With the increase in the size and capabilities of the ANSF comes considerable concern about the ability of the Government of Afghanistan to sustain the ANSF. The Government of Afghanistan will be dependent upon considerable international support for the foreseeable future, although efforts continue to increase the Afghan budget revenue. The Afghan Government included approximately \$455 million of funding in its Solar Year 1389 budget (covering March 2010 to March 2011) which is an increase of \$140 million over the past year. Although this is only a small portion of the cost for ANSF development, it is over 30% of total Afghan Government revenues, and shows progress on the part of the Afghan Government.

## **Section 3 – ASFF Execution Oversight**

In May 2009, a Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction audit of a large CSTC-A training contract found that CSTC-A lacked the appropriate contract management oversight mechanisms and identified the need for additional Contract Officer Representatives in country. In addition, due to the large increase in the overall size of the ASFF budget, as well as implementation of direct funding provisions, DoD has identified the need for increased oversight mechanisms. Specific measures implemented over the last year by DoD to improve oversight of ASFF accountability and contract management are described below.

### **3.1: Organizational Structure and Leadership**

In November 2009, CSTC-A added a one-star Deputy Commanding General for Programs (DCG-Programs), whose sole responsibility is to oversee the ASFF program. The DCG-Programs is responsible for aligning resources to requirements for generating and sustaining the ANSF in order to enable Afghan-led security. The DCG-Programs integrates infrastructure construction, equipment procurement, training contracts, and sustainment activities. Additionally, the DCG-Programs oversees and promotes local procurement of equipment and services needed by the ANSF with a focus on stimulating the development of manufacturing in Afghanistan in such sectors as construction and clothing. Finally, the DCG-Programs oversees the contract management branch of CSTC-A, which ensures all contracts have adequate oversight and controls in place. The Commander, CSTC-A is committed to ensuring his organization applies U.S. resources in an efficient and responsible manner to build enduring, sustainable, COIN-capable ANSF.

CSTC-A has added additional senior leadership positions to the staff to further increase program management capacity. Previously, a single colonel (O-6) was responsible for all acquisition and sustainment functions. CSTC-A has separated the acquisition and sustainment functions, adding experienced O-6s to provide expert leadership in each functional area. The Logistics Directorate O-6 is now responsible for supply, distribution, transportation, and sustainment, and additional O-6s are being added to stand-up and lead the Security Assistance Office-Afghanistan, as well as its two subordinate units, the Acquisition and Contract Management Office and the Security

Assistance Programs Office. This expansion of program leadership capacity enables CSTC-A to more effectively oversee the ANSF's aggressive growth plans.

### **3.2: Additional Staff Manning**

In December 2009, CSTC-A identified 26 additional high-priority positions that were needed to strengthen oversight of the ASFF program, including acquisition officers, internal auditors, foreign military sales specialists, and finance specialists. Of the 26 positions identified, 16 have been filled, nine are slated with arrival dates and one position is under administrative review. These experts are providing CSTC-A with the depth of knowledge needed to oversee the budget and acquisition processes, as well as enhanced contract oversight. Currently these key staff and support positions have reached a steady state, in accordance with the NATO Crisis Engagement and U.S. Joint Manning Documents. Periodic review and realignment of the Crisis Engagement and Joint Manning Documents are being conducted at the NTM-A/CSTC-A subordinate command levels in order to maintain optimum troop-to-task effectiveness.

### **3.3: Contracting Oversight**

For large U.S.-based contracts that require a substantial degree of effort to implement adequate contract oversight, CSTC-A has developed mechanisms to have the appropriate contracting command deploy full-time, "in-country" contract officer representatives co-located with CSTC-A. For contracts awarded in Afghanistan, and for small U.S.-based contracts, contract officer representatives have either been appointed from CSTC-A or assigned from other qualified USFOR-A personnel. Additionally, for certain contracts that require technical competence (such as vehicle and weapons maintenance) the Army is arranging for U.S. Government civilians from Army depots (e.g., Red River Army Depot) to deploy and provide oversight assistance.

### **3.4: Quality Assurance**

CSTC-A has implemented a system to ensure quality assurance is accomplished for all contracts. As part of this effort, they have instituted a tracking system to ensure designated contract officer representatives are verifying compliance with quality assurance plans. During the contract planning phase, requirement generators develop a detailed, written Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan and the associated contract officer representative coverage requirements, identifying the quantity, locations, and required qualifications and skills for qualified contract officer representatives to provide adequate oversight coverage to reasonably ensure compliance with the Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan.

### **3.5: Contract Management**

CSTC-A has established a six-person Contract Management Team to monitor contracts, validate contract oversight, and share best practices across the command. This team is implementing a

systemic approach to review the contract oversight and standards for every contract. Additionally, on a monthly basis, the Contract Management Team identifies contract officer representative requirements for every location where contracted services are provided and updates the description of the oversight responsibilities that need to be performed. CSTC-A ensures there are qualified individuals at each Regional Command to execute these oversight requirements and ensures replacements are appointed for redeploying contract officer representatives.

### **3.6: Senior Leadership Review**

CSTC-A has established a process to conduct a weekly review, led by the DCG-Programs, during which each staff directorate provides updates on: (1) the requirement for which a contract is based; (2) the oversight plan for each contract; and (3) the transition plan that will enable the function currently contracted by CSTC-A to be transitioned to the Afghan MoD or MoI, where appropriate.

### **3.7: Weapons Accountability Programs**

In response to audits by the DoD Inspector General, the Government Accountability Office, and the requirements of section 1225 of the FY 2010 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-118), CSTC-A conducts congressionally-mandated Defense Article Registration and End Use Monitoring Programs through the End Use Monitoring Division of Security Assistance Office-Afghanistan. Specifically, CSTC-A maintains detailed records of the origin, shipping, and distribution of defense articles and defense services transferred to the Government of Afghanistan and registers the serial numbers of all small arms provided to the Government of Afghanistan. The End Use Monitoring process ensures the Afghan Government adheres to applicable U.S. and international agreements for the transfer of weapons and other defense articles. In parallel, the End Use Monitoring team is also working with the MoD and MoI to ensure that they develop enduring systems and capacity to track weapons accountability.

### **3.8: Construction Oversight**

CSTC-A has recently increased the number of engineers at each of the ISAF Regional Commands so that each has a minimum of five full time engineer officers/non-commissioned officers (NCOs) assigned. These engineers are critical to overseeing construction contracts for projects such as temporary bases and facility sustainment. Regional Support Team engineer cells also provide a stronger link to the Afghan Engineering District of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and its U.S. Air Force equivalent, the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment, to ensure construction projects meet current and future requirements and are sustainable.

### **3.9: Internal Controls Unit**

CSTC-A has established a five-person Internal Controls Unit with the objective to improve, optimize, and establish end-to-end transparency and visibility of the supply chain that provides materiel to the ANSF. The Internal Controls Unit will focus on the “shoot, move, and communicate” systems being procured for the ANSF. This critical organization will ensure efficiencies and create auditable processes resulting in more accurate accountability and transparency within the system.

## **Section 4 – International Donations**

Offers of monetary, infrastructure, equipment, and munitions donations to the Afghan Government, in support of the security ministries, are evaluated by the office of the NTM-A/CSTC-A Assistant Commanding General for International Security Cooperation (ACG-ISC) to ensure that each supports an ANA or ANP requirement and will be sustainable. A donation is subsequently evaluated by the MoD or MoI for their final approval and acceptance. For ANA offers originating through NATO, NTM-A/CSTC-A typically notifies the donor nation of Afghan acceptance. NTM-A/CSTC-A may survey equipment or munitions offered by a donor nation to verify technical specifications are met and to provide quality assurance. On-site surveys are anticipated for ammunition, weapons, and highly technical equipment. At NTM-A/CSTC-A’s discretion, and with concurrence of the donor, additional on-site technical work may be performed to assist the deliberative process. After NTM-A/CSTC-A and the Afghan Government make the official decision to accept an offer, transportation arrangements are made. The NTM-A/CSTC-A Logistics Directorate transportation office is the key point of contact for all air and surface cargo transportation. Relying on both military and commercial carrier input, the Logistics Directorate tracks all airlifts from embarkation to delivery. The delivery process includes Logistics Directorate receipt of and accounting for all equipment, materials, and munitions.

Nations sometimes approach the Afghan Government directly and negotiate bilateral donations. Such bilateral donations may or may not come to the attention of the ACG-ISC. In most cases, however, the Afghans and the donor nation advise the ACG-ISC early in the process; the ACG-ISC makes every effort to provide assistance when necessary. For the remaining cases, ACG-ISC is unable to track donation details or assist the Afghans during the donation process.

Specific donation information (e.g., quantities and types of equipment) is tracked in a database maintained by the ACG-ISC. Since 2002, NATO, 45 nations (NATO and non-NATO), and six international funding agencies have contributed over \$1.57 billion in monetary assistance for ANSF to the Government of Afghanistan.

Since May 2009, Afghanistan has received many donations from the international community. Examples of large donations include the following:

- For the ANA, the Netherlands donated the funds necessary to purchase more than \$14 million worth of winter clothing and gear. Items include 2,593 cold weather boots,

61,022 pieces of organizational clothing, 30,511 field jackets, 30,511 jacket liners, and 20,616 sleep systems.

- For the ANA, a German Trust Fund contribution of approximately \$68 million for the ANA Barracks in Feyzabad, the Logistics School in Kabul, and the Engineering School in Mazar-e-Sharif.
- For the ANA, Denmark donated \$1.3 million for the Kabul Military Training Center Visitor Center project.
- For the ANA, China donated disaster relief materiel, including 170 tents, 100 beds, 35 mine detection systems, 50 fire fighter's uniforms, 100 gas masks, 2 generators, 1,000 blankets and 1,000 dining sets.
- For the ANP, Korea donated 100 ambulances with medical support equipment, 300 motorcycles, and 300 motorcycle helmets.
- For the ANP, a bilateral donation from Germany and Russia of two MI-8 helicopters.
- For the ANP, Japan has donated over \$140 million since 2006 to LOTF-A for salaries.

Future NTM-A solicitations will focus on equipment, infrastructure, and monetary donations for both the ANA and ANP. Monetary donations are especially critical due to the need for standardized equipment.

## **Section 5 – Institutional Trainer and Mentor Status**

One of the most significant challenges to the growth and development of the ANSF is the shortage of NTM-A institutional trainers who provide basic and advanced training to the ANSF. With an overall requirement of 2,325 institutional trainers, NTM-A has a current shortfall of 759 personnel. Aggressive engagement by NATO and U.S. senior leadership may have yielded significant potential results against the shortage of trainers (pending confirmation and ultimate deployment of all pledges). NATO Secretary General Rasmussen, Supreme Allied Commander-Europe Admiral Stavridis, and Deputy Supreme Allied Commander-Europe General McColl have engaged Allies and ISAF partners with specific requests for troop contributions to meet these staffing shortfalls.

In addition to the need for institutional trainers, the IJC has a total requirement of 475 Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (POMLTs) for the ANP and 180 Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLTs) for the ANA, who embed with ANSF formations in the field and coordinate with international partner units. The current projected requirements shortfall for mentoring teams assigned to the fielded ANSF forces is 17 OMLTs for the ANA and 108 POMLTs for the ANP. The OMLT/POMLT requirements are expected to increase in 2011 with the growth of the ANSF, although the specific requirement has not yet been identified as the final organizational structure for ANA and ANP units is under study.

The United States and NATO have stressed the trainer and mentor requirements during repeated high-level, international engagements including the January 2010 London Conference and the February 2010 NATO Defense Ministerial. NATO held an NTM-A Force Generation Conference in February 2010 to solicit additional contributions against these shortfalls. DoD is currently coordinating a plan with the interagency to identify and demarche regarding the

availability of non-NATO resources to provide mentors and trainers to fill those shortfalls. The United States uses every engagement opportunity to drive home the need for NATO Allies to step up to contribute forces to fill validated NATO requirements. Without these critical mentors and trainers, our ability to effectively grow and develop the ANSF is at risk.

The United States is providing forces to fill a large portion of the training and mentoring requirements in Afghanistan. The President's March 2009 decision to increase forces in Afghanistan by 30,000 personnel included a brigade combat team specifically tailored for the ANSF training mission. The arrival of the 4<sup>th</sup> Brigade of the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division, in September 2009, included trainers and mentors for both the ANA and ANP. This was the first time the ANP training mission had been specifically sourced with U.S. military personnel, though previously, NTM-A/CSTC-A had redirected U.S. military trainers to provide training capabilities for the ANP. In addition to meeting the need for institutional trainers, the 4<sup>th</sup> Brigade, 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division, deploying as part of the force uplift approved in December 2009, has been assigned to conduct ANA and ANP training with NTM-A and mentoring in RC-North. One battalion has been assigned to provide basic ANA recruit training while the remainder of the brigade has been assigned to RC-North to provide POMLTs in support of the German civilian police training mission. Finally, the United States has identified short-term solutions to man the most critical NTM-A trainer shortages through October 2010 and will continue to solicit additional resource from both NATO Allies and non-NATO partners.

## **Section 6 – Ministry of Defense (MoD)**

### **6.1: Institutional Capacity**

CSTC-A continues to execute the MoD and General Staff (GS) development program. This program synchronizes the development of MoD organizations and its intermediate and sustaining institutions with the development of management and operational systems. Vertical and horizontal integration of systems is achieved through mentor meetings, functional boards, and the Ministerial Development Board. CSTC-A functional staff focus on building organizational capacity and capability, while contract civilians with prerequisite skills (working with military functional experts and staff) develop the core management and operational systems essential to enable the Ministry to plan, program, manage and sustain the ANA. Currently, approximately 270 U.S. military personnel and contractors are engaged in this effort. The specific core systems being developed are divided into four key functional areas as indicated below. Since the last reporting period, CSTC-A has increased its efforts by providing mentors to develop several new areas within the MoD including strategy and policy, facilities engineering, force management, and the Inspector General's office.

## MoD/GS/Institutional Development

(as of February 2010)

### Support to Operations

Intelligence----- CM3  
 Operations----- CM2  
 GS G2-----CM3  
 Force Management----- CM3  
 Communications----- CM3  
 Communications Spt Unit CM2  
 Medical----- CM3  
 Reserve Affairs----- CM4  
 Disaster Response----- CM2  
 Facilities Engineering ---- CM3

### Personnel Management

Senior Personnel Coord---- CM3  
 Personnel (Ministry)----- CM2  
 Education (Ministry)----- CM3  
 Recruiting ----- CM2  
 Religious & Cultural Affairs  
 ----- CM3

### National Logistics

Senior Logistics Coord ----CM3  
 Acquisition, Tech & Logistics  
 -----CM3  
 Logistics Command-----CM3  
 Acquisition Agency -----CM3

### Horizontal Integration & Strategic Management

Office of Minister of Defense  
 -----CM2  
 Office of 1<sup>st</sup> Deputy Minister  
 -----CM2  
 Office of Ch of Gen Staff--CM3  
 Office of Vice Ch of Gen Staff  
 -----CM3  
 Strategy & Policy-----CM3  
 MoD Legal -----CM3  
 GS Legal -----CM3  
 Public Affairs -----CM2  
 MoD Inspector General ---CM2  
 GS Inspector General-----CM2  
 MoD Finance -----CM2  
 GS Budget and Finance ---CM2  
 Parliamentary Affairs -----CM2

CSTC-A uses Capability Milestones (CM) to track development of the MoD and the MoI. Current CM ratings are as follows:

*CM4 rating* – Evaluation objectives outline the basic requirements for standing up the department. This means that the *tashkil* (manning document) authorizes the department, the key leader is assigned (typically the department director or chief), and a clearly defined set of missions and capabilities required for the department is agreed upon. When requests come at this level, CSTC-A personnel are taking the lead on completing assigned departmental tasks.

*CM3 rating* – At CM3, work is being done by CSTC-A for the department personnel. At this level, CSTC-A personnel oversee and accomplish the department's assigned tasking while Afghan directorate personnel are completing tasks as assigned to them. Evaluation objectives should cover the following tasks at minimum: the department is staffed and equipment and office space authorization by *tashkil* is distributed; a review of the current assessment and plan with the department is complete and directorate personnel understand the way forward; the department has completed staff work to create job

descriptions and establish a meeting rhythm; and, the department personnel have received training on and understand the work their department is required to accomplish.

*CM2 rating* – Evaluation objectives should demonstrate the department’s ability to work with the mentoring team to accomplish its assigned tasks. At this stage the advising should focus on demonstrating the following: the departmental director should be able to review the department staffing, budget, and equipment and know how to use MoD procedures to initiate changes; the directorate should develop and implement the policies, systems and standard operating procedures needed to function as a department; and, if appropriate for the department’s function, expand its role to encompass activity at the regional and provincial levels.

*CM1 rating* – All evaluation objectives should indicate the department’s ability to perform its assigned tasks by itself. Advisors should monitor the departments as they execute the tasks received. While objectives should continue to indicate the demonstrated capability, core tasks should have words such as “verify,” “validate,” or “review.” At this stage the MoD should continue functioning by itself with CSTC-A assistance only if needed.

The MoD continues to improve its CM ratings. As of February 2010, 13 MoD departments being tracked were CM2, 18 were CM3, and one (Reserve Affairs) was CM4. Based on current missions and the ministerial development plans, the Ministry is expected to largely reach CM1 by mid-2012. MoD strengths include strong leadership from the Minister and the Chief of the General Staff and an improving capability to formulate and distribute policies, plans, and guidance. In particular, within both the Operations and Communications Directorates, progress has been made toward achieving CM2, while challenges within the Education (Ministry) Directorate, the Logistics Command, and the Acquisition Agency have delayed progression. CSTC-A continues to encourage senior Afghan leaders to work together and to focus on horizontal integration. Systems development in both logistics and personnel management are key focus areas for mentors.

### **6.1.1: Minister of Defense Advisory (MoDA) Program**

In FY 2010, DoD will launch a pilot Ministry of Defense Advisor (MoDA) Program. The goals of the MoDA Program are to, “strengthen defense reform efforts in Afghanistan as well as other countries.” The MoDA Program will deploy DoD civilians to help the Afghans improve ministerial level competencies such as personnel and readiness, strategy and policy, and financial management. The goals of this program are to improve the capacity of MoD institutions and to build long-term relationships beneficial to both parties. Specifically, MoDA matches DoD civilian experts with partner requirements and provides funding for temporary backfills for those civilian experts’ organizations. The FY 2010-FY 2011 pilot program will deploy up to 32 trained DoD civilian advisors to Afghanistan starting in June 2010. Original plans were to place them all within the MoD, but now DoD is considering assignment of some of the 32 personnel in the MoI as well. All advisors will deploy under the auspices of the DoD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce construct. Advisors will be assigned to the CSTC-A. Each advisor will receive



approximately six weeks of pre-deployment training, set to begin in early May 2010 in Washington, D.C. The pre-deployment training includes Civilian Expeditionary Workforce orientation, a senior advisor course, country familiarization, language familiarization, and senior-level consultations and briefings. Advisors will also participate in a CAPSTONE exercise conducted at Camp Atterberry, Indiana, immediately prior to deployment. Advisors will serve in Afghanistan for one year. This year does not include the six to eight weeks of pre-deployment training. A program management office will be established to recruit future advisors, facilitate advisor education and training, coordinate funding, provide operational support to deployed advisors, and assess pilot program implementation.

## **6.2: ANA Institutional Capacity and Growth**

Since the last reporting period, several decisions have been made that have affected the end-strength of the ANA. In August 2009, with the release of the COMISAF initial assessment on Afghanistan and the approval of the Secretary of Defense, the ANA growth timeline was accelerated. The new objective directed growth to 134,000 personnel by the end of October 2010 in order to provide a sufficient number of ANA on the ground to combat the insurgency. In order to do this, focus was placed on building infantry-centric units to assist early in COIN operations, with a plan to rebalance the force in future years to enable self-sufficiency. In January 2010, the JCMB agreed to further accelerate growth to 171,600 ANA personnel by October 2011.

These accelerated growth goals include a high level of risk to the success of the ANSF, including a risk to our ability to transition lead security role to the ANA if they are lacking in quality and capacity. Still, growth is critical to continued progress and countering the insurgency. Two major risks associated with accelerated ANA growth are inadequate recruiting and retention and inadequate leadership. COMISAF has implemented measures to mitigate these risks, which are described below.

### **6.2.1: Recruitment/Retention Risk**

Recent pay increases, including a base pay increase, re-contracting bonuses, and hazardous duty pay, as well as continued fielding of electronic pay systems to ensure pay is received by the soldier, will help mitigate concerns in both of these areas. Embedded partnering with international partner forces will likely also have a strong impact on recruiting as it will provide better mentorship and leadership to the ANSF as well as improved force protection and enablers to fielded forces. In addition, mandatory literacy training is now included as part of the basic training. This training has been shown as a significant factor as to why some individuals join the ANA.

## 6.2.2: Leadership Development Risk

COMISAF's new paradigm of embedded partnering, which occurs at every level within the MoD from the Ministry down to squad level, will provide direct oversight and leadership to mitigate some of the risk associated with a lack of qualified officers and NCOs in the ANA. Partnering, which involves co-locating ISAF forces with the ANA to integrate mutual resources, provide oversight, and build a more cohesive and trusting relationship, is not the same as mentoring, which is also occurring through the NATO OMLTs and U.S. Embedded Training Teams (ETTs).

## 6.3: ANA Organization

The ANA consists of six Army corps including the 111<sup>th</sup> Division in RC-Capital, 201<sup>st</sup> Corps and 203<sup>rd</sup> Corps in RC-East, 205<sup>th</sup> Corps in RC-South, 207<sup>th</sup> Corps in RC-West, and 209<sup>th</sup> Corps in RC-North. The newly formed 215<sup>th</sup> Corps is also being manned and trained to operate in RC-South. Fielding of the 215<sup>th</sup> Corps will establish two ANA corps in the south (one will cover RC-Southeast and one will cover the proposed RC-Southwest). Each corps has between two and four brigades. A brigade consists of 4 infantry *kandaks* (battalions), one combat support *kandak* and one combat service support *kandak*. The 3<sup>rd</sup> *Kandak*, 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade, 201<sup>st</sup> Corps is the only armor *kandak* in the ANA. In total there are 16 brigades and 99 *kandaks*. By October 2011, when the ANA is planned to reach its approved end-strength of 171,600 personnel, the ANA organization will include additional infantry, artillery, armor, engineer, commando, combat support, combat service support, and the requisite intermediate commands and sustaining institutions.

The MoD continues to ensure that the ANA is ethnically balanced at the *kandak* level to ensure that it is a force that represents the nation.

	Pashtun	Tajik	Hazara	Uzbek	Others
Officer	42%	41%	8%	4%	5%
NCO	46%	36%	10%	4%	3%
Soldier	38%	31%	14%	10%	7%
Total Force	41%	34%	12%	8%	5%


### 6.3.1: ANA Manning

Rapid growth of the ANA requires achieving higher recruiting and retention rates and lower attrition rates than have been reached historically in order to meet the approved end-strength goals. Although there is risk associated with rapid growth, the ANA has been close to meeting

its monthly end-strength goals. In late May 2009, the MoD reported that the ANA end-strength was 89,521 and as of late March 2010, ANA end-strength had grown to 112,779, which is slightly above its March 2010 goal of 112,700 (Figure 20 - ANA Monthly End Strength, May 2009-March 2010).

Recruiting within the ANA has largely exceeded goals between October 2009 and March 2010, and in several months the ANA recruited more personnel than they could train. Retention within the ANA (defined as the ability to re-contract ANSF personnel) has also been strong as the ANA exceeded its goal of 60% retention for each of the past six months. Attrition (defined as the unplanned loss of ANSF personnel), still remains a problem as the ANA has failed to meet desired goals over the last six months. Absent without leave (AWOL) personnel remain a significant contributor to attrition rates, with the percentages growing over the past year from six percent in May 2009 to a high of 12% in November 2009. For the last twelve months, AWOL has averaged nine percent. NTM-A and the MoD anticipate pay raises, instituted in December 2009, and other initiatives to provide better equipment (including up-armored vehicles and crew-served weapons), will improve attrition rates.

**Figure 20 - ANA Monthly End Strength, May 2009-March 2010**



### 6.3.2: ANA Training

The Afghan National Army Training Command (ANATC) is the primary training institution for the ANA. ANATC contributes to force generation through multiple programs and institutions designed to contribute to the fielding and subsequent development of an army with the skills and competencies needed to conduct effective COIN operations. Within NTM-A/CSTC-A, the

Combined Training and Advisory Group-Army has the mission of advising, mentoring, and monitoring the ANATC in order to establish a doctrine, education, and training system capable of supporting the development of a professional ANA in a timeframe that supports growth targets. Major training initiatives are described below.

### **Basic Warrior Training**

This recruit training process begins at the Basic Warrior Training Course at Kabul Military Training Center or at one of six remote Basic Warrior Training courses in the corps' areas. Afghan trainers, under the supervision of international partner mentors, conduct both courses. To meet desired growth goals, in October 2009, the MoD compressed Basic Warrior Training from ten weeks to eight weeks. The program of instruction was actually expanded to add 64 hours of mandatory literacy training. The reduction was achieved through scheduling efficiencies and by extending the duty day. The shorter courses increase training throughput — critical for the ANA to achieve the October 2010 end-strength goals without compromising key elements of training. We acknowledge concerns with the length of the program of instruction but believe that the current plan provides the best compromise to achieve goals for both growth and training quality. To ensure the ANA continues to meet its quality goals, NTM-A worked with the ANATC to add a U.S. Army marksmanship unit to instruct at Kabul Military Training Center and the remote training sites. This has increased the quality of the Basic Warrior Training program and improved operational readiness of fielded forces. In addition to this training, the extensive partnering between ANSF and ISAF units in the field is critical to improvements in the quality of the total force.

### **Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) Training**

The ANA Bridmal Academy in Kabul conducts much of the training and development programs for the ANA non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps. The academy teaches the Squad Leader Course, Platoon Sergeant Course, Senior Sergeant Course, First Sergeant Course, and Sergeant Major Course.

### **Officer Training**

The ANA conducts officer training and professional military training courses in partnership with international partner mentors. The current courses taught in the officer Professional Military Education (PME) program include: the Basic Officer Training Course, which provides basic branch specialty training for new lieutenants; the Company Commanders' Course, which prepares captains for company level command; the Staff Officers' Course, which provides captains and majors with basic staff officer skills; the Command & General Staff Course for majors and lieutenant colonels, which is the first officer PME course; the *Kandak* (Battalion) Commanders' Course, which prepares lieutenant colonels for *kandak*-level command assignments; and the Strategic Command & Staff Course, which is the culminating PME course taught to senior colonels and general officers. Current international partner and ANA efforts are expanding the officer PME system under the umbrella institution of the Command & Staff College. The Command & Staff College will house four PME courses, including the already-operating Command & General Staff Course and the Strategic Command & Staff Course. The new courses under international partner mentorship include the Junior Officers' Staff Course for captains and the Higher Command and Staff Course for senior lieutenant colonels and colonels. Together, these courses constitute a robust end-to-end PME system for ANA officers.

Corruption remains an issue within the ANA officer corps with reports of personnel buying positions. NTM-A is looking to counter this factor by implementing institutional and accountability measures. One example is the February 2010 implementation of a lottery-based assignment system at the graduation of the cadets at the National Military Academy of Afghanistan. The system increases transparency in assignments and ensures that personnel are randomly assigned to all regions in Afghanistan.

### **ANA Medical Training**

NTM-A/CSTC-A's Medical Training and Advisory Group is working to develop the ANA Medical Corps. Currently there are approximately 150 medical trainers at all levels within the ANA. The ANA operates a 50-bed hospital in each of the regional commands and is working to expand these facilities. There are also regional medical logistic depots in place and plans to build clinics in several key provinces. NTM-A/CSTC-A is focusing medical mentoring on advising on five focus areas within the ANA Medical Corps, which include expanding clinical service, building facilities, improving standards of care, training personnel, and developing medical logistics capabilities.

Due to the shortage of trained medics within the ANA, the MoD has opened a Combat Medic School that provides training to front line medics and builds their capacity to respond to combat injuries, increase overall survivability of units, and improve personnel readiness. The MoD is also working to develop a nursing corps and medical service corps.

Challenges within the ANA Medical Corps remain. Currently the medical training cannot keep pace with the rapid expansion of the ANSF and this issue will need more focus in coming years. Additionally, the ANA requires more modern hospitals and equipment.

### **Literacy and Language Training**

NTM-A/CSTC-A instituted a two-week pilot literacy training program during pre-basic training for ANA soldiers. In addition, literacy training is an integral part of instruction at the Bridmal NCO Academy and the Basic Warrior Training course. Afghans place great value on literacy and the goal is to leverage literacy programs to promote recruitment and retention and minimize attrition. This will support the current ISAF and NTM-A/CSTC-A command initiatives to "grow the force" in order to meet stated end-strength objectives by December 2010 and build an enduring and literate force.

Additionally the ANA has set up a Foreign Language Institute that Luxembourg has expressed interest in funding via the ANA Trust Fund. This program emphasizes the instruction of non-English languages such as European and Asian languages and Dari/Pashto to strengthen international military education opportunities for the ANA.

### **Unit Fielding**

To increase unit cohesion and enhance collective training, a new ANA unit is formed at the Consolidated Fielding Center where ANA manpower is assembled, fully equipped, and trained. Unit members undergo 45 days of individual and collective training, including staff functions and roles and responsibilities of headquarters personnel, prior to deployment to the unit's corps area for combat operations. Conduct of combat and security operations under international

mentorship round out ANA unit development. Each ANA unit is accompanied by either a U.S. ETT or an ISAF OMLT. These teams provide comprehensive partnering and mentoring across unit capability requirements. Specifically, the teams provide the ANA unit leadership with advisory support on all unit functions and direct access to U.S. and NATO ISAF enablers who, in turn, enhance the ANA's effectiveness and independence. These teams also serve as role models and key liaisons between ANA and international forces. They coach unit staffs and commanders and assist them in development of their training programs, logistics and administrative systems, and planning and employment in operations. ETTs and OMLTs also facilitate the operational assessment of ANA units, helping the ANA identify strengths, shortfalls, and opportunities for improvement.

### **Commando Training**

The Commando Training Center Garrison is the primary ANA institution to train future commando leaders and soldiers through the School of Excellence. Various specialty programs teach commando leaders and soldiers the skills necessary for specific missions such as close air support, Afghan information dissemination operations, and the military decision-making process. The 751-soldier commando *kandaks* are the premier Afghan fighting force. Commando *kandaks* plan, support, and rapidly deploy a commando operational company to conduct limited-duration, offensive, light infantry operations against high-value targets throughout assigned regional corps' areas of operations to support the operational objectives of the MoD. There are currently over 5,000 commandos fielded in seven commando *kandaks* with one additional *kandak* in training at the Commando Training Center. The fielded commando *kandaks* operate out of fire bases located in Pol-e Charki, Gardez and Rish Kvor in RC-East; Kandahar, and Camp Bastion (Helmand) in RC-South; Shindand in RC-West; and Mazar-e-Sharif in RC-North. 6<sup>th</sup> Commando, co-located with the Commando Training Center, acts as the National *Kandak*. Currently all commando *kandaks* fall under the 1<sup>st</sup> Commando Brigade based out of Rish Kvor, southwest of Kabul. Three commando *kandaks* maintain additional company-sized forward operations bases established to maintain commando presence in areas that insurgents covet as foundations of their strength. The commandos' exceptional skills and aggressive maintenance put continuous pressure on anti-Afghan Government forces and place them at the forefront of the effort to secure stability for the Afghan people.

The commandos are widely known for their ability to conduct targeted operations. Commandos have recently deployed in support of sustained operations such as the effort to free Marjeh from the grips of insurgents who imprisoned the farming community within a ring of improvised explosive devices. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Commandos from Kandahar and the 6<sup>th</sup> Commandos from Rish Kvor deployed to Helmand Province to conduct operations in support of Operation MOSHTARAK. The 7<sup>th</sup> Commandos, who graduated from the Commando Training Center on the January 21, 2010, deployed immediately to their operations base in Helmand and supported Operation MOSHTARAK by providing a quick reaction force that was deployed twice before the entire *kandak* completed the movement from the Commando Training Center to Helmand. Deployments such as those recently conducted in support of Operation MOSHTARAK continue to enhance the Afghan commandos' reputation as the most aggressive and effective fighting force indigenous to Afghanistan.

### **6.3.3: ANA Equipping**

The current equipping strategy for the ANA is focused on providing critical “move, shoot, and communicate” assets to meet accelerated unit fielding to reach 171,600 personnel by October 2011. The ANA is being fielded with primarily NATO-standard weapons, including M-16 rifles and M-9 pistols. The ANA has been able to field units with almost all of their needed equipment although there have been shortages in U.S. crew-served weapons and communications equipment. Additionally, M1151 and M1152 up-armored high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) have been fielded for the ANA since August 2008. As of March 2010, 2,914 have been delivered with 5,407 scheduled through October 2010. NTM-A/CSTC-A has worked with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command to accelerate delivery of these items and they estimate all units will receive crew-served weapons by May 2010 and communication equipment by October 2010.

### **6.3.4: ANA Logistics Capabilities**

The Logistics Directorate and the Logistics Training and Advisory Group, both within NTM-A/CSTC-A, have provided policy development, training, mentoring, equipment, and infrastructure to improve logistics capabilities within the ANA, traditionally one of the ANA’s weaker areas.

NTM-A/CSTC-A has 107 advisors and mentors embedded in the Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and ANA national logistics system working shoulder-to-shoulder with the Afghans, helping them to improve their logistics enterprise at both the national and operational levels and to find Afghan solutions for Afghan problems.

Throughout the logistics enterprise, the ANA has begun to automate many of their staffing functions with computers, copiers, printers, and faxes.

The MoD Acquisitions Technology and Logistics unit is also working to establish training criteria for all functional areas within the national logistics system (e.g., 85% of the workforce is trained and assessed following the capability milestones criteria). All functional areas will establish training records for personnel assigned with core training requirements identified. They are also working to set up a system of incentives and rewards with certifications of training.

NTM/CSTC-A is working jointly with the General Staff and the Acquisitions Technology and Logistics unit to set up a logistics strategy. The strategy has eight lines of operation established to identify shortfalls and requirements for self-sustaining ANA logistics infrastructure. Lines of operation include logistics structure (manpower authorization and organizational structure review), doctrine/policy, procurement, training/mentoring personnel, materiel management, maintenance, distribution, and logistics automation.

The ANA increased its infrastructure projects to assist in expanding logistics capability. These include:

- Pol-e-Charki Fuels Depot renovation — modernized central region fuel storage and distribution center.
- Central workshop expansion to improve/expand depot level repair capability in Kabul.
- Central Movement Agency expansion — expanded vehicle dispatch and drivers training center.
- Depot supply warehouse expansion — built two new state-of-the-art depot warehouse facilities in Kabul (largest in ANA). The facility will house various classes of supply as well as weapons awaiting distribution to the ANA.
- Computerized inventory management system — online data-based technology being established throughout all nodes of logistics for ANA to provide asset visibility throughout national logistics system.

Despite the work being put into the logistics systems, challenges still remain. These include the conscious decisions to rapidly field the combat forces and for the capacity of the logistics system to be established after a strong fighting force is in place. For the next few years, the ANA will continue to rely on NTM/CSTC-A for enablers to support their fielding and sustainment requirements until both the logistics systems and funding are put into place.

### 6.3.5: ANA Assessment

Progress in the ANA is tracked by Capability Milestone (CM) ratings. ANA *kandaks* progress through the CM ratings over a period of time with assistance from the ETTs and OMLTs that perform the coach/train/mentor roles with the assistance of the ISAF partnered units. ETTs and OMLTs continually assess the ANA units, reporting their status to the IJC through the regional commands. In specific cases, U.S. Special Forces Operational Detachments serve as mentors for infantry *kandaks*. CM ratings are defined below:

*CM4 rating* – The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is formed but not yet capable of conducting primary operational mission(s). Capability in terms of doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF), objective proficiency, or other applicable measure is defined at less than 50%.

*CM3 rating* – The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is capable of partially conducting, planning, executing, and sustaining operational missions with international partner support. Capability in terms of DOTMLPF, objective proficiency, or other applicable measure is defined at 50-69%.

*CM2 rating* – The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is capable of conducting primary operational mission(s) with international partner support. Capability in terms of DOTMLPF, objective proficiency, or other applicable measure is defined at 70-84%.



*CM1 rating* – The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is capable of conducting primary operational mission(s). Capability, in terms of DOTMLPF, is defined at more than 85%.

### **ANA Overall Assessment**

As of May 2009, 22 ANA combat units were CM1, 14 were CM2, and 14 were CM3. As of March 2010, 22 ANA units were CM1, 35 were CM2, and 28 were CM3. The slow progress in ANA *kandaks* achieving CM ratings over the last year has multiple causes, many which have been described above. High attrition and low retention have resulted in a large number of new personnel cycling into units. Additionally, many of the units that are not achieving CM1 ratings are in the south with the 205<sup>th</sup> Corps, which has had increased operational tempo. Ongoing combat operations since January 2010 have had a negative rate on manning, equipping, and training in these *kandaks*, which caused a downgrade in CM ratings. Finally, throughout the entire ANA, there is a shortage of trained and competent leadership in the officer and NCO corps that has affected the quality of the *kandaks*. COMISAF's implementation of embedded partnering should help counter some of these negative trends in the upcoming months.

It is also important to note that the current CM ratings look only at the manning, training, and equipping of a unit, so a combat unit can be operationally effective without necessarily being rated at CM1. COMISAF is looking at alternatives to CM ratings. An overall assessment of district security forces would provide a more comprehensive look at the development of both the ANSF and the security situation in a district.

### **6.4: Afghan National Army Air Corps (ANAAC)**

The Afghan National Army Air Corps (ANAAC) provides a third dimension in maneuver capability, enhancing freedom of action, battlespace situational awareness, intelligence, and air combat support for national military and police forces. Once organized, trained, and equipped, the ANAAC will perform a wide range of missions including presidential airlift, aero-medical evacuation and casualty evacuation, battlefield mobility, airlift, training, and close air support. Since the last report, the ANAAC continues to increase in size and capabilities. The ANAAC currently includes approximately 3,100 personnel and 46 aircraft, up from 2,538 personnel and 32 aircraft in May 2009. The ANAAC has a fleet of five AN-32s and one AN-26 fixed-wing propeller-driven aircraft that provides medium cargo lift. In addition, in October 2009 the ANAAC acquired its first two U.S.-manufactured C-27 Spartan fixed-wing, propeller-driven aircraft, which will also perform the medium airlift mission. This is historic as it is the first ever Western-built aircraft in the ANAAC inventory. The current plan is to build a medium-lift fleet that includes 20 C-27s by late 2012. The ANAAC also has battlefield mobility provided by 22 MI-17 helicopters, with three additional MI-17s for presidential lift. In addition, the ANAAC has an additional nine MI-35s for rotary-wing close air support. The MI-35s are projected to be replaced with close air support-capable MI-17s. NTM-A/CSTC-A and the MoD are evaluating a potential light attack/close air support aircraft for purchase in the coming years.

With the assistance of NTM-A/CSTC-A mentors, the ANAAC has expanded its reach with functional air wings at Kabul International Airport and Kandahar Airfield. Future plans include

an air wing and training center at Shindand, as well as air detachments, or flying units, in Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Jalalabad, and Gardez. NTM-A/CSTC-A and the MoD doubled the size of the Kabul Air Corps Training Center at Kabul International Airport and are in the process of developing an aviation branch school for the ANA.

As capacity and capabilities grow, the ANAAC has had several operational success stories. The ANAAC assisted in the 2009 Presidential election by delivering and retrieving election materials for districts throughout Afghanistan. They provided overhead support following the January 8, 2010 Taliban attack in Kabul. The ANAAC also supported disaster relief and humanitarian operations, including rescuing 75 people after the Salang avalanche in February 2010, when ISAF aircraft were unable to complete the mission, and saving 83 civilians after the Kandahar floods last winter. The ANAAC routinely enables commando *kandaks* to complete operational air assault missions. Air assault mission successes include support of Operation MOSHTARAK and the capture of a suspected insurgent in RC-West battlespace.

NTM-A/CSTC-A has worked with the MoD over the past year to institute several programs to increase the quality of the ANAAC training and manpower. In 2009, the MoD instituted an Aviator Incentive Pay program to encourage retention of qualified and trained pilots. The ANAAC graduated the first U.S.-trained pilot in over 50 years in 2010 and has had personnel trained as flight surgeons, loadmasters, forward observers, and control staff officers. Future training plans include increased pilot production to develop a young cadre of experienced personnel for Afghanistan.

Despite these efforts, challenges remain. Recruiting will need to be robust over the coming year to mitigate a shortage in pilots and maintenance personnel. Due to the technical nature of the training, new recruits will need to be literate and many will need English language training as well. Capacity of the Kabul Air Corps Training Center must increase to meet the demand for trained technical personnel to perform maintenance on the aircraft fleet, and the ANAAC must continue to add technically capable officers to its leadership ranks. Additionally, it will take time to develop an experienced NCO corps within the ANAAC to create a base of leadership and technical expertise for the force.

## **Section 7 – Ministry of Interior (MoI)**

### **7.1: Institutional Capacity**

The ministerial development program works to synchronize organizations within the MoI Headquarters and build the core management systems essential to plan, program, and manage ANP institutions and forces. Vertical and horizontal integration of systems is achieved through mentor meetings, working groups, and the Ministerial Development Board. To ensure coordination and unity of effort in ANP development, the International Police Coordination Board, which is co-chaired by the MoI and EUPOL, serves as the international coordinating body between operational-level ANP reform and development at the ministerial level.

CSTC-A continues to work within the MoI to assist and advise selected senior Afghan officials and officers. Contracted “mentors” help with actions and issues associated with reform initiatives, as well as serving as a conduit between MoI officials, the CSTC-A commander and principal staff, the EUPOL Head of Mission, and the Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). CSTC-A functional staffs focus on building organizational capacity and capability, while contracted civilians with prerequisite skills (working with military functional experts and staff) assist the Afghan senior leaders and staff to develop and implement policies, systems, and procedures to establish modern management practices essential to facilitate MoI reform. Currently over 160 CSTC-A military and civilian contractors are involved in the ministerial mentoring of the ANP.

## MoI Development

### Ministry of Interior

Parliamentary Affairs----- CM4  
 Public Affairs----- CM3  
 Inspector General----- CM2  
 Anti-Corruption----- CM3

### DM of Counter Narcotics

Counter Narcotics-----CM3

### DM of Strategy & Policy

Strategic Planning-----CM3

### DM of Security

Afghan Civilian Police----- CM3  
 Afghan Border Police ----- CM3  
 Anti-Crime (CID) ----- CM3  
 AGF----- CM3  
 Operations Planning ----- CM3  
 Force Readiness----- CM3  
 Intelligence----- CM3  
 GDPSU-----CM4

### DM of Admin & Support

Personnel Management-----CM3  
 Logistics-----CM4  
 Finance & Budget-----CM3  
 Facilities & Install Mgmt --CM4  
 Surgeon Medical -----CM3  
 Info, Comms & Tech -----CM3  
 Legal Affairs -----CM3  
 Training Management -----CM3  
 Acquisition & Procurement CM3  
 Force Management -----CM3

CSTC-A uses CM ratings similar to those used for the MoD to evaluate the capacity of the MoI. As of late March 2010, one MoI organization was rated CM2, 19 were rated CM3, and 4 were rated CM4. Many challenges remain within the MoI and they are several years behind MoD development. Logistics and personnel management are two important areas where capacity is lacking. Mentors are focusing on these areas but the majority of the MoI is not expected to reach CM2 until July 2011.

### 7.1.1: National Police Strategy

One of the most significant developments within the MoI was the recent approval of a National Police Strategy, which Minister Atmar signed on March 6, 2010. The National Police Strategy lays out a long-term vision of the ANP that will “uphold the Constitution of Afghanistan and

enforce the prevailing laws of the country to protect all people of Afghanistan. The ANP will perform their duties in a professional, non-discriminatory, accountable and trustworthy manner.” The National Police Strategy is a holistic document that lays out a comprehensive plan for the ANP and the way forward for the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), Afghan Border Police (ABP), Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), and enabling forces. An additional milestone in the future operational capability of the MoI was the signing of the National Police Strategy on March 28, 2010. The National Police Strategy provides operational planning guidance for the continued development of MoI operational capability to meet current and future challenges.

### **7.1.2: International Coordination**

One of the challenges of the ANP Development program is the influence exerted by a large number of stakeholders, including NATO, EUPOL, the United Nations, individual countries, the U.S. Embassy, and many others. Multiple and competing inputs from different actors have often led to a disjointed and confusing approach to police training. One of the main mechanisms in place to help coordinate issues in-country is the International Police Coordination Board, a forum that includes all relevant stakeholders and meets regularly to coordinate activities and de-conflict issues. In addition to meetings of the International Police Coordination Board, there are other sub-groups of the body that routinely meet to discuss issues, one of which is the Senior Police Advisory Group, which is made up of senior law enforcement personnel from international partners. This group provides quality policing advice to our military leadership at CSTC-A and the MoI.

## **7.2: ANP Organization**

The ANP consists of four major categories of police; the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), the Afghan Border Police (ABP), the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) and Specialized Police. The overall manning of the ANP, broken down by component, is illustrated in Figure 22 - ANP Manning, May 2009-March 2010. As of March 2010, the MoI intends to change the names of the AUP and the ANCOP to the Afghan Civilian Police and the Afghan Gendarmerie, respectively, to better reflect their missions; however, legal, political and inter-departmental issues must be resolved before final name changes can occur.


The operational command and control structure for the AUP in the field starts with 34 provincial police headquarters, six regional police headquarters, and 365 police districts. The chief of police at each level is appointed by the national government. There are also five ABP zones, with a chief appointed by the MoI. Each zone has multiple headquarters. There are four ANCOP brigades with headquarters staffs located in Kabul and deployed throughout the country, as required. There are multiple Special Police organizations including investigative police, counternarcotics police, and counterterrorism police. All of these police formations require ISAF and international community assistance in building a legitimate, respectable, and professional police force.

The ANP have accomplished considerable growth since the last reporting period, meeting the goals established in early 2009. By December 2009, the ANP achieved their 2009 growth objective of an additional 14,800 police; however, the execution was not without bumps in the road. In mid-2009, the Government of Afghanistan and the international community agreed there were insufficient numbers of police to achieve security for the August 20, 2009 election. The JCMB agreed to immediately increase the end-strength of ANP in Kabul and ten high-threat districts by 14,800 personnel prior to the election. The MoI was able to recruit only 9,800 prior to the election and failed to ensure they all completed basic training on time. Due to the compressed time period available to train these police, 6,900 attended three weeks of the eight-week training program prior to the election and 2,900 received no training. After the election, a plan was implemented to ensure these police completed the entire eight-week program with the first class in September 2009. They are projected to be complete by July 2010.

In January 2010, the JCMB, the international community, and the U.S. Government agreed to the Afghan proposal to grow the ANP to 109,000 by October 2010 and 134,000 by October 2011. These goals were approved by the international community and the Government of Afghanistan in the January 20, 2010 JCMB and endorsed at the January London Conference, and are in accordance with the goals of the President to train and develop the ANSF to allow them to take over security in the country.

### 7.2.1: ANP Manning

Figure 21 - ANP Monthly End Strength, May 2009-March 2010



**Figure 22 - ANP Manning, May 2009-March 2010<sup>29</sup>**

	AUP			ANCOP(G)			ABP			Special Police	ANP Total		
	Goal	Asgn	% Asgn	Goal	Asgn	% Asgn	Goal	Asgn	% Asgn		Goal	Asgn	% Asgn
May-09		51,763			2,709			12,967		14,808		82,247	
Jun-09		54,005			2,890			12,867		15,185		84,947	
Jul-09		59,677			3,211			12,945		14,246		90,079	
Aug-09	62,034	60,512	97.5%	5,365	3,056	57.0%	17,621	13,817	78.4%	14,744	96,800	92,129	95.2%
Sep-09	62,114	61,122	98.4%	5,365	3,455	64.4%	17,621	13,815	78.4%	14,952	96,800	93,344	96.4%
Oct-09	63,724	63,841	100.2%	5,400	3,284	60.8%	17,400	12,826	73.7%	13,858	96,800	93,809	96.9%
Nov-09	62,229	62,934	101.1%	5,400	3,431	63.5%	17,400	12,800	73.6%	15,793	96,800	94,958	98.1%
Dec-09	62,229	63,945	102.8%	5,400	3,226	59.7%	17,400	13,117	75.4%	16,089	96,800	96,377	99.6%
Jan-10	62,229	64,724	104.0%	3,870	3,269	84.5%	13,698	13,235	96.6%	17,037	96,792	98,265	101.5%
Feb-10	62,114	64,221	103.4%	5,365	4,941	92.1%	17,482	13,729	78.5%	16,686	97,589	99,577	97.6%
Mar-10	62,114	65,499	105.4%	5,365	5,802	108.1%	17,482	13,912	79.6%	16,925	99,261	102,138	102.9%

### Afghan Uniform Police (AUP)

The Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) are those police assigned to police districts, provincial, and regional commands. Operational control of AUP forces is exercised by six regional commanders, who report to the Deputy Minister of Security. The overall goal of the AUP program for 2010 is to focus on improving quality of the AUP. In current MoI growth plans, the AUP make up a very small portion of the overall total growth in the ANP in 2010. As of March 2010, the MoI reports the AUP and enabler end-strength as 81,842, which is more than the 78,386 goal for March 2010. AUP attrition rates have been at or below the goal in the last six months, but poor retention continues to threaten program success. MoI has instituted measures to improve recruiting and retention within the AUP such as pay raises, increased survivability equipment, and improved training.

### Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)

The Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) is a specialized police force trained and equipped to counter civil unrest and lawlessness. Currently there are 48 ANCOP companies fielded and the projected growth of 5,000 ANCOP personnel is a major component of the current plan to grow to 109,000 personnel. The MoI reports the current ANCOP end-strength as 5,802, which is above its goal of 5,365. A high level of attrition within the ANCOP, likely caused by its high operations tempo, remains problematic. To address the problems caused by high operations tempo, the MoI has proposed that by mid-April, the MoI will begin an ANCOP rotation cycle of training, employment, and rest periods in order to address ANCOP attrition. MoI estimates that over the past ten months, ANCOP attrition is at 70%. NTM-A, the MoI, and EUPOL established an ANCOP Working Group to examine how to reduce attrition and improve the ANCOP program, for example, by examining personal protection, pay, and quality of life issues. In particular, we are examining a rotational deployment model for the ANCOP to reduce operational stress. In June 2010, the group will also reassess how new initiatives have affected the ANCOP program.

### Afghan Border Police (ABP)

The Afghan Border Police (ABP) provides security in the Border Security Zones, which extend 50 kilometers into the territory of Afghanistan, to deter and detect illegal entry and other criminal

<sup>29</sup> Figures reported by the Afghan Ministry of Interior and NTM-A. Special Police includes MoI Headquarters, Anti-Crime, Training Centers, Counter Narcotics, Medical, Fire, Customs, and other miscellaneous police units. Monthly goals were not established for the ANP until late summer 2009.

activity. The ABP controls pedestrian and vehicular traffic at border crossing points, including international airports, and is responsible for airport security. ABP end-strength growth of 5,000 personnel is another major component of the overall growth of the ANP. The MoI reports current ABP strength of 13,912, which is below the 17,482 goal for March 2010. The ABP failed to meet recruiting and attrition goals over the last several months but recent initiatives mentioned above may improve this situation.

### **Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3)**

The Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3) is an Afghan-led program that relies on increased community responsibility for security in order to extend the legitimate governance of the Afghan Government to designated districts in key provinces through community-based security forces. The AP3 pilot began in Wardak Province in RC-East in March 2009. The Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) serves as the security arm of AP3. The AP3 APPF “Guardians,” as the uniformed members are called, is an official MoI force that reports to the Wardak Provincial ANP Chief of Police. APPF elements answer to local ANP commanders down to the district level.

Currently the AP3 in Wardak is being mentored by U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF). The current total force of trained AP3 APPF Guardians is 1,010 out of a planned force of 1,212. The final AP3 APPF training course began in March 2010 and is expected to fulfill the AP3 APPF *tashkil* limit of 1,212 APPF Guardians. Anecdotal evidence indicates that the AP3 has improved the security situation in the area and is respected by the local population. DoD currently does not plan to expand the AP3 program due to the large amount of resources that are needed to implement the pilot program.

## **7.2.2: Meeting End-Strength Goals**

In order to meet the aggressive end-strength goals set out by the JCMB, the MoI has implemented measures to improve retention, recruiting, and attrition within the ANP, which are described below.

### **Recruiting Command**

One of the major past weaknesses of the ANP program is the lack of centralized command and control for recruiting and training. In order to have an effective police training system, Afghans must have oversight of recruiting and assume responsibility for these functions. NTM-A/CSTC-A has worked closely with the MoI to establish an ANP Recruiting Command, which was formally established in January 2010. The new command will work to synchronize and coordinate recruiting policies across the ANP. In addition, it will be staffed with 263 recruiters posted in all 34 provinces that will directly coordinate recruiting activities with MoI Headquarters.

### **Personnel Asset Inventory**

A major concern of the international community is the lack of personnel accountability in the ANP force. There have been accounts of “over-the-*tashkil*” police in various districts doing police work while not being paid through LOTF-A, as well as accounts of “ghost police” who

are on the payroll but are not actually present for duty. In October 2009, NTM-A/CSTC-A and the MoI began conducting a personnel asset inventory to establish a database of all ANP, which will enhance ANP accountability and transparency. The Personnel Asset Inventory will provide a baseline for the police force and help eliminate corruption. The process includes registration, drug testing, vetting, weapons verification, and obtaining biometric data on all ANP personnel. The goal is to complete the personnel asset inventory by early May 2010.

### **Drug Testing**

The Personnel Asset Inventory includes drug testing of the entire fielded police force. Results to date (from more than 32,409 tested personnel) have found a 13.7 % positive rate. Of those who tested positive, approximately 80% are for THC (tetrahydrocannabinol, the primary intoxicant in marijuana and hashish), 13% for opium, 3% for methamphetamines, and the remainder for indeterminate drugs. The MoI has developed a four-pillar program to address the drug issue that includes drug awareness, testing/identification, enforcement, and referral for treatment. Beginning in the second quarter of FY 2010, mandatory drug awareness training will be included in all police basic training curricula. NTM-A/CSTC-A is working with the MoI to ensure adherence to the current drug policies.

### **7.2.3: ANP Training**

Training is a key challenge to building the capacity of the ANP. In recent years, because of the lack of program resourcing, 60-70% of the force was hired and deployed with no formal training (the “recruit-assign” model). While working to increase the throughput of new recruits, NTM-A/CSTC-A has also had to implement plans, in coordination with the IJC and the MoI, to provide training to those already on the *tashkil*. For basic recruit training, one of the major initiatives, implemented in March 2010, is the establishment of a “recruit-train-assign” model. “Recruit-train-assign” will ensure all new police recruits receive necessary training before performing official duties. Training for existing AUP who were hired under the old model is being accomplished through the Focused District Development (FDD) program discussed in detail later in this report. Other training initiatives are detailed below.

### **Police Training Command**

One key initiative that NTM-A/CSTC-A and the MoI have implemented, with assistance from the international community, is the establishment of the Police Training Command within the MoI. This organization is similar to the ANA Training Command and will execute the education and training requirements for the MoI and the ANP. This is an unprecedented capability that, when linked with centrally-controlled recruiting and improved personnel management, will promote institutional stability and assignment discipline, standardize programs of instruction, institute career path models, and increase professionalism. At the same time, NTM-A/CSTC-A established their own Combined Training Advisory Group-Police, which will assist in mentoring and developing the MoI training command. These efforts will provide increased oversight and will focus on police training and assessment. The Combined Training Advisory Group-Police is commanded by an Italian one-star and has an integrated NATO staff that includes trainers from the European Gendarmerie Force.



**Afghan Police Training Teams (APTT)**

NTM-A/CSTC-A is working with the IJC and the MoI to develop Afghan Police Training Teams (APTTs) that can work alongside ISAF POMLTs and Police Mentoring Teams to extend the reach of training and development capacity into districts that lack training support. This effort can accelerate the ANP reform program and raise the quality of deployed police units. APTTs, located mostly at the district level, will consist of one officer, two NCOs and a civilian literacy trainer. Teams will be responsible for police training, literacy training, mentoring, administration (drug testing and accountability for personnel, weapons, and entitlements), and anti-corruption. The MoI will begin with 60 APTTs to be operational by October 2010 and 100 teams by April 2011. Future growth to 400 APTTs is planned. The first APTT class of 60 ANP officers began training in March 2010.

**Training Centers**

Currently, basic training of the ANP occurs at 18 training centers. Training of the ABP occurs at four training facilities at U.S. forward operating bases. Several partner countries also conduct police training on or near their Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) sites, including the Czechs in Logar, the Turkish in Wardak, the Dutch in Tarin Kowt, the British in Helmand, and the Germans in several areas throughout the north.

One of the critical aspects of the current ANP growth plan is ensuring sufficient ANP training capacity. NTM-A/CSTC-A continues to develop several additional sites to facilitate training. The main project is the construction of the National Police Training Center in Wardak Province, projected to reach initial operating capability in late 2010. This center will have an initial operating capacity of 350, rising to 1,000 by early 2011 and a fully operational capacity of 2,000 policemen by October 2011. NTM-A/CSTC-A is also expanding regional training centers at Konduz, Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, and Jalalabad to increase training capacity by approximately 700 personnel at each location.

**Basic Training**

With the exception of specialized units such as the ANCOP, ANP are not fielded as units but rather hired as individuals to join existing police organizations. As a result of changes to the training model discussed above, police will now complete basic training before they are sent to their assigned districts.

In order to meet growth goals and train the current force, the MoI has extended the length of the duty day at basic training and decreased course length from eight to six weeks to improve student throughput. The six-week course contains the same program of instruction and actually increases the number of student/instructor contact hours over the eight-week course with the addition of 64 hours of mandatory literacy training (actual hours thus increased from 265 to 329). We recognize that this solution is not optimum, but represents a trade-off in risk.

The Department of State (DoS) International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Bureau (INL) currently manages the basic police training contract, which is funded through ASFF. Through DynCorp International LLC, INL has more than 500 qualified civilian police advisors serving as training developers and instructors at the training centers and as mentors at regional,

provincial, and district locations. These civilian police mentors augment the military mentors assigned to police development.

In July 2009, based on a recommendation from the Commanding General of CSTC-A and Ambassador Eikenberry, DoS and DoD agreed to pass the management of this contract to DoD to ensure better financial accountability of DoD funds and to improve command and control of the police program. The recommended effective date for the transition was January 31, the date the existing DynCorp contract with DoS was scheduled to end. Due to the operational need to award a new contract quickly, CSTC-A leadership selected the Counter-Narcoterrorism and Technology Program Office (CNTPO) and the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Strategic Forces Command to oversee the development of an appropriate acquisition strategy for the ANP training contract. CNTPO was already being used as a contracting mechanism for the ABP training in Afghanistan. The new strategy called for procuring the required services through an issuance of a task order on an already-existing Multiple Award Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quality (MAIDIQ) contract within CNTPO. The task orders for the training of the ANP were to be competed among five existing MAIDIQ holders, including ARINC Engineering Services, LLC; Blackwater Lodge and Training Center, Inc. (now U.S. Training Center); Lockheed Martin Integrated Services, Inc.; Northrop Grumman/TASC, Inc; and Raytheon Technical Service Company. Before any task orders could be issued under the MAIDIQ contracts for the ANP requirements, the Government Accountability Office sustained a protest by DynCorp and determined that the task order for the ANP program was outside the scope of the MAIDIQ contracts. DoD is planning to conduct a full and open competition over the coming months to ensure the ANP training contract is fairly awarded. In the interim, the ANP training program continues. The DoS has extended the current DynCorp contract until July 31, 2010 and DoD and the DoS are exploring options on a bridging solution for the period from July 31 until a new contract is in place.

### **Leadership Training**

High levels of corruption persist in the ANP and reports of promotions being sold are common. NTM-A/CSTC-A is aware of this issue and has initiated a planning team, coordinating with EUPOL and the MoI to address the issues of leadership and professional development and to identify ways to counter corruption. NTM-A/CSTC-A is working with the MoI to institute a competitive selection and promotion process that is transparent and merit based. This process is especially needed in schools such as the Afghan National Police Academy where only two percent of the last graduating class deployed to the south while 74% remained in Kabul. To improve professional development, the international community must provide instructors to train ANP in specialized police schools and host talented ANP students in their own professional law enforcement academies. NTM-A/CSTC-A is exploring ways to enable NGOs to provide training to the ANP in the areas of human rights and community relations. One obstacle to ANP leadership development is the absence of a retirement and pension system that allows for merit-based upward mobility of younger officers and civil servants. The MoI has drafted a "Law on Regulating Personnel Affairs of Officers and NCOs" to address these issues. The Ministry of Justice is reviewing this law and the next step will be to submit it to the Afghan Parliament.

**ANP Medical Training**

NTM-A/CSTC-A's Medical Training and Advisory Group is working to develop the ANP Medical Corps. Currently there are approximately 27 medical trainers and advisors at all levels within the ANP. NTM-A/CSTC-A is focusing the mentoring in five focus areas within the ANP Medical Corps, which include expanding clinical service, building facilities, improving standards of care, training personnel, and developing medical logistics capabilities.

NTM-A/CSTC-A and the ANP Medical Corps have also focused on reducing drug use within the MoI and ANP. As noted, drug testing is now a mandatory part of the personnel asset inventory. The MoI Medical Corps is integrated into the development of the MoI strategy to deal with personnel who test positive for drug use. They are also working with the Ministry of Public Health to provide treatment options to addicted police personnel.

Challenges within the ANP Medical Corps remain. Currently, medical training cannot keep up pace with the rapid expansion of the ANSF and clinics are dramatically understaffed. Additionally, more modern equipment and facilities are needed, especially in more remote areas of Afghanistan where the police operate.

**Literacy Training**

An important component of the revised basic training program of instruction is the inclusion of mandatory literacy training, which not only improves the quality of the force but has been shown to be a recruiting tool. NTM-A/CSTC-A has added 64 hours of mandatory literacy training to the basic training program of instruction at all police regional training centers. In addition, the MoI has expanded follow-on literacy training throughout the country by adding literacy trainers in 221 locations. The long-term goal is to have all ANP achieve at least a 3rd grade level of literacy. Not only does the literacy training program improve the quality of the ANP, it is one of our best recruiting and retention tools.

**7.2.4: Enhancing Quality of Fielded Forces****ANP Development Model**

The ANP development model was changed with the establishment of the IJC in late 2009. The responsibility for employing POMLT mentoring teams was shifted from NTM-A/CSTC-A to the IJC, while NTM-A retained responsibility to recruit, train, and equip the ANP. This change also transfers responsibility to evaluate fielded police to the IJC. COMISAF's July 2009 partnering initiative directed international partner mentors and operational forces to make "embedded partnering" with ANP a priority. Embedded partnering is defined as provision of daily mentoring, training, and operational oversight to create a more capable and professional police force. Sufficient data to provide a valid assessment of the effectiveness of the directive has not yet been gathered from the field. Initial indications in RC-South and RC-North are positive. There have been substantial variations in execution of the partnering directive within the Regional Commands and within bilateral national level execution of police training. At the conclusion of the force uplift (August 2010), international partners will be partnered with the police in 45 of the 80 key districts that comprise the COMISAF Campaign Plan's "key terrain"; however, across the country, as of March 30, 2010, there is a projected shortfall of 108

POMLTs and this shortfall will only increase as we increase the size of the ANP and the corresponding embedded partnering requirements. There are currently 241 ANP units partnered.

### **Focused District Development (FDD)**

ISAF continues to implement Focused District Development (FDD) to train the AUP in the provinces and districts. In addition, we have implemented a new program, the Directed District Development program, similar to FDD but with training accomplished in districts rather than at regional training centers. For FDD, 83 districts have been trained and the next training cycle began on March 13, 2010 and includes five additional districts. The Directed District Development program has only trained police in Helmand but future implementation is expected to expand this program into additional areas. FDD has improved the quality of ANP in many districts but many districts have only had minimal success after completing the FDD training program due to the lack of reform in other areas such as governance and rule of law. Without these institutions in place, police training efforts will only be minimally effective.

### **Focused Border Development**

Focused Border Development is a program designed to rapidly enhance the training and effectiveness of the ABP. The Focused Border Development training system commenced in October 2008. NTM-A/CSTC-A is currently using four training centers and contract instructors to conduct Focused Border Development. ABP companies are provided with vehicles, weapons, and communication assets as they complete their training cycle. The four training locations and their steady-state capabilities are: Zone 5 – Sheberghan (300); Zone 4 – Shouz (300); Zone 3 – Spin Boldak (200); and Zones 1 and 2 – Lonestar (500). Due to security concerns and transportation difficulties that arise from being located in such remote locations, the ABP does not fully utilize the existing training centers and only approximately 5,480 ABP have been trained. An additional 6,714 ABP are projected to be trained in FY 2010, but classes remain under full strength. ABP is developing a training system centered on zone headquarters, which will use Afghan cadres to develop and lead all ABP training (NCO development, basic training, and border-specific training). This is an area of risk because much of the training and development that the ABP needs cannot be achieved by the current basic Focused Border Development training program.

## **7.2.5: ANP Equipping**

The current equipping strategy for the ANP is focused on providing critical “move, shoot, communicate” assets to meet accelerated unit fielding to reach the 134,000 end-strength goal by October 2011. The ANP are being fielded with former Warsaw Pact-type weapons including the AK47. NTM-A/CSTC-A has implemented several initiatives to increase the overall survivability of the ANP force, as the ANP is taking the majority of the casualties among the ANSF. One of the biggest improvements is the fielding of Up-Armored HMMWVs for the ANP, as most ANP are currently traveling in un-armored pick-up trucks. The ANP have a requirement of 3,500 Up-Armored HMMWVs; 425 are on-hand while the remainder have been sourced or are on order. NTM-A/CSTC-A continually reassesses this requirement based upon the security situation and force requirements.

### **7.2.6: ANP Logistics**

As with the ANA, the logistics systems in the ANP have been weak. Over the past year, the NTM-A has assisted the Logistics Training and Advisory Group in improving its logistics system to better meet the needs of the ANP. The MoI has established a new Chief of Logistics office that is staffing a national logistics policy and implementing a national logistics system. The MoI hosted its first ever logistics seminar in March 2010.

Additionally, at the lower levels, the ANP has set up regional logistics centers in Mazar-e-Sharif in RC-North and in Herat in RC-West. The MoI is planning to open additional centers in late 2010 in Gardez and Kandahar. These centers will bring an important capability to the regional levels and enable the ANP to better field equipment to the forces. Additional plans include building provincial supply points, adding two transportation battalions to the MoI, and building a national logistics center in Wardak province in RC-East in 2011.

Despite progress, the MoI logistics system is in its early stages of development and lacks automation, infrastructure, and expertise. Additionally, the lack of a national transportation system and lack of adequate roads in some areas makes it difficult to get supplies to many remote police districts. NTM-A/CSTC-A will continue to emphasize fielding ANP recruits and units as they grow and work to build sustainable institutions for logistics within the ANP.

### **7.2.7: Pay Incentives**

The revised ANP pay package, although approved in October 2009, was not instituted by the MoI until January 2010. The pay package increased ANP longevity and time-in-service pay and re-contracting bonuses, as well as hazardous duty pay in medium- and high-threat districts. It is too soon to judge the impact of this initiative, although we expect increases in recruiting and improvements in retention and attrition within the ANP.

### **7.2.8: Women's Police Initiatives**

Currently there are just under 1,000 female police serving on the force. These women play an important cultural role in searching and gathering intelligence from women suspects. While they are paid the same as their male counter parts, they suffer from low public opinion, lack of support from male co-workers, and the dangerous nature of the job. In coordination with the MoI, DoD and DoS are working to improve opportunities in the ANP for women. In February 2010, the MoI held a two-day conference focusing on how to recruit and train a total of 5,000 police women by 2014.

Female police recruits attend training in Kabul and at a facility that was opened in December 2009 in Jalalabad, named in honor of Lieutenant Colonel Makakai Kakar, a policewoman from Kandahar who was killed by the Taliban in 2009. She has served as an inspiration for many of

the women in police training. Women police are also trained in specialty courses in a variety of skills including intelligence gathering, self-defense, and weapons handling.

### **7.2.9: Rule of Law and Criminal Justice Development**

Establishment of effective rule of law institutions is critical to the sustainment of an effective police force. To date, in the justice sector, there has been little enduring progress despite investment toward reform, infrastructure, and training. Courts are understaffed and chronically corrupt. Corruption can be stemmed by ensuring there are adequate salaries and an adequate number of defense attorneys, and by implementation of a case management system and court watch or court monitoring program. Security for judges and prosecutors continued to be a significant problem, especially in RC-South.

Effective justice sector support at a district level must include support to both the formal and informal justice sectors. To date, this support has not been forthcoming. There must also be support to strengthening the links, oversight, and accountability mechanisms between the two sectors. At the district level, it is anticipated that the District Delivery Program (DDP), an Afghan Independent Directorate for Local Government initiative, will be one mechanism to improve access to justice at the district level. Judges and prosecutors are the civil servants most at risk at the district level and the ability of ANSF and ISAF to protect returning judges and prosecutors will be critical to the successful establishment of an effective justice system at the district and provincial levels.

The Afghan Government has committed to the adoption and implementation of a national informal justice policy (formally called the National Policy on Relations between the Formal Justice System and Dispute Resolution Councils) addressed in the ANDS, the National Justice Sector Strategy, the National Justice Program, and the London Conference Communiqué. The adoption of such a policy will provide a public demonstration of political will, consensus, and commitment to the Afghan Government-led recognition of and support for the informal justice sector in Afghanistan.

In contrast to the judicial system, the corrections system continued to show slow but steady progress under the leadership of the U.S. Department of Justice. Prison facilities have been opened in all 34 provinces in the last six months, and district detention centers exist in 225 of 364 districts (62%). However, these facilities are far from perfect and there is a continued need for infrastructure construction/renovation, increased staffing, and training. In December 2009, only 50% of Afghans believed that prisons were capable of holding prisoners for the duration of their sentences. This belief likely stems from knowledge of past prison escapes as well as a number of high-profile cases of criminals who were convicted and sent to prison but later pardoned due to government corruption.

### **7.2.10: ANSF Efforts to Curb the Production and Trafficking of Illicit Narcotics**

with reducing narcotics production and distribution in Afghanistan. The existing CNPA structure was envisioned in 2004, memorialized in the 1383 *tashkil* in 2005, and documented in the Afghan National Drug Control Strategy in 2006. CNPA is authorized to have a total of 2,519 personnel with offices in all of Afghanistan's 34 provinces. CNPA's specialized units (Sensitive Investigation Unit, National Interdiction Unit, and Intelligence and Investigations Unit) work closely with the DEA and the United Kingdom's Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA). DoD, DoS and DEA coordinate training and support for the specialized units. DoD has established a CNPA Development Cell under CSTC-A/NTMA in order to coordinate the development of CNPA. DoD is providing support for four experts from the Department of Justice's International Investigative Criminal Training Assistance Program to operate the CNPA Development Cell under CSTC-A/NTMA.

Training and education to support development of the ANSF's CN capabilities continued during the reporting period. The Counter-narcotics Training Academy, with support from DoD, continued to provide CN courses for the CNPA officers. Over 200 CNPA personnel received training at the Counter-narcotics Training Academy. The training at Counter-narcotics Training Academy provides CNPA personnel with additional CN-specific education after completion of basic police training. DoD support for the CNPA is coordinated with the interagency in Afghanistan and in Washington. DoD formally meets with an interagency team, comprised of members from DoJ, DEA and DoS/INL, to conduct bi-annual Program Management Review for the CNPA. In Afghanistan, USCENTCOM personnel work with DoS/INL from U.S. Embassy's Narcotics Affairs section to coordinate projects on a daily basis. In Washington, DoD works with DEA and INL on a daily basis to coordinate future programs and ongoing efforts.

### **7.2.11: Overall Assessment of the ANP**

The ANP continues to lag behind the ANA and has made limited progress in CM ratings. In May 2009, the ANP had 24 districts or ANCOP units at CM1, 27 at CM2, and 71 at CM3. As of February 2010, only 26 districts/units are CM1, 64 are CM2, and 100 are CM3. The slow progress of FDD districts police and ANCOP companies achieving CM1 ratings are due to several reasons, as stated above. The lack of Police Mentoring Teams and POMLTs has caused a gap in mentoring in many of these units as many district AUP have no mentors or mentoring teams spread throughout several districts. COMISAF's embedded partnering should help provide needed assistance for many of these forces. For the AUP and ANCOP, poor retention and high attrition cause district ANP units to constantly be turning over, thus requiring the need for ANP to be retrained. Poor leadership and a scarcity of trained officers and NCOs across the ANP have a large affect on the quality of the ANP forces at the district level as well. For ANCOP, the high operational tempo over the past year with both FDD and operations in the south has negatively affected our ability to man, train, and equip the force. Finally, for the district AUP, the lack of other rule of law improvement in districts also limits the effectiveness of the police. Even when well-trained, AUP units have regressed when a mentoring team has been reassigned.

It is also important to note that the current CM ratings look only at the manning, training, and equipping of a unit, so a combat unit can be operationally effective without necessarily being rated at CM1. COMISAF is assessing alternatives to CM ratings in the upcoming months to develop a methodology to provide an overall assessment of district security forces to provide a more comprehensive look at the development of both the ANSF and the security situation in a district.

## **Section 8 – ANSF Operations**


### **8.1: ISAF Strategy**

Under the ISAF concept of operations, the main effort is to conduct decisive clearing operations concentrated on the most threatened population in the southern part of the country to establish population security and implement measures that diminish insurgent influence over the people. As described in Figure 23 - ISAF Concept of Operations, the main effort in RC-South, by province, is in Helmand and Kandahar, where efforts are focused on clearing districts most threatened by insurgents. A supporting effort in RC-East focuses on governance and development programs in accessible areas while conducting shaping operations in insurgent controlled areas. Shaping efforts in Zabul and Paktika deny insurgent freedom of movement and improve border security. Supporting efforts in Laghman, Nuristan, Konar, and Nangarhar generate political acceptance for governance and development while maintaining sufficient security to prevent insurgent gains. RC-Capital is responsible for an additional supporting effort to sustain a secure environment in Kabul Province. Economy of force operations in RC-North and RC-West will contain the spread of the insurgency, bolster governmental control, and implement socio-economic development. These efforts will contain the insurgency in contested areas while providing support for expanding governance and development efforts. ISAF will focus on the expansion and building of infrastructure across the Combined Joint Operational Area (CJOA) to receive and sustain ANSF and ISAF troop increases.



## 8.2: ISAF Concept of Operations

Figure 23 - ISAF Concept of Operations



## 8.3: Security

The security situation has improved since the end of 2009; however, individual islands of security exist in a sea of instability and insecurity. The limits of security are significantly related to the presence of a well-led and non-corrupt ANSF. Combined forces continue to gain ground in Marjeh and central Helmand. Consolidating gains and continuing to deny the Taliban a chance to re-establish a foothold will be essential to continued operations. In areas where ANSF presence is limited, militias and guardians – while an imperfect guarantee of security – assist in improvements to the security of various districts.

## 8.4: Operations

### Regional Command-Capital

RC-Capital is focused on providing security support for Kabul, the capital city of Afghanistan. As such, RC-Capital operations seek to prevent and deter insurgents from performing rocket attacks; deter insurgent actions likely to cause significant media attention or exploitable for information/operation gain; gather intelligence and conduct shows of force; build and develop trust and positive relationships with the local population; train the ANSF; set conditions that separate insurgents from the population; and extend ANSF/Government of Afghanistan influence. RC-Capital and ISAF work closely with the ANSF to continually revise and

implement an effective Kabul City Security Plan to address security concerns and keep the city safe.

In partnership with ANSF, RC-Capital conducted and participated in six operations in the greater Kabul City area between November 16, 2009 and February 19, 2010. Although insurgents responded with very little activity, these operations provided an opportunity to conduct training and improve partnering between ANSF and international partners.

### **Regional Command-East**

Military operations in RC-East have focused on building and reinforcing ANSF competence, capacity, and credibility in a unified effort to protect the population; connect the people to the government; effect sustainable development; and defeat insurgent forces to improve the lives of the Afghan population.

RC-East has increased the partnering capability between international partners and ANSF by collocating Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) tactical command posts with ANA corps headquarters and ensuring the ANA remain the focus of the combined action execution in RC-East. Operations against insurgents in RC-East were directed at disrupting enemy networks that were threatening the population, conducting attacks on ANSF and international partners, and seeding instability. Focused tactical operations specifically targeted insurgent cells facilitating IED attacks against security forces. Combined operations against the Haqqani Network and Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin have reinforced the credibility of the ANSF and disrupted enemy sanctuary.

### **Regional Command-South**

In November 2009, RC-South received a new commander who conducted a review and implemented a new operational design. The new operational design provides direction to all task forces operating in RC-South on the commander's intent to conduct population-centric COIN operations. The primary focus of the commander's intent is centered on showing positive trends quickly, protecting the population, expanding Government of Afghanistan authority, separating the insurgents from the population (physically and psychologically), and partnering with the ANSF at all levels.

The main effort in the south focused on Operation MOSHTARAK, which commenced on February 13, 2010. Shaping operations began in the fall of 2009 with an emphasis on Government of Afghanistan-led engagement in order to shape the political environment and contribute to an anti-climactic clearing operation. Part of this shaping operation involved national-level engagement with the President of Afghanistan and ministry officials so that operations in central Helmand were not simply another ISAF planned operation, rather, they were an Afghan plan to take back this traditional home of the Taliban. President Karzai has embraced the plan as his own and has made significant strides in his role of Commander-in-Chief as a result.

Operation MOSHTARAK is being conducted in three primary phases. Phase 1 was focused on freedom of movement throughout the battle space and provided demonstrable progress. Phase 2 is focused on operations in central Helmand and consists of governance-led clear, hold, and build

operations with the aim of extending Government of Afghanistan authority to the previously ungoverned areas of Nad Ali District, including the town of Marjah. These operations were conducted by 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade of 205<sup>th</sup> (HERO) Corps ANA, supported by U.S. and UK ground forces from Task Force Leatherneck and Task Force Helmand.

On February 13, 2010, once sufficient Afghan and ISAF combat power had been effectively trained and partnered with the objectives physically isolated, the clear phase of the operation commenced with an aviation insertion of 1,420 U.S. Marines and their Afghan partners into Marjah and 900 UK forces and their Afghan partners into the northern elements of Nad Ali District. As a result of previous shaping operations, tactical surprise was achieved for the aviation insertion, and by the end of the day, ANSF and ISAF forces established control of key junctions and locations in both districts. On February 14, 2010, a U.S. Marine ground operation was conducted to break through the IED crust surrounding Marjah and troop numbers rapidly increased in the objective areas. Afghan and ISAF partnered units established Government of Afghanistan-led control of the area in the days following, allowing Afghan Government leadership, to include President Karzai, to conduct visits to Marjah and Nad Ali and to physically and conceptually extend Afghan governance to these areas. As of March 15, 2010, Government of Afghanistan authority has been successfully extended as development projects are ongoing and include the visible construction of a new road connecting Nad Ali District with the provincial capital of Lashkar Gah, and the establishment of enduring ANP checkpoints and police stations to act as a robust reminder of the extension of Afghan Government rule of law to the people of the district.

The initial success of the clear and hold phases of Operation MOSHTARAK resulted in localized Afghan security and improved freedom of movement. While insurgent intimidation efforts continue, the population is thus far resisting these tactics. Likewise, development and governance continue to make strides forward but will take time to mature. The expanded security in Nad Ali and Marjah has forced insurgents to conduct attacks elsewhere, as was demonstrated by the recent complex attacks in Kandahar and Lashkar Gah that caused significant civilian casualties.

ANSF partners have been critical to this success in central Helmand and there have been only a few relatively isolated cases of reported ANP offenses and corruption. The most notable was the alleged rape of a young boy in one report and another sexual assault of two females, both by ANCOP police officers newly assigned into central Helmand. Thus far, the mitigation and legal action taken by local commanders and elected officials has calmed public outrage over the reports. The ANCOP forces are due to be replaced by mid-April by AUP. The ANA has recently activated a new corps headquarters, the 215<sup>th</sup> Corps, to provide additional security forces to the RC-South area of operations. Additional ANP forces will also be required to assist with hold operations as additional police checkpoints and sub-stations constructed as a part of Operation MOSHTARAK will now need a more permanent manning solution. Build operations have likewise been continuous throughout the start of operations in central Helmand, and as a result, police checkpoints have been improved, route clearance and improvements have occurred, and additional bridges over canals have been constructed.

Phase 3 is focused on operations in central Kandahar. The combined force planning for the force increase and expansion of operations in central Kandahar is ongoing; the operation is to be Government of Afghanistan-led with ISAF in a supporting role. This phase of the operation will commence incrementally and all deploying international partner units in this battlespace will be partnered to the maximum extent with corresponding ANSF.

### **Regional Command-West**

Military operations in RC-West have focused on enhancing ANSF capabilities in order to improve security through partnered holding operations, removing malign insurgent influence, improving Afghan Government presence, and enhancing freedom of movement along major lines of communication. Task Force Fury has made significant strides in partnering and has seen significant improvements in the ANA, although less so in the ANP. Embedded partnering is less prevalent in RC-West due to a limitation on facilities that can currently accommodate combined units; however, partnered patrols are on the increase and RC-West remains committed to improving its partnership program that has been in place for the past two years.

### **Regional Command-North**

Military operations in RC-North have focused on shape and clear operations throughout the battlespace. Improvements in RC-North have only occurred in those provinces where international partners and ANSF retain the capability to effectively conduct hold operations. Capability of these forces will continue to improve with the arrival of additional U.S. Forces as ANP partners; the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Brigade Combat Team is scheduled to arrive in mid-May. Recent operations in Baghlan Province have been encouraging as combined operations have been successful at clearing insurgent strongholds and establishing new combat outposts and checkpoints. The recent reintegration of more than 60 former Hezb-e Islami-Gulbuddin fighters also has the potential to further isolate Taliban fighters in this region. Additionally, the movement of additional special operations forces to the area will be critical to shaping the region as the new 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Brigade Combat Team begins operations throughout RC-North.

## **Section 9 – ANSF Assessment Process**

Assessments are conducted on multiple levels in the ANA and ANP. These assessments are based on objective and subjective inputs from international partners and leaders. There is also a formal assessment group, called the Validation Training Team, that evaluates ANA organizations to determine capabilities and operational effectiveness. The Validation Training Team evaluates *kandaks* graduating from the Consolidated Fielding Center as well as *kandaks* in the field that regional commands believe have achieved a certain level of operational effectiveness. The CM levels of some ANA and ANP organizations have gone down for a number of reasons, including ANSF leadership issues, high attrition rates, lengthy deployments in combat environments, and logistical sustainability issues. As noted above, the IJC has implemented embedded partnering and a number of formal training programs to address these challenges and increase the operational effectiveness of all ANSF forces.

## **9.1: Afghanistan National Security Forces Operational Effectiveness**

Increased operational effectiveness of the ANSF requires embedded partnering between international partners and Afghan army and police units. Partnering has taken many forms over the past year from basic advising (mentoring) to fully embedded partnering. Embedded partnering involves international partner forces living and working with ANSF units on a daily basis. The embedded approach is the most resource-intensive form of partnering. The IJC is confident this approach is the best method to build the professional army and police forces required to provide enduring security and has directed all regional commands to fully implement this concept. Our partnering efforts with the ANA are well developed and include partnering relationships with nearly every *kandak*-level organization. Although partnering efforts with the ANP are less developed, they are currently the priority of effort across the Regional Commands.

### **9.1.1: Afghan National Army Operational Effectiveness**

ANA operational effectiveness has improved where partners are assigned to Afghan army organizations. Partner teams continue to work at all levels within the Afghan army to teach and model both the technical and leadership skills required of a professional military force.

The ANA is often cited by opinion polls as the most respected national organization in Afghanistan. Reports from Regional Commanders on the operational effectiveness of ANA forces have stated some ANA organizations are capable of planning and conducting independent operations. The major challenges to the ANA's operational effectiveness include leadership skills, planning ability, logistics operations, high personnel turn-over, and low literacy rates. Leader skills, planning ability, and logistical operations challenges appear to be a result of lack of officer and NCO development training over many years and a culture of short-term planning. Additionally, officers and NCOs do not have the level of experience commensurate with the grades and position occupied.

### **9.1.2: Afghan National Police Operational Effectiveness**

Similar to results observed with the ANA, ANP operational effectiveness has also improved where partners are assigned to police organizations. Partnering at all levels is enabling significant gains in operational effectiveness by teaching and modeling critical technical skills and leader development techniques.

The AUP has benefited from international partnering, as well as the FDD and Directed District Development reform programs. The rapid growth of the AUP — with limited international partner forces available to partner — has caused IJC to initially prioritize available partners to police units in Key Terrain districts. The IJC directed that each of its 2010 priority Key Terrain districts (45 in all)<sup>30</sup> have embedded partners by June 2010. In analyzing embedded partnering,

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<sup>30</sup> ISAF selected 20 priority Key Terrain districts for 2009 and added an additional 45 for 2010.

it is clear that partnered AUP units are better than those that do not have the advantage of credible ISAF partner/mentors, especially in the areas of patrolling and engagement with Afghan citizens across the CJOA. Regional Commands have reported that active patrolling and engagement with Afghan citizens across the CJOA have increased where AUP units are partnered. Regional Commands report corruption and poor leadership as the two most significant impediments to AUP operational effectiveness. International partners understand the critical nature of these issues and continue to develop anti-corruption policies and leadership development programs.

The ABP shortage of personnel in all zones and high attrition rate of 28% hamper ABP operational effectiveness. ISAF forces have begun partnering with Border Police in Key Terrain districts to assist them with technical and leader development (similar to AUP). There are currently eight ABP units partnered in Key Terrain districts and 23 ABP units partnered across the CJOA. ISAF and international community partners report these efforts have resulted in improved interagency, ANA, and ABP cooperation. Additionally, new equipment and training have increased the ABP's ability to interdict illegal drugs and explosives being smuggled across Afghanistan's wide and largely ungoverned borders.

The ANCOP is considered the premier force in the ANP and its recruits are subject to a higher literacy requirement than other police organizations. ANCOP operational effectiveness has been proven through their use in the FDD program, as well as in their demonstrated professionalism during recent hold operations in central Helmand. Deployment of ANCOP organizations at the same pace into hostile operational environments will undoubtedly lead to high attrition rates, as well as reduced operational effectiveness. NTM-A is working a number of initiatives to offset this inevitability, including embedded partnering, an operational deployment cycle, increased pay, and increased personnel strength authorizations to mitigate these shortcomings. All of these initiatives will likely improve operational effectiveness and reduce ANCOP attrition.

## **9.2: ANSF Lessons Learned**

In mid-March, the Afghan Ministry of Defense signed an Afghan Lessons Learned Policy program. The ANA has a lessons learned team in the ANATC that collects, analyzes, and publishes ANA Lessons Learned. A representative from the Center for Army Lessons Learned and two NATO counterparts provide advice and mentorship.

Additionally, the ANA has two ten-man Training and Validation Teams, overseen by an Afghan general officer that visits units, validates them, and collects observations, insights, and lessons learned that are then pushed to the ANATC team for dissemination. This group also accepts requests for information from units. For example, ANA military police recently requested training in western culture so that they might better understand and work more efficiently with their international partners. The ANP institutions are not as developed as the ANA. The ANP will establish a National Police Training Center in September 2010, which will become the focal point for training and education integration in the ANP. The capturing, analyzing and influencing of lessons learned for future programs will be part of this training center.

**Annex A – The Insurgency**

*Please refer to classified annex.*

**Annex B – Security Incidents**

*Please refer to classified annex.*



**Annex C – International Partner Participation and Caveats**

*Please refer to classified annex.*

**Annex D – International Donor Assistance in Afghanistan**

*Please refer to classified annex.*

**Annex E – Acronyms**

ABP	Afghan Border Police
ACG-ISC	Assistant Commanding General for International Security Cooperation
ACSS	Afghanistan Civil Service Support
ADT	Agribusiness Development Team
ANATC	Afghan National Army Training Command
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANAAC	ANA Air Corps
ANCOP	Afghan National Civil Order Police
ANDS	Afghan National Development Strategy
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANSF	Afghanistan National Security Forces
AP3	Afghan Public Protection Police
APPF	Afghan Public Protection Force
APTT	Afghan Police Training Team
ARTF	Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
ASFF	Afghan Security Forces Fund
ATFC	Afghan Threat Finance Cell
AUP	Afghan Uniformed Police
AVIPA	Afghanistan Vouchers for Increased Production in Agriculture
C2	Command and Control
C-IED	counter-improvised explosive device
CIVCAS	civilian casualties
CFSOCC-A	Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan
CJIATF	Combined Joint Interagency Task Force
CJIATF-N	Combined Joint Interagency Task Force–Nexus
CJOA	Combined Joint Operational Area
CJSOR	Combined Joint Statement of Requirements
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CM	capability measurement
CN	Counternarcotics
CNJC	Counternarcotics Justice Center
CNPA	Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan
CNTPO	Counter-Narcoterrorism and Technology Program Office
COIN	counterinsurgency
COMIJC	Commander, ISAF Joint Command
COMISAF	Commander, International Security Assistance Force
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
CTAP	Civilian Technical Assistance Program
DCG-Programs	Deputy Commanding General for Programs
DDP	District Delivery Program
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DFIP	Detention Facility in Parwan
DoD	Department of Defense
DoJ	Department of Justice

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DoS	Department of State
DOTMLPF	doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities
DST	District Support Team
ETT	Embedded Training Team
EUPOL	European Union Police
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FDD	Focused District Development
FP	force package
FY	Fiscal Year
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Countries
GS	General Staff
HIG	Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin
HMMWV	up-armored high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle
HQN	Haqqani Network
IARCSC	Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission
ICMCP	Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan
IDLG	Independent Directorate of Local Governance
IEC	Independent Elections Commission
IED	improvised explosive devices
IJC	ISAF Joint Command
IJU	Islamic Jihad Union
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMU	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
INL	International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Bureau
IO	Information Operations
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence
JCMB	Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board
JFC-B	Joint Force Command-Brunssum
JTF	Joint Task Force
kg	kilograms
LDI	Local Defense Initiative
LeT	Lashkar-e Tayyiba
LOTF-A	Law and Order Trust Fund-Afghanistan
MAIL	Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock
MCTF	Major Crimes Task Force
MoD	Ministry of Defense
MoDA	Ministry of Defense Advisor
MoI	Ministry of Interior
MRAP	Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO	non-commissioned officer
NDN	Northern Distribution Network
NGO	non-governmental organization

UNCLASSIFIED

NTM-A	NATO Training Mission Afghanistan
NWFP	Northwest Frontier Province
OMLT	Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team
OPLAN	Operations Plan
OPTEMPO	operational tempo
PAKMIL	Pakistan military
PME	Professional Military Education
POMLT	Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
RC	Regional Command
SCR	senior civilian representative
SOCA	Serious Organized Crime Agency
SOF	special operations forces
SRSG	Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Afghanistan
SWA	South Waziristan Agency
SY	Solar Year
SWA	South Waziristan Agency
TTP	Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan
TFBSO	Task Force for Business and Stability Operations
T-JIOC	Tripartite Joint Intelligence Operation Center
TNSM	Tehrik-e Nafaz Shariat Mohammadi
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission-Afghanistan
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
U.S.	United States
USAID	Agency for International Development
USCENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
USDA	U.S. Department of Agriculture
USFOR-A	United States Forces-Afghanistan
USMC	United States Marine Corps

## Annex F – FY2008 NDAA Section 1230, with FY2010 NDAA Section 1236

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**SEC. 1230. REPORT ON PROGRESS TOWARD SECURITY AND STABILITY  
IN AFGHANISTAN.**

(a) **REPORT REQUIRED.**—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter through the end of fiscal year 2010, the President, acting through the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan. President.

(b) **COORDINATION.**—The report required under subsection (a) shall be prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the head of any other department or agency of the Government of the United States involved with activities relating to security and stability in Afghanistan.

(c) **MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED: STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF UNITED STATES ACTIVITIES RELATING TO SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN.**—The report required under subsection (a) shall include a description of a comprehensive strategy of the United States for security and stability in Afghanistan. The description of such strategy shall consist of a general overview and a separate detailed section for each of the following:

(1) **NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE.**—A description of the following:

(A) Efforts of the United States to work with countries participating in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan (hereafter in this section referred to as “NATO ISAF countries”).

(B) Any actions by the United States to achieve the following goals relating to strengthening the NATO ISAF, and the results of such actions:

(i) Encourage NATO ISAF countries to fulfill commitments to the NATO ISAF mission in Afghanistan, and ensure adequate contributions to efforts to build the capacity of the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF), counter-narcotics efforts, and

reconstruction and development activities in Afghanistan.

(ii) Remove national caveats on the use of forces deployed as part of the NATO ISAF.

(iii) Reduce the number of civilian casualties resulting from military operations of NATO ISAF countries and mitigate the impact of such casualties on the Afghan people.

(2) **AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES.**—A description of the following:

(A) A comprehensive and effective long-term strategy and budget, with defined objectives, for activities relating to strengthening the resources, capabilities, and effectiveness of the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) and the Afghanistan National Police (ANP) of the ANSF, with the goal of ensuring that a strong and fully-capable ANSF is able to independently and effectively conduct operations and maintain security and stability in Afghanistan.

(B) Any actions by the United States to achieve the following goals relating to building the capacity of the ANSF, and the results of such actions:

(i) Improve coordination with all relevant departments and agencies of the Government of the United States, as well as NATO ISAF countries and other international partners.

(ii) Improve ANSF recruitment and retention, including through improved vetting and salaries for the ANSF.

(iii) Increase and improve ANSF training and mentoring.

(iv) Strengthen the partnership between the Government of the United States and the Government of Afghanistan.

(3) **PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS AND OTHER RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES.**—A description of the following:

(A) A comprehensive and effective long-term strategy and budget, with defined objectives, for reconstruction and development in Afghanistan, including a long-term strategy with a mission and objectives for each United States-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan.

(B) Any actions by the United States to achieve the following goals with respect to reconstruction and development in Afghanistan, and the results of such actions:

(i) Improve coordination with all relevant departments and agencies of the Government of the United States, as well as NATO ISAF countries and other international partners.

(ii) Clarify the chain of command, and operations plans for United States-led PRTs that are appropriate to meet the needs of the relevant local communities.

(iii) Promote coordination among PRTs.

(iv) Ensure that each PRT is adequately staffed, particularly with civilian specialists, and that such staff receive appropriate training.

(v) Expand the ability of the Afghan people to assume greater responsibility for their own reconstruction and development projects.

(vi) Strengthen the partnership between the Government of the United States and the Government of Afghanistan.

(vii) Ensure proper reconstruction and development oversight activities, including implementation, where appropriate, of recommendations of any United States inspectors general, including the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction appointed pursuant to section 1229.

(4) COUNTER-NARCOTICS ACTIVITIES.—A description of the following:

(A) A comprehensive and effective long-term strategy and budget, with defined objectives, for the activities of the Department of Defense relating to counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan, including—

(i) roles and missions of the Department of Defense within the overall counter-narcotics strategy for Afghanistan of the Government of the United States, including a statement of priorities;

(ii) a detailed, comprehensive, and effective strategy with defined one-year, three-year, and five-year objectives and a description of the accompanying allocation of resources of the Department of Defense to accomplish such objectives;

(iii) in furtherance of the strategy described in clause (i), actions that the Department of Defense is taking and has planned to take to—

(I) improve coordination within the Department of Defense and with all relevant departments and agencies of the Government of the United States;

(II) strengthen significantly the Afghanistan National Counter-narcotics Police;

(III) build the capacity of local and provincial governments of Afghanistan and the national Government of Afghanistan to assume greater responsibility for counter-narcotics-related activities, including interdiction; and

(IV) improve counter-narcotics-related intelligence capabilities and tactical use of such capabilities by the Department of Defense and other appropriate departments and agencies of the Government of the United States; and

(iv) the impact, if any, including the disadvantages and advantages, if any, on the primary counter-terrorism mission of the United States military of providing enhanced logistical support to departments and agencies of the Government of the United States and counter-narcotics partners of the United States in their interdiction efforts, including apprehending or eliminating major drug traffickers in Afghanistan.

(B) The counter-narcotics roles and missions assumed by the local and provincial governments of Afghanistan and the national Government of Afghanistan, appropriate



departments and agencies of the Government of the United States (other than the Department of Defense), the NATO ISAF, and the governments of other countries.

(C) The plan and efforts to coordinate the counter-narcotics strategy and activities of the Department of Defense with the counter-narcotics strategy and activities of the Government of Afghanistan, the NATO-led interdiction and security forces, other appropriate countries, and other counter-narcotics partners of the United States, and the results of such efforts.

(D) The progress made by the governments, organizations, and entities specified in subparagraph (B) in executing designated roles and missions, and in coordinating and implementing counternarcotics plans and activities, and based on the results of this progress whether, and to what extent, roles and missions for the Department of Defense should be altered in the future, or should remain unaltered.

(5) **PUBLIC CORRUPTION AND RULE OF LAW.**—A description of any actions, and the results of such actions, to help the Government of Afghanistan fight public corruption and strengthen governance and the rule of law at the local, provincial, and national levels.

(6) **REGIONAL CONSIDERATIONS.**—A description of any actions and the results of such actions to increase cooperation with countries geographically located around Afghanistan's border, with a particular focus on improving security and stability in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas.

(d) **MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED: PERFORMANCE INDICATORS AND MEASURES OF PROGRESS TOWARD SUSTAINABLE LONG-TERM SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—The report required under subsection (a) shall set forth a comprehensive set of performance indicators and measures of progress toward sustainable long-term security and stability in Afghanistan, as specified in paragraph (2), and shall include performance standards and progress goals, together with a notional timetable for achieving such goals.

(2) **PERFORMANCE INDICATORS AND MEASURES OF PROGRESS SPECIFIED.**—The performance indicators and measures of progress specified in this paragraph shall include, at a minimum, the following:

(A) With respect to the NATO ISAF, an assessment of unfulfilled NATO ISAF mission requirements and contributions from individual NATO ISAF countries, including levels of troops and equipment, the effect of contributions on operations, and unfulfilled commitments.

(B) An assessment of military operations of the NATO ISAF, including of NATO ISAF countries, and an assessment of separate military operations by United States forces. Such assessments shall include—

(i) indicators of a stable security environment in Afghanistan, such as number of engagements per day, and trends relating to the numbers and types of hostile encounters; and

(ii) the effects of national caveats that limit operations, geographic location of operations, and estimated number of civilian casualties.

(C) For the Afghanistan National Army (ANA), and separately for the Afghanistan National Police (ANP), of the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) an assessment of the following:

(i) Recruitment and retention numbers, rates of absenteeism, vetting procedures, and salary scale.

(ii) Numbers trained, numbers receiving mentoring, the type of training and mentoring, and number of trainers, mentors, and advisers needed to support the ANA and ANP and associated ministries.

(iii) Type of equipment used.

(iv) Operational readiness status of ANSF units, including the type, number, size, and organizational structure of ANA and ANP units that are—

(I) capable of conducting operations independently;

(II) capable of conducting operations with the support of the United States, NATO ISAF forces, or other coalition forces; or

(III) not ready to conduct operations.

(v) Effectiveness of ANA and ANP officers and the ANA and ANP chain of command.

(vi) Extent to which insurgents have infiltrated the ANA and ANP.

(vii) Estimated number and capability level of the ANA and ANP needed to perform duties now undertaken by NATO ISAF countries, separate United States forces and other coalition forces, including defending the borders of Afghanistan and providing adequate levels of law and order throughout Afghanistan.

(D) An assessment of the estimated strength of the insurgency in Afghanistan and the extent to which it is composed of non-Afghan fighters and utilizing weapons or weapons-related materials from countries other than Afghanistan.

(E) A description of all terrorist and insurgent groups operating in Afghanistan, including the number, size, equipment strength, military effectiveness, sources of support, legal status, and any efforts to disarm or reintegrate each such group.

(F) An assessment of security and stability, including terrorist and insurgent activity, in Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas and in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

(G) An assessment of United States military requirements, including planned force rotations, for the twelve-month period following the date of the report required under subsection (a).

(H) For reconstruction and development, an assessment of the following:

(i) The location, funding (including the sources of funding), staffing requirements, current staffing levels, and activities of each United States-led Provincial Reconstruction Team.

(ii) Key indicators of economic activity that should be considered the most important for determining the prospects of stability in Afghanistan, including—

(I) the indicators set forth in the Afghanistan Compact, which consist of roads, education, health, agriculture, and electricity; and

(II) unemployment and poverty levels.

(I) For counter-narcotics efforts, an assessment of the activities of the Department of Defense in Afghanistan, as described in subsection (c)(4), and the effectiveness of such activities.

(J) Key measures of political stability relating to both central and local Afghan governance.

(K) For public corruption and rule of law, an assessment of anti-corruption and law enforcement activities at the local, provincial, and national levels and the effectiveness of such activities.

(e) **FORM.**—The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex, if necessary.

(f) **CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFINGS.**—The Secretary of Defense shall supplement the report required under subsection (a) with regular briefings to the appropriate congressional committees on the subject matter of the report.

(g) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

**SEC. 1231. UNITED STATES PLAN FOR SUSTAINING THE AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES.**

(a) **PLAN REQUIRED.**—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter through the end of fiscal year 2010, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on a long-term detailed plan for sustaining the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) and the Afghanistan National Police (ANP) of the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF), with the objective of ensuring that a strong and fully-capable ANSF will be able to independently and effectively conduct operations and maintain long-term security and stability in Afghanistan.

(b) **COORDINATION.**—The report required under subsection (a) shall be prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State.

(c) **MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.**—The report required under subsection (a) shall include a description of the following matters relating to the plan for sustaining the ANSF:

(1) A comprehensive and effective long-term strategy and budget, with defined objectives.

(2) A mechanism for tracking funding, equipment, training, and services provided for the ANSF by the United States, countries participating in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan (hereafter in this section referred to as “NATO ISAF countries”), and other coalition forces that are not part of the NATO ISAF.

(3) **DEFENSE SERVICES.**—The term “defense services” has the meaning given the term in section 644(f) of such Act (22 U.S.C. 2403(f)).

(4) **MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES.**—The term “military and security forces” means national armies, national air forces, national navies, national guard forces, police forces and border security forces, but does not include non-governmental or irregular forces (such as private militias).

(h) **EXPIRATION.**—The authority provided under subsection (a) may not be exercised after September 30, 2010.

(i) **EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES.**—

(1) **ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY.**—The authority provided by subsection (a) is in addition to the authority provided by section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

(2) **AGGREGATE VALUE.**—The value of excess defense articles transferred to Iraq or Afghanistan during fiscal year 2010 pursuant to section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 shall not be counted against the limitation on the aggregate value of excess defense articles transferred contained in subsection (g) of such Act or against the limitation on the aggregate value of defense articles transferred contained in subsection (b)(1) of this section.

(j) **RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.**—Nothing in this section shall be construed as to provide the authority to refurbish, transport, or otherwise assist in the transfer to Iraq or Afghanistan of excess defense articles outside of Iraq or Kuwait as of the date of the enactment of this Act.

**SEC. 1235. ANALYSIS OF REQUIRED FORCE LEVELS AND TYPES OF FORCES NEEDED TO SECURE SOUTHERN AND EASTERN REGIONS OF AFGHANISTAN.**

(a) **STUDY REQUIRED.**—The Secretary of Defense may, in support of the Commander of United States Forces for Afghanistan (USFOR-A), enter into a contract with a Federally Funded Research Development Center (FPRDC) to provide an analysis of the required force levels and types of forces needed to implement the Commander’s strategic objectives in Afghanistan, including securing the southern and eastern regions of Afghanistan in order to provide a space for the Government of Afghanistan to establish effective government control and provide the Afghan security forces with the required training and mentoring.

(b) **FUNDING.**—From funds made available for the Department of Defense by section 301(5) for operation and maintenance, Defense-wide activities, \$3,000,000 may be used to carry out subsection (a).

**SEC. 1236. MODIFICATION OF REPORT ON PROGRESS TOWARD SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN.**

(a) **REPORT REQUIRED.**—Subsection (a) of section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181; 122 Stat. 385) is amended by striking “2010” and inserting “2011”.

(b) **MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED: STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF UNITED STATES ACTIVITIES RELATING TO SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN.**—Subsection (c) of such section is amended—

(1) in paragraph (1)—

(A) by redesignating subparagraph (B) as subparagraph (C); and

(B) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the following new subparagraph:

“(B) A description of commitments or agreements by NATO ISAF countries regarding the following:

“(i) Mutually agreed upon goals.

“(ii) Strategies to achieve such goals.

“(iii) Resource and force requirements.

“(iv) Commitments and pledges of support regarding troops and resource levels.”;

(2) by redesignating paragraphs (2) through (6) as paragraphs (3) through (7), respectively; and

(3) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new paragraph:

“(2) NON-NATO ISAF TROOP-CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES.—A description of commitments or agreements with non-NATO ISAF troop-contributing countries regarding the following:

“(A) Mutually agreed upon goals.

“(B) Strategies to achieve such goals.

“(C) Resource and force requirements.

“(D) Commitments and pledges of support regarding troops and resource levels.”.

(c) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED: PERFORMANCE INDICATORS AND MEASURES OF PROGRESS TOWARD SUSTAINABLE LONG-TERM SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN.—Subsection (d)(2) of such section is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (A), by striking “individual NATO ISAF countries” and inserting “each individual NATO ISAF country”;

(2) by redesignating subparagraphs (C) through (K) as subparagraphs (D) through (L), respectively;

(3) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following new subparagraph:

“(C) With respect to non-NATO ISAF troop-contributing countries, a listing of contributions from each individual country, including levels of troops and equipment, the effect of contributions on operations, and unfulfilled commitments.”;

(4) by redesignating subparagraphs (F) through (L) (as redesignated) as subparagraphs (G) through (M), respectively;

(5) by inserting after subparagraph (E) (as redesignated) the following new subparagraph:

“(F) An assessment of progress in ending the ability of the insurgency (including the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and other anti-government elements), to establish control over the population of Afghanistan or regions of Afghanistan and establish safe havens in Afghanistan, and to conduct attacks inside or outside Afghanistan from such safe havens.”; and

(6) in subparagraph (J) (as redesignated)—

(A) by redesignating clause (ii) as clause (iv); and

(B) by inserting after clause (i) the following:

“(ii) The coordination of reconstruction and development activities in Afghanistan, including—

“(I) the roles of members of the Armed Forces and non-Armed Forces personnel within the staffing of United States-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams;

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“(II) the use of members of the Armed Forces for reconstruction, development, and capacity building programs outside the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense; and

“(III) the coordination between United States-led and other international-led programs to develop the capacity of national, provincial, and local government and other civil institutions as well as reconstruction and development activities in Afghanistan.

“(iii) Unfilled staffing and resource requirements for United States reconstruction, development, and civil institution capacity building programs.”

(d) **CONFORMING AMENDMENT.**—Subsection (d)(2) of such section, as amended, is further amended in subparagraph (K) (as redesignated) by striking “subsection (c)(4)” and inserting “subsection (c)(5)”.

(e) **EFFECTIVE DATE.**—The amendments made by this section shall apply with respect to any report required to be submitted under section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181; 122 Stat. 385) after December 31, 2009.

**SEC. 1237. NO PERMANENT MILITARY BASES IN AFGHANISTAN.**

None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be obligated or expended by the United States Government to establish any military installation or base for the purpose of providing for the permanent stationing of United States Armed Forces in Afghanistan.

### Subtitle C—Other Matters

**SEC. 1241. REPORT ON UNITED STATES ENGAGEMENT WITH IRAN.**

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than January 31, 2010, the President shall submit to Congress a report on United States engagement with Iran. President.

(b) **ELEMENTS.**—The report required by subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) **DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT.**—With respect to diplomatic engagement, the following:

(A) A description of areas of mutual interest to the Government of the United States and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran in which cooperation and discussion could be of mutual interest.

(B) A discussion and assessment of the commitment of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to engage in good-faith discussions with the United States to resolve matters of concern through negotiation.

(C) An assessment of direct contacts between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, including any direct discussions, exchange of letters, or other activities.

(2) **SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM.**—An assessment of the types and amount of support provided by Iran to groups designated by the United States as foreign terrorist organizations and

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(I) the indicators set forth in the Afghanistan Compact, which consist of roads, education, health, agriculture, and electricity; and

(II) unemployment and poverty levels.

(I) For counter-narcotics efforts, an assessment of the activities of the Department of Defense in Afghanistan, as described in subsection (c)(4), and the effectiveness of such activities.

(J) Key measures of political stability relating to both central and local Afghan governance.

(K) For public corruption and rule of law, an assessment of anti-corruption and law enforcement activities at the local, provincial, and national levels and the effectiveness of such activities.

(e) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex, if necessary.

(f) CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFINGS.—The Secretary of Defense shall supplement the report required under subsection (a) with regular briefings to the appropriate congressional committees on the subject matter of the report.

(g) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

**SEC. 1231. UNITED STATES PLAN FOR SUSTAINING THE AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES.**

(a) PLAN REQUIRED.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter through the end of fiscal year 2010, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on a long-term detailed plan for sustaining the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) and the Afghanistan National Police (ANP) of the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF), with the objective of ensuring that a strong and fully-capable ANSF will be able to independently and effectively conduct operations and maintain long-term security and stability in Afghanistan.

(b) COORDINATION.—The report required under subsection (a) shall be prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State.

(c) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required under subsection (a) shall include a description of the following matters relating to the plan for sustaining the ANSF:

(1) A comprehensive and effective long-term strategy and budget, with defined objectives.

(2) A mechanism for tracking funding, equipment, training, and services provided for the ANSF by the United States, countries participating in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan (hereafter in this section referred to as “NATO ISAF countries”), and other coalition forces that are not part of the NATO ISAF.

(3) Any actions to assist the Government of Afghanistan achieve the following goals, and the results of such actions:

(A) Build and sustain effective Afghan security institutions with fully-capable leadership and staff, including a reformed Ministry of Interior, a fully-established Ministry of Defense, and logistics, intelligence, medical, and recruiting units (hereafter in this section referred to as “ANSF-sustaining institutions”).

(B) Train and equip fully-capable ANSF that are capable of conducting operations independently and in sufficient numbers.

(C) Establish strong ANSF-readiness assessment tools and metrics.

(D) Build and sustain strong, professional ANSF officers at the junior-, mid-, and senior-levels.

(E) Develop strong ANSF communication and control between central command and regions, provinces, and districts.

(F) Establish a robust mentoring and advising program, and a strong professional military training and education program, for all ANSF officials.

(G) Establish effective merit-based salary, rank, promotion, and incentive structures for the ANSF.

(H) Develop mechanisms for incorporating lessons learned and best practices into ANSF operations.

(I) Establish an ANSF personnel accountability system with effective internal discipline procedures and mechanisms, and a system for addressing ANSF personnel complaints.

(J) Ensure effective ANSF oversight mechanisms, including a strong record-keeping system to track ANSF equipment and personnel.

(4) Coordination with all relevant departments and agencies of the Government of the United States, as well as NATO ISAF countries and other international partners, including on—

(A) funding;

(B) reform and establishment of ANSF-sustaining institutions; and

(C) efforts to ensure that progress on sustaining the ANSF is reinforced with progress in other pillars of the Afghan security sector, particularly progress on building an effective judiciary, curbing production and trafficking of illicit narcotics, and demobilizing, disarming, and reintegrating militia fighters.

(d) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.