Permissible Arms

Reconsidering Amphibious Warfare

Posted in us military by Karaka on 24 June 2010

I was very amused by this response in the LA Times from LTC Roger Galbraith on reconsidering amphibious warfare for the Marines:

In this age of sophisticated, cheap anti-ship missiles, I understand why one might question the need to assemble hundreds of ships for an Inchon-style beach assault or thousands of ships for another D-Day. As The Times reported in its June 21 article, “U.S. rethinks a Marine Corps specialty: storming beaches,” assaulting a defended beach is seen as a thing of the past. If that is the only perceived mission for the Marine Corps, then why do we even need a Corps?

Well, if not a Corps, then what do we need?

Our nation — a maritime nation — will always need to be involved with populations and crises across seas. What kind of crises and what kind of crisis response force (CRF, for the purposes of this article) will be required to carry out our nation’s interests?

What will the nation want to do? Americans are a law-abiding, free-trading, caring lot, and we like to exhibit these behaviors in our foreign affairs. We want a CRF that can respond to provide humanitarian assistance within a few days of a tragedy to have the greatest chance of saving life and limb. Because many humanitarian crises are caused by armed conflicts, the CRF will need an ability to provide its own security as well as create an umbrella of security for others in a city or small nation.

How large should this CRF be? It should be large enough to make a difference in a city or small nation. It should be able to create several micro-camps or security points that can be assisted and controlled by one headquarters. The new force should be able to support itself with enough transportation, security and supplies to last for at least a couple weeks before help arrives. The actual type of transportation should be able to make a seaport or airport where there are none, as is often the case after a natural disaster or armed conflict.

What is the best way to get to the crisis? Food, water, generators, weapons, trucks and armored vehicles are heavy. In the commercial world, we can see that air transport and sea transport each have their places. Flowers are transported by airplane, while vehicles are moved on ships. So to take a lesson from the civilian companies that transport heavy items for a living, the best way to transport large amounts of heavy items is to do it by sea.

How many crisis response forces should there be? Our CRFs should be positioned within a few thousand miles of each other to ensure an adequate response time. Placing CRFs at those distances around the globe gives you a necessary number of five to seven CRFs. Then multiplying the number of CRFs times three to give an adequate ratio of at-sea time to training and rest time gives you the structure of the total strength of the new crisis response force needed.

So we have done it. We have created a new crisis response force that economically transports itself over the sea, can provide humanitarian assistance and security, can provide for its own transportation and resupply until more help arrives, and can connect the lowest levels of command in the field with national goals and objectives.

I am reminded of the last time our nation had a crisis response force like this: We called them “Marines.”

Now that’s some snappy comeback. Chesty would be proud.

Advertisements

2 Responses

Subscribe to comments with RSS.

  1. Jason said, on 25 June 2010 at 06:34

    I don’t think anyone can argue for the need of a “CRF” like the Marines, but when the Marines act like Army forces – heavy Abrams tanks, desires for Bradleys that float (EFV), going into landlocked countries for years on end – one begins to doubt their “uniqueness.”

    I’m for Marines that act like Marines – designed for 1-3 month quick reaction drills, focused on low-intensity operations, doing small wars like they used to. They’ve lost focus, become too proud as a “separate service” rather than as a part of the joint team.

  2. Karaka said, on 25 June 2010 at 09:18

    I think that’s probably true–in an earlier post on the subject I called it existential paranoia, and I genuinely think that’s a lot of what drives both a quick defence of existing skills as well as a perceived competition with other service branches.

    I think being experts in QRF and rapid insertion, with maybe some operational support for FID, would be the way to balance both the existing skillset and the historical precedent for action. But then you potentially get into some pissing contests with SOCOM.

    Either way, I think it’s probably a net good thing that USMC is doing some debating about, well, what it wants to do.


Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s

%d bloggers like this: